United States District Court, Southern District of New York
February 6, 2003
ESAU STALEY III, PETITIONER, AGAINST CHARLES GREINER, RESPONDENT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Debra Freeman, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Esau Staley III ("Petitioner") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in New York State Supreme Court, New York County. Upon a jury verdict, Petitioner was found guilty of one count of Attempted Rape in the First Degree and one count of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 15 years on the rape charge and seven years on the sexual abuse count. He is currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility.
Petitioner challenges his conviction and asserts that (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) his arraignment was improperly delayed; (3) the indictment against him was impermissibly amended; and (4) his due process rights were violated because he was not given an opportunity to testify before the grand jury. (See Pet. at § 12.)*fn1 Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed on the grounds that Petitioner's claims are unexhausted, procedurally barred, or without merit. (See Resp. Mem. at 10-17.)*fn2 For the reasons stated below, I recommend that the petition be dismissed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to the testimony at trial, on the morning of October 23, 1995, Bah Fatoumata, ("Fatoumata") a 36-year old woman, arrived at work at the Bebe Hair Braiding Salon at 145 Eighth Avenue in Harlem. (Tr. at 100.)*fn3 She was the first to arrive, so she unlocked the front door. (Id.) The salon's glass door was covered by a large poster, thereby concealing the salon's interior from the street. (Id. at 104, 108.)
Shortly thereafter, Petitioner opened the front door of the salon and began talking to Fatoumata. (Id. at 101.) Fatoumata could not understand what he was saying, but Petitioner gestured in such a way as to indicate that he wanted his hair braided. (Id.) Fatoumata pointed to her watch to indicate that he should come back later. (Id. at 101, 115.) Petitioner then left the salon. (Id.)
Approximately 20 minutes later, Petitioner returned to the salon and began speaking again to Fatoumata. (Id.) Fatoumata testified that she was frightened by Petitioner, so she told him that she did not speak English and again pointed to her watch to indicate that he should come back later. (Id. at 101-02, 117.) Petitioner, however, closed the door and walked towards Fatoumata. (Id. at 102.) Petitioner then grabbed Fatoumata and pulled her onto the floor. (Id.) Fatoumata and Petitioner began to struggle as Petitioner attempted to rape Fatoumata. (Id. at 102-04, 120-130.) Petitioner grabbed a pair of scissors that were nearby, and attempted to cut Fatoumata's pants, and to stab her in the neck. (Id. at 102, 124.) After a struggle over the scissors, Petitioner cut Fatoumata's face near her right eye. (Id. at 104.) During the struggle, Fatoumata managed to rip one of the posters off the glass door, hoping that someone on the street would then see and help her. (Id. at 104-05, 235.)
At some point between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. that morning, Lacine Kamara ("Kamara") was bringing his girlfriend, Mawa Kata ("Kata"), to work at the salon. (Id. at 248.) He saw that the poster had been pulled down, and spotted two feet on the ground inside the store with the toes pointing up. (Id. at 248-50.) Kamara and Kata approached the salon to investigate. (Id. at 250.) When Kata pushed the door open, Petitioner got up and ran from the store. (Id. at 251.) After spotting Fatoumata in the store, covered with blood, Kamara chased after Petitioner. (Id. at 251-52.) He was joined by some uniformed police officers and one of them, Police Officer Guillermina Tavares ("Tavares"), apprehended Petitioner. (Id. at 252, 260-61.)
Kamara returned to the salon immediately after Petitioner was taken into custody. (Id. at 252.) Tavares arrived at the salon shortly thereafter. (Id. at 261-62.) At that time, she found Fatoumata lying on the ground outside of the store near the scissors, which Tavares collected as evidence. (Id. at 262-65.) Fatoumata had a cut by her right eye, and acted as if she were in shock. Since she did not speak English, Fatoumata was unable to tell the police what had happened. (Id. at 134, 263.) A bystander told Tavares that Petitioner had tried to rob Fatoumata. (Id. at 272.)
Fatoumata was taken by ambulance to Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, where she was met by her husband and brother. (Id. at 193-94.) With her family interpreting, Fatoumata told the hospital staff what had happened. (Id. at 194-95.) On November 8, 1995, Fatoumata picked Petitioner out of a line-up. (Id. at 167.)
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Trial Proceedings
On October 24, 1995, the day after his arrest, Petitioner was taken to Criminal Court, Supreme Court, New York County, to be arraigned on a felony complaint. (See Respondent's Affidavit in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, sworn to April 1, 2002 ("Resp. Aff."), Ex. G.) The government asserts that Petitioner was, in fact, arraigned on October 24, although his case was then adjourned to October 27, in order to determine whether the grand jury would return an indictment against him. (See Resp. Mem. at 13.) It appears from the record that the government is correct on this point, and it also appears that counsel appeared for Petitioner at the time of his arraignment on October 24. (Resp. Aff., Exs. G and M.) Petitioner, however, disputes that he was arraigned on October 24, contending that he was not actually arraigned until October 27. (See Resp. Aff., Exs. F and G.)
On November 1, 1995, Petitioner was indicted on one count each of first degree rape, sexual abuse, and second degree-burglary. On April 10, 1996, the burglary count was dismissed.*fn4 On May 2, 1996, a Wade/Huntley hearing was held before the Honorable Franklin R. Weissberg.*fn5 (See Resp. Mem. at 6; Resp. Aff., Exs. A and B.) In that hearing, Petitioner moved to suppress his post-arrest statements and the victim's identification testimony. (Id.) On May 16, 1996, Justice Weissberg denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the identification evidence, but granted a portion of Petitioner's motion to suppress his statements. (Id.)
B. Jury Selection and Trial
Petitioner was tried by a jury from May 20, 1996, through May 23, 1996. At trial, the prosecution's witnesses were Fatoumata, Kamara, Tavares, and Detective John Savino. Petitioner presented no witnesses and did not testify on his own behalf. On May 23, 1996, the jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree rape and first degree sexual abuse. (Tr. at 391.) On June 10, 1996, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 15 years on the rape charge and seven years on the sexual abuse count. See People v. Staley, 262 A.D.2d 30, 30, 692 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1999).
C. Direct Appeal
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, First Department. On appeal, he raised the following two claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's request to call Fatoumata to testify at the Wade hearing; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial based on the interpreter's alleged mis-translation of Fatoumata's testimony. (See Resp. App. Ex. B.) On September 30, 1999, the Appellate Division affirmed Petitioner's conviction. See People v. Staley, 262 A.D.2d 30, 692 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1999). In its opinion, the Appellate Division concluded that the "hearing court properly denied defendant's request for the complainant to testify at the Wade hearing." 262 A.D.2d at 30, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Additionally, the Appellate Division held that Petitioner "failed to establish that there was any error in the translation of the complainant's testimony." Id., 692 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
Petitioner sought leave to appeal the affirmance of his conviction. (See Resp. App. Ex. D.) On June 28, 1999, leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. See People v. Staley, 93 N.Y.2d 979, 695 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1999).
D. Petitioner's Motion To Vacate The Conviction
On June 27, 2000, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to vacate the judgment pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 440.10(1)(h). (See Resp. Aff. Ex. F.) Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that his trial attorney failed: (1) to challenge an alleged 72-hour delay between the time of Petitioner's arrest and his arraignment; (2) to challenge the legality of the initial accusatory instrument, which, according to Petitioner, contained charges different than those upon which he was indicted; (3) to advise Petitioner of his right to testify before the grand jury; and (4) to challenge the trial court's ruling concerning alleged errors of translation by the official court interpreter. (See id.) The State opposed Petitioner's motion on November 6, 2000. (See id., Ex. G.)
By written opinion dated December 13, 2000, the trial court denied Petitioner's Section 440.10 motion, stating:
Despite some apparent confusion on defendant's part, the
record clearly reveals that defendant was arraigned in a
timely manner. Defendant also asserts that his trial
lawyer was ineffective in failing to challenge the
legality of the felony complaint. Regardless of the
sufficiency of the felony complaint, however, the return
of an indictment by the Grand Jury served to cure any
alleged defect. As such, defendant's trial attorney's
failure to raise these issues below did not constitute
In addition, defendant claims [sic] that his attorney
was ineffective because he failed to inform him of his
right to testify before the Grand Jury is similarly
denied. Assuming arguendo that this claim is true, a
point which the People do not concede, a failure to
effectuate a defendant's alleged desire to testify
before a Grand Jury does not rise to a deprivation of
meaningful representation. (citation omitted).
Finally, the remaining purported error by the trial
court, which involved the accuracy of the court
interpreter's translation, was already unsuccessfully
raised on direct appeal. As the underlying error
complained of by the defendant was not error at all, it
clearly cannot be used to form the basis for a finding of
ineffectiveness of counsel.
(Id., Ex. H.)
On March 20, 2001, the Appellate Division denied Petitioner's motion for leave to appeal the denial of his Section 440.10 motion. (See id., Ex. K.) The instant petition followed.
1. Legal Standards
A federal court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted all state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Dorsey v. Kelly, 112 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1997). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must have "fairly presented" his claims to the state courts, thereby affording those courts the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of . . . [a] prisoner's federal rights." Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (citation omitted).
The standards for presenting federal constitutional claims to state courts are not so stringent as to require the recitation of "book and verse on the federal constitution." Picard, 404 U.S. at 278 (citation omitted). However, the state courts must be "apprised of `both the factual and the legal premises of the claim [the petitioner] asserts in federal court.'" Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Daye v. Attorney Gen., 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc)). Petitioners can ensure that state courts are "alerted to the fact that [they] are asserting claims under the United States Constitution," Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995), by presenting their claims in a fashion demonstrating either
(a) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing
constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases
employing constitutional analysis in like fact
situations, (c) [an] assertion of the claim in terms
so particular as to call to mind a specific right
protected by the Constitution, [or] (d) [an]
allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within
the mainstream of constitutional litigation.
Daye, 696 F.2d at 194; accord Petrucelli v. Coombe, 735 F.2d 684
, 688 (2d Cir. 1984). Once the state courts are apprised of the constitutional nature of a petitioner's claims, the exhaustion requirement is generally fulfilled when those claims have been presented to "the highest court of the pertinent state." Bossett v. Walker, 41 F.3d 825
, 828 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
2. Petitioner Has Presented a "Mixed" Petition.
In this case, it appears that Petitioner has presented a "mixed petition," containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001).
Petitioner's first claim alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim Petitioner raised previously in his Section 440.10 motion. As noted above, Petitioner asserted in that motion that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge certain purported constitutional violations involving, inter alia, the timing of Petitioner's arraignment, the appropriateness of the indictment on which he was tried, and the conduct of the grand jury proceedings. When Petitioner's Section 440.10 motion was denied by the trial court, Petitioner sought leave to appeal the denial of that motion to the Appellate Division. Once the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal, Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim was exhausted for purposes of habeas review. See Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981) ("no appeal to the New York Court of Appeals lies from an order denying a motion for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division"), overruled on other grounds by Daye, 696 F.2d at 195; Jackson v. Moscicki, No. 99 Civ. 2427 (JGK), 2000 WL 511642 at *5 (Apr. 27, 2000) (petitioner exhausted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by raising it in a Section 440.10 motion and seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division). Therefore, to the extent the ineffective assistance claim now being asserted by Petitioner is the same as the claim he asserted in his Section 440.10 motion, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.*fn6
In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner is now also directly challenging three of the alleged constitutional violations that formed the predicate of the ineffective assistance claim that he raised in his Section 440.10 motion. Because he never previously raised any of these alleged violations as separate and distinct claims — either in the Section 440.10 motion itself or on direct appeal — these additional claims are arguably all unexhausted. See Turner v. Artuz, 262 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A court considering ineffective assistance might never reach the underlying constitutional claims, and the rejection of the ineffective assistance claims without detailed comment does not bespeak any necessary ruling on the underlying constitutional claims."). Nonetheless, it seems appropriate, under Turner, to consider one of these additional claims exhausted, in that the trial court effectively ruled on it, on the merits, in the context of the court's decision rejecting the ineffective assistance claim. See id. (expressly declining to address the situation where the state court clearly analyzed the merits of an underlying claim). More specifically, and as quoted above, the trial court held that Petitioner's counsel had not been ineffective for failing to object to an unconstitutional delay in Petitioner's arraignment, because, as a factual matter, there was no delay in arraignment. (See supra at 6.) Because the trial court actually addressed the purported delay, that particular underlying claim should be viewed as exhausted. The other two underlying claims, however, should be considered unexhausted, as they were never presented as separate claims — or separately analyzed — by the state court.
2. Petitioner's Unexhausted Claims Should Be Deemed Exhausted and
When ruling on a mixed petition, the Court may choose (1) to reach the merits of all claims in the petition — including the unexhausted claims — as long as the Court denies the claims on the merits, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2000); (2) to stay the petition and allow the petitioner a "reasonable" period of time to return to state court, exhaust the claims, and return to federal court, Zarvela, 254 F.3d at 381; (3) to dismiss the petition without prejudice to the petitioner's ability to re-file after exhausting the unexhausted claims, id. at 380; or (4) to "deem" the claims exhausted, provided that the unexhausted claims no longer can be raised in state court, see Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346
, 351 (1989); Bossett v. Walker, 41 F.3d 825
, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117
, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
In this instance, Petitioner could have raised his unexhausted claims in his one opportunity for direct appeal,*fn7 but did not do so. For this reason, he is now foreclosed from raising the claims collaterally in another Section 440.10 motion. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 440.10(2)(c) (barring collateral review of claims that could have been raised on direct appeal). Petitioner also cannot seek state review of his unexhausted claims pursuant to either a writ of error coram nobis, see People v. Gordon, 183 A.D.2d 915, 584 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dep't 1992) (coram nobis relief only available for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel) (citation omitted), or a state writ of habeas corpus, see People ex rel. Allah v. Leonardo, 170 A.D.2d 730, 565 N.Y.S.2d 331 (3d Dep't 1991) (state writ of habeas corpus unavailable where claim could have been raised on direct appeal) (citations omitted). Because Petitioner now has no procedural recourse to New York's courts to advance his unexhausted claims, those claims are appropriately deemed exhausted. See Bossett, 41 F.3d at 828-29; Grey, 933 F.2d at 120-21.
When, however, a claim is deemed exhausted because of a procedural bar, "the procedural bar that gives rise to exhaustion provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence, and thus prevents federal habeas corpus review of the defaulted claim." Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); see also Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 2001). The only ways that Petitioner can overcome the procedural bar to review in this Court are to show (1) both "cause" for failing properly to raise the claim in state court and "prejudice" resulting from the alleged constitutional error, or (2) that the failure to address the claim on habeas would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). In this case, Petitioner cannot satisfy either standard, with respect to either of his unexhausted claims.
"Cause" for a procedural default is established when "some objective factor external to the defense" impeded the petitioner's efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Ayuso v. Artuz, No. 99 Civ. 12015 (AGS) (JCF), 2001 WL 246437, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001). Cause for a default exists where a petitioner can show that (1) "the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel," (2) "`some interference by state officials' made compliance [with the procedural rule] impracticable," or (3) "the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." Bossett v. Walker, 41 F.3d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "Prejudice" requires Petitioner to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional error worked to Petitioner's "actual and substantial disadvantage." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original).
Here, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any "cause" for his procedural defaults. He has not shown, and cannot show, that the factual or legal bases for his defaulted claims were not reasonably available at the time of his direct appeal. Nor has Petitioner alleged, and there is no evidence suggesting, that his failure to raise the claims on direct appeal resulted from either interference by state officials or ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. As Petitioner cannot show cause for his procedural defaults, this Court need not reach the question of whether Petitioner can show prejudice. See Stepney v. Lopes, 760 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Since a petitioner who has procedurally defaulted in state court must show both cause and prejudice in order to obtain federal habeas review, we need not, in light of our conclusion that there was no showing of cause, reach the question of whether or not [petitioner] showed prejudice.").
The Court may also excuse a procedural default where the petitioner "can demonstrate a sufficient probability that our failure to review his federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). This exception, however, is quite narrow; it is "concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence." Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992). Thus, to meet this standard, a petitioner must show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. "To be credible, [a claim of actual innocence] requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). In this case, Petitioner has offered no evidence, scientific or otherwise, showing his actual innocence. Therefore, Petitioner has not made an adequate showing to satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Accordingly, Petitioner's unexhausted claims should be dismissed as procedurally barred.
Moreover, as discussed further below (see infra at 19-22), Petitioner's unexhausted claims should be dismissed in any event, because they do not actually raise federal constitutional issues, and thus they are not cognizable on habeas review.
B. Standard of Review
Where the state court has reached the merits of a claim, this Court must apply a deferential standard in reviewing that claim in a habeas proceeding. Specifically, this Court must adhere to the standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), the relevant portion of which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim
— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition, under AEDPA, where not manifestly unreasonable, a state court's factual findings are presumed correct, and can only be overcome by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of AEDPA Section 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law where the state court either applies a rule that "contradicts the governing law" set forth in Supreme Court precedent, id. at 405, or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision" and arrives at a different result, id. at 406. An "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law occurs when the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle, but unreasonably applies that principle to the particular facts before it. Id. at 413. The Supreme Court has explained that "the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410. Thus, the writ may not issue simply because the state court decision is erroneous or incorrect; rather, the application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411.
AEDPA Section 2254(d), however, only applies to the review of claims that have been "adjudicated on the merits" by the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Second Circuit has held that the phrase "adjudicated on the merits" means "a decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground." Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001). Where the state court has rejected a claim on procedural grounds or has otherwise not reached the merits of the claim, this Court must review that claim de novo. See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 2001).
C. Petitioner's Claims
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To the extent the state court adjudicated Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits on Petitioner's Section 440.10 motion, this Court must review that determination under AEDPA's deferential standard of review. Applying that standard of review, the Court should dismiss the claim.
The right to counsel in criminal prosecutions is grounded in the Sixth Amendment. Because the Constitution "envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results[,] . . . `the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)). Counsel can deprive a criminal defendant of this right "simply by failing to render `adequate legal assistance.'" Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
In order for counsel to be deemed constitutionally "ineffective," however, counsel's conduct must have "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. Petitioner can demonstrate such ineffectiveness by showing both that: (1) counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and (2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694. The Court may reject an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to satisfy either of these prongs of the Strickland standard, without reaching the other. See id. at 697 ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed."); see also Morales v. United States, 199 F.3d 1322 (Table), No. 98-3700, 1999 WL 1015641, at *1 (2d Cir. 1999) (court did not address "whether appellant's trial counsel was unreasonably deficient in his performance because any deficiency in this regard did not prejudice appellant").
Here, if Petitioner is resting his ineffective assistance claim on the contention that his trial counsel failed to challenge an alleged 72-hour delay between the time of Petitioner's arrest and arraignment, then Petitioner cannot meet the Strickland standard because he is relying on an incorrect factual premise. In ruling on Petitioner's Section 440.10 motion, the trial court found that, despite "apparent confusion" on the part of Petitioner, the record "clearly reveal[ed]" that Petitioner had been arraigned in a "timely manner." (See Resp. Mem. Ex. H.) Under AEDPA, this factual finding is "presumed correct" and can only be overcome by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Not only has Petitioner failed to present any evidence to rebut this factual finding, but this Court's own review of the documentary record regarding Petitioner's arraignment reveals that Petitioner was initially arraigned on October 24, 1995, the day after he was arrested, and that he was represented by a lawyer at his arraignment. (See Resp. Aff., Exs. G and M.)*fn8
As this Court must accept as correct the state court's finding that there was no unreasonable delay in Petitioner's arraignment, it cannot be said that Petitioner's counsel acted unreasonably in failing to challenge the alleged delay. Nor can it be said that the state court's resulting rejection of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner is asserting such a claim here, it should be dismissed under AEDPA.*fn9
2. Speedy Arraignment
Petitioner also claims that the alleged 72-hour delay before his arraignment was itself a constitutional violation. Liberally construed, this claim could be read to suggest that the alleged delay implicated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See Holmes v. Bartlett, 810 F. Supp.2d 550, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (analyzing claim by habeas petitioner of delay between arrest and arraignment as an alleged violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial). As already discussed, however, the trial court found, and the record reflects, that Petitioner was actually arraigned within one day of his arrest. Under the circumstances, Petitioner can have no basis for arguing any constitutional violation.
Indeed, even if Petitioner were correct that 72 hours elapsed before he was arraigned, he would still have no grounds to complain that this violated a constitutional right. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the following four factors must be considered in determining whether a defendant' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether or not the defendant asserted his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530-33. The Court noted that "[t]he length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Id. at 530. In this case, Petitioner's bases his claim solely on the length of the alleged 72-hour period between his arrest and arraignment. This delay is not "presumptively prejudicial." See United States v. Vassell, 970 F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that any delay over eight months is presumptively prejudicial, while a delay of less than five months is not); United States v. Ballam, 70 F.3d 1280, 1995 WL 710498 at *2 (9th Cir. 1995) (text in Westlaw) (stating that "[t]he judicial consensus of how much time must go by before a delay is presumed prejudicial ranges from eight months . . . to one year"); United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp. 481, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a delay of 20 days was not presumptively prejudicial).
Moreover, in Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit held that delays of 72 hours between arrest and arraignment in the New York City criminal justice system do not violate the right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to obtain a probable cause determination within a "brief" period of time after arrest. See id. (holding that "the procedural benefits provided to arrestees under New York City's arraignment system justify constitutionally arrest-to-arraignment periods of seventy-two hours in length"). Thus, if Petitioner's claim is based on the Fourth Amendment, it would fail under Williams.
For these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the state court's rejection of this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
3. Petitioner's Remaining Claims
Petitioner's last two claims relate to the conduct of the state grand jury proceedings. Specifically, Petitioner claims that (a) the original indictment against him was impermissibly amended, and (b) he was unfairly denied the opportunity to testify before the grand jury. (Pet. §§ 12(C) and (D).) As discussed above (see supra at 10-13), these claims are unexhausted and procedurally barred. Further, they cannot be reviewed in this Court, as they do not implicate federal constitutional rights.
a. Amendment of the Indictment
According to Petitioner, the assistant district attorney went to the grand jury with robbery charges on October 27, 1995, but then determined that robbery charges were not warranted. (See Pet. §§ 12(B) and (C).) On November 1, 1995, Petitioner was indicted on different charges, i.e. on one count each of first degree rape, sexual abuse, and second degree-burglary. (See Pet. § 12(C).) Based on these allegations, Petitioner contends that the indictment against him was improperly amended. (Id.) Respondent, however, asserts that Petitioner has misunderstood the relevant proceedings. (See Resp. Mem. at 15.) Respondent contends that, in claiming that the indictment "broaden[ed] and altered" the initial charges against him (Pet. § 12(C)), Petitioner must be referring to the fact that the felony complaint against him included a different charge (i.e. robbery) than the charges ultimately contained in the indictment (i.e. first degree rape, sexual abuse, and second-degree burglary). (See Resp. Mem. at 15.) Respondent asserts that the prosecution properly submitted to the grand jury the charges on which Petitioner was eventually indicted, and that the indictment itself was never amended. (Id.)
It appears that, in deciding Petitioner's Section 440.10 motion, the state court accepted Respondent's version of events. (See Resp. Mem. Ex. H (finding that "return of an indictment by the Grand Jury served to cure any alleged defect" in the original felony complaint).) Any such factual finding by the state court is presumed correct under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Yet regardless of whether the state court entirely resolved the relevant factual issue, Petitioner does not relate his claim to a federal constitutional violation (see Pet. § 12(C) (contending only that the indictment was amended), and therefore his claim is not cognizable on habeas review.
It may be that Petitioner is attempting to argue, as he did in his Section 440.10 motion, that the purported amendment to his indictment violated his right "to be tried only on charges brought by the Grand Jury indictment." (See Resp. Aff., Ex. F, at 11-12.) Yet if this is Petitioner's argument on habeas review, his claim still fails. The right to have state charges presented to a grand jury is a state-created right, not a federal right. Rodriguez v. Senkowski, No. 92 Civ. 5484, 1995 WL 347024, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 1995) (rejecting challenge to a state trial court's amendment of an indictment). Accordingly, "any alleged impropriety in the amendment of the indictment is predicated on state law, and is therefore beyond this Court's review." Id.; see also Medina v. Herbert, No. 98 Civ. 1871, 1998 WL 799173 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1998) ("In general, challenges to the sufficiency of a state indictment are not issues cognizable on habeas review.").
b. Deprivation of Right To Testify Before the Grand Jury
Petitioner finally claims that his due process rights were violated because he was never given the opportunity to testify before the grand jury. (Pet. § 12(D).) Once again, however, any alleged defects in the state grand jury process are not cognizable on habeas review. See Lopez v. Riley, 865 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that claims concerning state grand jury proceedings are foreclosed from habeas review because "any error in the grand jury proceeding was rendered harmless beyond reasonable doubt by the petit jury's guilty verdict"); Afflic v. New York, No. 01 Civ. 6152, 2002 WL 500373 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2002) ("Petitioner's claim that he was not advised of his right to appear before the Grand Jury does not present an issue of constitutional dimension, but merely one of state law"); McMoore v. Miller, No. 98 Civ. 1915, 2002 WL 975305 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2002) (dismissing habeas claim based on petitioner's failure to testify before the grand jury because "[petitioner's] right to testify before a grand jury is based solely on state law, the wrongful denial of that right does not entitle him to a federal writ of habeas corpus") (emphasis in original).
As Petitioner's claim does not implicate a federal constitutional right, it cannot be reviewed in this Court, and should be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed in its entirety. Further, I recommend that the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), because Petitioner has not "made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1340, New York, New York 10007, and to the chambers of the undersigned, United States Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, Room 631, New York, New York, 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Rakoff. FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 22 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983).