Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Buy This Entire Record For
ARNOLD v. GOETZ
February 4, 2003
DAVID ARNOLD, PLAINTIFF,
C.O. A. GOETZ, SGT. A. MONTEGARI, AND C.O. W. KELLY, DEFENDANTS
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Whitman Knapp, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff David Arnold ("Arnold" or the "plaintiff") is an inmate at
the Green Haven Correctional Facility. Arnold, proceeding pro se, brought
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in order to recover damages
for an alleged assault he suffered at the hands of Correctional Officer
A. Goetz, Correctional Officer W. Kelly, and Sergeant A. Montegari
(collectively the "defendants"). The defendants argue that Arnold failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies and thereby failed to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub.L. No. 104-134, Title VIII, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321-71
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) ("PLRA"). As
such, they now move to dismiss Arnold's action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Arnold is an inmate at the Green Haven Correctional Facility. (Am.
Compl. at 2.) On June 22, 2001, Correctional Officer A. Goetz ("Goetz")
ordered Arnold "to lock in." (Am. Compl. at 3.) Thereafter, Goetz
allegedly entered Arnold's cell, grabbed him by the neck, and told Arnold
that he would have "to learn to respect him." (Am. Compl. at 4.) When
Goetz then purportedly pushed Arnold's face towards Goetz's crotch and
told the plaintiff to "suck his penis," Arnold refused and began to
struggle with him. Id. Goetz allegedly responded by beating the
plaintiff. Id. He then led Arnold out of his cell and purportedly threw
him to the floor in such a manner that the plaintiff struck his head.
At this stage, another correctional officer escorted Arnold down some
stairs. Id. While the plaintiff stood facing a wall in handcuffs,
Correctional Officer W. Kelly ("Kelly") and Sergeant A. Montegari
("Montegari") came by to question Arnold regarding his assault against a
staff member. (Am. Compl. at 5.) Before the plaintiff had a chance to
answer their questions, Montegari and Kelly allegedly began to beat him.
Shortly after the plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, the defendants
moved to dismiss this action. They contend that the action must be
dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies in satisfaction of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. When the
plaintiff failed to respond to that motion over the ensuing months, we
issued an order affording him one more opportunity to submit such a
response. See Arnold v. Goetz (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2002) No. 01 Civ. 8993
(WK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24224, at *1-*2. We directed Arnold to submit
an opposition brief, if he so chose, by January 17, 2003. Id. at *2. As
part of that directive, we also allowed Arnold to explain "what he meant
when he indicated in his Amended Complaint that he `did not know what to
do' with respect to submitting a grievance" even though he apparently
knew that a grievance program existed at Green Haven. Id. To date, Arnold
has not submitted an opposition brief and has offered no explanation
regarding his statements in the Amended Complaint.
I. Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The defendants move this Court to dismiss the plaintiff's action
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In other words, they contend that we lack subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain this lawsuit and that the plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Where, as here, the defendants have
moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) as well as on other grounds, we
must initially consider their Rule 12(b)(1) challenge since all other
objections and defenses would become moot and need not be addressed if we
first dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. United
States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United States Tech. Corp. (2d
Cir.) 985 F.2d 1148, 1155-1156, cert. denied (1993) 508 U.S. 973; Rhulen
Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n (2d Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 674,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of
a complaint when the court "lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). However, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional in nature. Graham v. Perez (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
121 F. Supp.2d 317, 322. See also Handberry v. Thompson (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
28, 2003) No. 96 Civ. 6161 (CBM), 2003 WL 194205, at *3 ("the PLRA
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional"); Mendoza v. Goord
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) No. 00 Civ. 146 (GEL), 2002 WL 31654855, at *2
n. 3 ("§ 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional");
Rodriguez v. Ghoslaw (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002) No. 98 Civ. 4658 (GEL),
2002 WL 1424586, at *2 ("Failure to exhaust is not a jurisdictional
matter"); Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) No. 98
Civ. 9009 (WHP), 2000 WL 347155, at *8 ("Exhaustion of administrative
remedies under the PLRA is not jurisdictional"); Santiago v. Meinsen
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) 89 F. Supp.2d 435, 441 ("the exhaustion requirement of
the PLRA is not jurisdictional"); Howard v. Headly (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
72 F. Supp.2d 118, 122-123 ("[T]he Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have held that the administrative exhaustion provision of
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement . . . It is
assumed that the Second Circuit will concur, as the Court does, . . . and
hold, as have all those circuits courts which have considered the issue,
that the statute does not preclude subject matter jurisdiction."); Hayes
v. N.Y.S. D.O.C. Officers (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998) No. 97 Civ. 7383
(MBM), 1998 WL 901730, at *7 n. 4 (internal citations omitted) ("[T]he
vast majority of courts to have considered the issue have concluded that
exhaustion under the PLRA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. In light
of § 1997e(c)(2), these courts are plainly correct.").
Rather, "[w]hen a defendant raises a prisoner's failure to comply with
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the failure is properly assessed as an
affirmative defense." Gonzalez v. Officer in Charge of Barber Shop on
Duty on May 13, 1999 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2000) No. 99 Civ. 3455 (DLC),
2000 WL 274184, at *3. See also Acosta v. Artuz (2d Cir. 2000)
221 F.3d 117, 121 (referring to the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies in compliance with the PLRA as an affirmative defense); Jenkins
v. Haubert (2d Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 19, 28-29 ("Because, under the PLRA, a
prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 1983
suit . . ., a defendant in a prisoner § 1983 suit may also assert as
an affirmative defense the plaintiff's failure to comply with the PLRA's
requirements."); Reyes v. Punzal (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 206 F. Supp.2d 431, 433
("in the Second Circuit, failure to comply with the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement is viewed as an affirmative defense"); John v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Corr. (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 183 F. Supp.2d 619, 624 ("Failure to comply with
the exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense."); Hallett v. New
York State Dep't of Corr. Serv. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 109 F. Supp.2d 190, 196
("[I]n the Second Circuit, failure to comply with the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement is viewed as an affirmative defense."); Cuoco, 2000 WL
347155, at *8 ("Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA
. . . is an affirmative defense."); Howard v. Goord (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
1999) No. 98-CV-7471 (FB), 1999 WL 1288679, at *2 ("When a defendant
raises a prisoner/plaintiff's failure to comply with the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement, the failure is properly assessed as an affirmative
defense."). For that reason, the defense "may be waived by a defendant,
or forfeited by failure to raise the defense." Rodriguez, 2002 WL
1424586, at *2. See also Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr. (7th Cir.
1999) 182 F.3d 532, 536 ("Defendants may waive or forfeit reliance on
§ 1997e(a), just as they may waive or forfeit the benefit of a
statute of limitations."); Graham, 121 F. Supp.2d at 322 ("[T]he
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA . . . may be waived in appropriate
circumstances."). Cf. Davis v. New York (2d Cir. 2002) ___ F.3d ___, 2002
WL 31780920, at *7 (remanding case to district court to consider whether
defendants waived compliance with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by
failing to raise the issue).
Although many courts agree that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite, we are cognizant that this view is not
universally held in our district. A split exists among our fellow courts
with respect to this issue. See Handberry, 2003 WL 194205, at *3; Law v.
Bergamini (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2002) No. 01-CV-463 (LEK/DEP), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25434, at *8 n. 3, approved (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2003) 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 487, at *4-*5. Certain courts in this district have
dismissed an inmate's § 1983 action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in accordance with
Rule 12(b)(1) where they determined that
the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Harris v.
Totten (S.D.N.Y. Jan 31, 2003) No. 01 Civ. 5214 (SHS), 2003 WL 221745, at
*1, *4; Paulino v. Amicucci (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2003) No. 02 Civ. 208
(LAP), 2003 WL 174303, at *2-*3; Timmons v. Pereiro (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2003) No. 00 Civ. 1278 (LAP), 2003 WL 179769, at *1-*2; Cherry v. Edwards
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2002) No. 01 Civ. 7886 (AGS), 2002 WL 31619038, at
*1-*2; Meehan v. Frazier (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2002) No. 01 Civ. 9591 (KMW)
(KNF), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20604, at *11; Benitez v. Straley (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 2002) No. 01 Civ. 181 (RCC) (RLE), 2002 WL 31093608, at *2-*3;
Hines v. Valhalla County Corr. Facility (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2002) No. 01
Civ. 6935 (SAS), 2002 WL 1822740, at *1, *4; Monsalve v. Parks (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2002) No. 01 Civ. 6010 (LMM), 2002 WL 1359725, at *3; Long v.
Lafko (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2001) No. 00 Civ. 723 (VM), 2001 WL 863422, at
*2; Hernandez v. Greiner (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2000) No. 99 Civ. 4601 (NRB),
2000 WL 520639, at *2; Williams v. Muller (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2000) No.
98 Civ. 5204 (BSJ), 2000 WL 487954, at *3. Cf. Johnson v. Bedheim
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2001) No. 00 Civ. 720 (JSR), 2001 WL 799569, at *4;
Rodriguez v. Goord (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2000) No. 99 Civ. 11665 (VM), 2000
WL 1773513, at *1-*2; Lombardo v. Goord (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2000) No. 99
Civ. 1676 (NRB) (KNF), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10476, at *6-*7.
We respectfully disagree with the primary premise underlying these
decisions, namely that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement implicates a
court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Long, 2001 WL 863422, at
*1. Although the Second Circuit has yet to rule on this question, every
circuit court to have considered the issue has concluded that an inmate's
failure to comply with § 1997e(a) does not deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction. See Casanova v. Dubois (1st Cir. 2002) 289 F.3d 142, 146;
Ali v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 2002) 278 F.3d 1, 5-6; Foulk v.
Charrier (8th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 687, 697 (citing Chelette v. Harris
(8th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 684, 686-688, cert. denied (2001) 531 U.S. 1156);
Nyhuis v. Reno (3d Cir. 2000) 204 F.3d 65, 69 n. 4; Wyatt v. Leonard (6th
Cir. 1999) 193 F.3d 876, 869; Rumbles v. Hill (9th Cir. 1999)
182 F.3d 1064, 1068, cert. denied (2000) 528 U.S. 1074; Perez, ...