Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

CARPENTER v. REYNOLDS

July 27, 2002

TERRELL CARPENTER, PETITIONER,
V.
EDWARD REYNOLDS, SUPERINTENDENT 7113(ADS) MOHAWK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MS. DIANE MARTIN (ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY), RESPONDENTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Spatt, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

Terrell Carpenter ("Carpenter" or the "petitioner"), by petition dated October 25, 2001, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Presently before the Court is a motion by Edward Reynolds, the Suffolk County Police Department, and Ms. Diane Martin (collectively, the "respondents") to vacate this Court's December 12, 2001 order directing them to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued and to dismiss the petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P.").

I. BACKGROUND

On May 4, 2001, Carpenter pled guilty to three counts of Robbery in the First Degree (Penal Law § 160.15(4)) in Suffolk County Court (Ohlig, J.). In response to questions from court, the petitioner stated that he was not being treated by a physician or psychiatrist; he was in good health; and he had not taken drugs or had alcohol within the past 24 hours. The petitioner also indicated that he had had sufficient time to speak with his attorney and his family before deciding to plead guilty to the indictment. Counsel for the petitioner stated that "I feel it's within my client's best interest to take this plea to the indictment and receive the five and a half years as opposed to being convicted after trial with a potential of facing a fifty-year sentence" (P. 17).*fn1

In response to further questions by the court, the petitioner stated that on September 20, 2000, he acted in concert with an unidentified person to forcibly steal money from Muhammed Zafar while displaying what appeared to be a firearm. The petitioner also stated that on October 19, 2000, he acted in concert with an unidentified person to forcibly steal money from Mohammed Sajjad while displaying what appeared to be a weapon. The petitioner further stated that on the same date and in the same location, he acted in concert with an unidentified person to forcibly steal property while displaying what appeared to be a firearm.

The petitioner indicated that he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to a jury trial and all attendant rights, including the right be represented by counsel at trial, the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, the right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to testify and call witnesses on his own behalf, and the right to a unanimous verdict of guilty. The petitioner also understood that a guilty plea has the same legal significance of a guilty verdict after trial. He further told the court that his guilty plea was not a result of threats by the police department or District Attorney's Office. The petitioner stated that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. As part of the plea agreement, the petitioner waived his right to appeal.

On June 19, 2001, the petitioner was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. He is presently incarcerated.

In a petition dated October 25, 2001, Carpenter seeks a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Carpenter states that he pled guilty in state court; did not appeal his judgment of conviction; and did not file other petitions, applications, or motions in state or federal court. Carpenter claims that he was convicted because two police officers in the Third Precinct of the Suffolk County Police Department violated his civil and constitutional rights by relying on hearsay, using racial profiling tactics, and conducting an illegal search and seizure. The petitioner argues that the actions of the two police officers violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Carpenter also claims that he only intended to "joyride" in the stolen car and, therefore, his sentence is excessive. In particular, Carpenter argues that he should have received probation or county jail time for his conduct. Carpenter also refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 and requests judgment in the amount of $300 million.

In an order dated December 12, 2001, this Court directed the respondents to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued by filing a return to Carpenter's petition.

In papers dated February 7, 2002, the respondents moved to vacate the Court's December 12, 2001 order and to dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) Carpenter failed to exhaust his claims in state court; and (2) Carpenter's allegations are unintelligible and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. DISCUSSION

At the outset, several of Carpenter's claims are not cognizable under federal habeas corpus review. To the extent that Carpenter seeks a monetary judgment for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, those claims are not properly brought in a habeas corpus petition, which does not permit remuneration for constitutional violations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing that if a petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, a writ of habeas corpus shall issue). Accordingly, Carpenter's claims pursuant to Sections 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 are dismissed without prejudice. If it is money Carpenter seeks, he must file a separate Section 1983 action.

Turning to the remaining portion of the petition, habeas corpus relief is available only where the petitioner has exhausted the remedies available in the state courts or there is "either an absence of available State corrective process; or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). To satisfy this exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must present the substance of the same federal constitutional claims he raises in his federal petition to the highest court in the state. See Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001); Turner v. Artuz, 262 F.3d 118, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2001); Pesina v. Johnson, 913 F.2d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 1990).


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.