general remark made in a dispute between two persons in the
Insofar as Montanile contends that the Court ignored this
alleged statement by Weinman, she is mistaken. The Court
recognized that Montanile had alleged one isolated incident that
fell short of substantiating Weinman's knowledge of Montanile's
complaint to NBC's Employee Relations Department. Against this,
the Court weighed the sworn statements of Weinman that she had
no knowledge of any institutional complaint filed by Montanile
and of Alex McCauley who testified that NBC's Executive Vice
President of Employee Relations specifically instructed all
relevant parties not to discuss the complaint with Weinman and
that none of them did so. Montanile, 2002 WL 1628866, at *5.
Thus, even affording Montanile all reasonable inferences in her
favor, the evidence that Montanile cites in support of her claim
is limited to her own speculations and assumptions.
As to Montanile's claim of employment discrimination, the
Court found that Montanile had failed to present any evidence of
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Id. at *4. Montanile's motion raises nothing to warrant
reconsideration on this claim. None of the alleged changes in
Montanile's terms and conditions of employment — minor changes
in job responsibilities, the relocation of her desk and
cessation of over-time pay — were related in any cognizable way
to Montanile's claims of discrimination.
Furthermore, Montanile appears to ignore the critical analysis
set forth in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
506-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The Defendants
not only demonstrated that Montanile had failed to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination, they also offered convincing
evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their
actions. Thus, in order to survive summary judgment, Montanile
was obliged to present evidence suggesting that the Defendants'
stated reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742. In her opposition papers and in her
motion for reconsideration, Montanile merely rested on her
inferential leaps and speculative assertions. Throughout the
burden-shifting analysis in Title VII cases, the ultimate burden
of proving intentional discrimination lies with the plaintiff.
Montanile failed to carry her burden and the Court found no
evidence that would even suggest circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Montanile's motion for reconsideration pursuant
to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. Nos.
26 & 27] is DENIED.