sufficient to demonstrate that Malley's injury was caused by any
policy or custom of the municipal defendants. Furthermore, if
Malley seeks to pursue claims against the agencies of the City,
such as the Board or Corporation Counsel, these departments do
not have the capacity to be sued. See Orraca v. City of New
York, 897 F. Supp. 148, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); N.Y. City Charter
§§ 431-40. Instead, any action against such agencies must be
brought against the City of New York, N.Y. City Charter § 396.
Malley's disregard of this Court's various Orders cannot be
tolerated. Accordingly, his latest action is dismissed.
Furthermore, Malley is reminded that "[p]ro se status does not
confer the right to make frivolous motions and claims."
Glendora v. Ken, 97 Civ. 1131, 98 Civ. 421, 1999 WL 390642, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999). By his own conduct, Malley has
demonstrated his refusal or, perhaps inability, to abide by this
Court's prior admonitions and injunctions. Thus, "`the Court
must find additional methods to make its message clear to
plaintiff.'" Weinstein v. Hatch, No. 98 Civ. 8119, 1998 WL
851581, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1998) (quoting Williams v.
Revlon, Co., 156 F.R.D. 39, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
Consequently, the Court shall extend Judge Keenan's bar order
and hereby prohibit Malley from filing any further complaints in
any federal court pertaining to his employment or subsequent
termination with the New York City Board of Education. The Clerk
of Court is directed to refuse any action filed by Malley in any
federal court unless such filing is accompanied by an
affirmation, attested under penalty of perjury, setting forth
succinctly (1) the facts which gave rise to the action, (2) an
attestation that the case does not relate to his prior
employment with or termination by the Board which he has been
enjoined from further litigating, (3) a petition for leave to
file an action for approval by the assigned Judge, and (4) a
copy of this Order and of Judge Keenan's Order of September 15,
1997. This injunction shall apply regardless of whether
plaintiff seeks to pay the $150.00 filing fee or to proceed in
forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
minimal threshold requirement for all documents presented to the
court, whether offered by counsel or the party, including a pro
se litigant. Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
20 F. Supp.2d 465, 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Jones v. City of
Buffalo, No. 96-CV-0739E(F), 1998 WL 214807, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1998); Jemzura v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 961 F. Supp. 406,
414-15 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Williams v. Revlon Co., 156
F.R.D. 39, 43-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d
Cir. 2000). The fact that a litigant appears pro se does not
shield him from Rule 11 sanctions because "one acting pro se has
no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court
dockets." Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir.
1988) (quoting Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358,
359 (5th Cir. 1986)). Malley's conduct is vexatious, harassing
and frivolous within the meaning of Rule 11. See Revson v.
Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 49 F. Supp.2d 686, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1999). Thus, imposition of monetary sanctions is appropriate.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that this Court's bar order issued on September 15,
connection with Malley v. N.Y. City Bd of Educ., No. 94 Civ.
7186, is extended to prohibit Malley from filing any further
complaints in any federal court pertaining to his employment
with or subsequent termination by the New York City Board of
Education, as well as any other action, unless such filing
complies with the provisions of this Order; and Malley is
ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE by affirmation why monetary sanctions
in the amount of $2,000.00 should not be imposed against him
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Malley shall submit to this Court, within ten (10) days of the
date of this Order, his written affirmation setting forth good
cause why this sanction under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should not be imposed upon him by this Court.
Should Malley fail to submit his affirmation within the time
directed, or should his affirmation fail to set forth good cause
to excuse him from this sanction, the $2,000.00 sanction shall
be imposed. If the $2,000.00 sanction is imposed, no further
filing of any other action by Malley in this Court shall be
accepted by the Clerk of Court, until such sanction is properly
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
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