The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harold Baer, Jr., United States District Judge:
Zao Konversbank ("respondent" or "Konversbank") moves to dismiss the petition to confirm a foreign arbitration award ("petition") filed by petitioner Nedagro B.V. ("petitioner" or "Nedagro"), pursuant to (i) Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction, respectively; and (ii) the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In the alternative, respondent seeks to defer a decision pursuant to Article VI of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards ("Convention"), implemented by 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. For reasons detailed more fully below, respondent's motion to dismiss is denied and the proceeding is adjourned pending resolution of this matter in Russia.
I. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a joint venture agreement between the parties dated October 10, 2000, ("agreement"), Konversbank, a commercial Russian bank with its principal place of business in Moscow, obtained capital and technological contributions from Nedagro, a Dutch corporation. (Ovechlin Decl. ¶ 7). Konversbank does not advertise in the United States and derives no revenues from goods used or consumed or services rendered in the United States. (Id. ¶ 4). Konversbank does not own, possess, lease, use or have any interest in any real estate in the United States; nor does Konversbank transact any business or banking business in the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6). However, Konversbank does maintain certain correspondent accounts in New York with Citibank and Deutsche Bank, which accounts are used to facilitate international banking transactions on behalf of Konversbank' s Russian customers. (Resp.'s memorandum of law at 3). The funds in these accounts do not belong to Konversbank but rather are the property of its Russian customers. (Id.). Paragraph 5.5 of the agreement provides that any dispute relating to the agreement will be governed by the law of the Russian federation. (Id. ¶ 12). All business related to the agreement between the parties was transacted in Russia. Nedagro, although a Dutch corporation, engaged in extensive business activities in Russia, in accordance with the agreement.
On or about November 22, 2000, Konversbank unilaterally cancelled the agreement and suspended all payments to Nedagro without justification. (Petition ¶ 10). On May 21, 2001, Nedagro filed an arbitration claim against Konversbank with the International Court of Commercial Arbitration ("ICCA") at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. (Id.). On January 14, 2002, the ICCA issued an award in favor of Nedagro in the amount of approximately $1.9 million in damages plus interest. (Id. ¶ 12). Specifically, the Russian arbitration panel found that Konversbank unilaterally breached the agreement by ceasing payments to Nedagro for goods and services provided, without justification. (Kondrashin Decl. Ex. A). The panel also found that Konversbank's breach forced Nedagro into bankruptcy in The Netherlands. (Id.). On March 29, 2002, following the ICCA arbitration's panel's finding, petitioner applied to the Moscow City Court for confirmation and execution of the damage award. (Id. Ex. B). However, on April 29, 2002, on the very last day of the three-month period in which to move to set aside an ICCA award, Konversbank filed a petition in the Moscow City Court to set aside the award. (Id. ¶¶ 5 (a-d)). Specifically, Konversbank challenged Nedagro's right to file for arbitration on the following four grounds: (1) that Nedagro assigned its right to do so to another entity; (2) that Nedagro did not validly execute the arbitration agreement; (3) that Nedagro did not validly execute its claim for arbitration; and (4) that the parties' dispute was outside the scope of the governing arbitration clause. (Ovechklin Decl. ¶ 20). Konversbank also challenged enforcement of the award as a violation of public policy under the Russian foreign exchange law and on the grounds that the arbitrators were not impartial and failed to timely disclose material conflicts of interest in violation of the Rules of the ICCA and Russian law. (Id.). Although Konversbank filed its application within the three-month time period, it failed to pay the appropriate fee; consequently, the Moscow City Court permitted Konversbank to re-file the application or else it would be dismissed. (Id.). Rather than comply with this ruling, Konversbank appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Russia on the ground that it could not pay its court fees; the Supreme Court upheld the Moscow City Court's ruling. (Id.). These challenges to the award as well as Nedagro's actions to enforce it were eventually consolidated in the Moscow City Court on July 5, 2002. (Id.). Although a hearing was held on both July 8 and July 24, 2002, no decision was made because in each instance Konversbank made additional demands for documents. (Id.). At the postponed hearing that was held on August 2, 2002, the new judge ordered that the case be transferred to the Moscow Commercial Court, otherwise known as the "Arbitrazh" Court. Although a Dutch bankruptcy court judge had originally appointed a receiver, W.E. Merens, to initiate arbitration proceedings in Russia, the Dutch receiver subsequently retained the law firm of Herrick, Feinstein to assist in confirming and executing on the arbitration award in the United States, where Konversbank was believed to have assets.
Prior to the hearing in the Moscow City Court on August 2, Nedagro sought a provisional remedy of attachment of Konversbank' s assets pending the determination of the enforceability of the ICCA award. By decision dated May 13, 2002, the court dismissed Nedagro's application for provisional remedies on the following grounds: (i) the award was not yet executable as a judgment in Russia; (ii) Nedagro was bankrupt and therefore could not provide an undertaking; and (iii) Konversbank had sufficient assets in Russia to satisfy the award. (Ovechkin Decl. ¶¶ 17-18). Nevertheless, on May 23, 2002, Nedagro filed a petition in this Court and obtained an ex parte order of attachment freezing Konversbank's funds in two New York bank accounts, Citibank and Deutsche Bank. At a preliminary conference with the Court on June 10, 2002, Konversbank agreed to increase the attachment amount from $1.9 million to $2.1 million in the Deutsche Bank account to cover interest due, and the attachment on the Citibank account was released. (Pet.'s memorandum of law at 5). No mention was made at the June 10, 2002 conference that the funds did not belong to Konversbank. (Id.). Konversbank consented to increasing the attached amount and consented to the attachment remaining in place pendente lite. Ultimately, an agreement between the parties with respect to a briefing schedule was submitted and signed by Judge Batts, sifting in Part I of this Court, on June 28, 2002.*fn1
Konversbank's motion to dismiss became sub judice on September 25, 2002, oral argument was heard on November 8, 2002, and supplemental memoranda were received on November 18 and November 22, 2002. By letter dated December 2, 2002, petitioner informed the Court that, by decision dated November 5, 2002, the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow concluded that "there are no grounds for setting aside the Award of the International Court of Commercial Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation of 14th January 2002," and issued a writ of execution for enforcement of the award. (Letter dated December 2, 2002 from Marianne Yen). Konversbank responded on the same day by informing the Court that it had filed a writ of appeal of this decision on November 15, 2002 to the Russian Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District and that, for this reason, the award was not yet enforceable under the Convention. (Letter dated December 2, 2002 from Raymond L. Vandenberg). However, on December 19, 2002, the Russian Federal Arbitration Court reversed and remanded the case to the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow to retry a number of issues, including: (1) whether the ICCA's decision was made within the framework of the arbitration clause; (2) whether the ICCA violated Russian law by directing that the award be paid to the account of a person who was not a party to the proceedings; and (3) whether the ICCA had jurisdiction "for the examination of all claims" made by the petitioner. (Determination of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District Court, at 4). On January 3, 2003, I directed the parties to submit supplemental memoranda on the issues of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, particularly in light of the Russian Federal Arbitration Court's reversal of the lower court's decision, by January 10, 2003.
1. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Article V of the Convention or in the alternative, Adjournment Pursuant to Article V. of the Convention
Among its many stated grounds for dismissal, Konversbank moves to dismiss the petition under Rule 12(b)(1), which provides that a complaint may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to this Rule "when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). The burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction is proper. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, Konversbank contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Convention because the arbitral award is not yet enforceable in Russia, that is, under the law of the arbitral forum. For this reason, Konversbank requests that this Court not only dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but also vacate its order of attachment in recognition of the decisions of the Moscow City Court dated May 13 and May 16, 2002, which dismissed Nedagro's application for the provisional remedy of attachment. (Resp.'s memorandum of law at 6). Alternatively, Konversbank requests that this Court adjourn the petition under Article VI of the Convention until the action is fully adjudicated, and a final decision rendered, in the Russian courts.
Under the Convention and 9 U.S.C. § 201, a contracting state "shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon." (Convention, Article III). Under the Convention, the district court's role in reviewing a foreign arbitration award is strictly limited, so that "[t]he court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention." Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, (2d Cir. 1997), citing 9 U.S.C. § 207. Under Article V, a district court may refuse to confirm a foreign arbitration award only upon a showing that one or more of the following five enumerated grounds exist:
(a) The parties to the agreement were, under the
applicable law, under some incapacity; or the subject
agreement is not valid under the applicable law;
(b) The party opposing the award was not given proper
notice or was otherwise unable to present its case;
(c) The subject of the award falls outside the scope
of the arbitration agreement;
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties or in accordance with the law
of the country; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the
parties. (Convention, Article V).
Recognition and enforcement may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition is sought finds that "(1) [t]he subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (2) [t]he recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." (Convention Article VI(1) — (2)). See also Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 23 (stating that "the Convention is . . . clear that when an action for enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state may refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the Convention").
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit recognized that "[t]he primary defect of the Geneva Convention was that it required an award first to be recognized in the rendering state before it could be enforced abroad, the so-called requirement of `double exequatur.'" 126 F.3d at 22. And, as this Court has remarked, "[t]he Convention clearly manifests a `general pro-enforcement bias.'" Overseas Cosmos, Inc. v. NR Vessel Corp., 1997 WL 757041, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1997) (citing Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974)); accord American Constr. Mach. & Equip. Corp. v. Mechanised Constr. of Pakistan Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 828 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988)). The Yusuf court continued that the double exequatur requirement "was an unnecessary time-consuming hurdle . . . and greatly limited [the Geneva Convention's] utility." 126 F.3d at 22.*fn2 Finally, the party opposing confirmation — here, Konversbank — bears the burden of proving that one of the grounds enumerated in Article V applies. See Overseas Cosmos, 1997 WL 757041, at *2.
In the alternative, respondent seeks to defer a decision on the petition pursuant to Article VI of the Convention, which states that
[i]f an application for the setting aside or
suspension of the award has been made to a competent
authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the
authority before which the award is sought to be
relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn
the decision on the enforcement of the award and may
also, on the application of the party claiming
enforcement of the award, order the other party to
give suitable security. (Convention Article VI).
The crux of the instant dispute with respect to subject matter jurisdiction derives from the parties' interpretation of Article V(1)(e). More precisely, according to Konversbank, the arbitral award is not yet binding — and therefore not enforceable in this Court under Article V(1)(e) of the Convention — because it has not yet been reduced to judgment in Russia. Although the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow concluded that there were no grounds for setting aside the award and issued a writ of execution for enforcement of the award on November 5, 2002, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District reversed and remanded the case to the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow on December 19, 2002 to retry a number of unsettled issues, including whether the ICCA even had jurisdiction to examine all of the claims asserted by the petitioner in the first instance. Petitioner, by contrast, contends that the award is binding under both Russian and United States law. Specifically, petitioner cites ...