The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles S. Haight, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Respondent Elliot L. Spitzer, the Attorney General of the State of New
York, opposing Williams' petition, contends that federal habeas relief is
not available to Williams as a matter of law because (1) federal habeas
review is foreclosed when a state court expressly relies on a state
procedural default as an adequate and independent ground for denying
petitioner relief, circumstances respondent avers exist in the case at
bar; and (2) in any event, Williams' petition is barred by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") since
Williams cannot show, as the statute requires, that the state court
judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).
Respondent's second contention, based on the AEDPA, poses the question
whether the Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971), which considered the constitutional due process
implications of a prosecutor's promise given to induce an individual to
plead guilty, should be extended to the breach of a prosecutor's promise
given to induce an individual to cooperate with law enforcement after
having pleaded guilty. On that point this appears to be a case of first
impression.
In 1993 petitioner Trumont Williams belonged to the C & C criminal
organization, a violent group that operated in the Williamsburg area of
the Bronx. C & C assigned street locations to drug dealers and
charged the dealers for "rent" and protection services, which included
the murder of rival dealers who did not deal with C & C. A summary of
the C & C organization's activities may be found in United States v.
Padilla, 203 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2000). Petitioner was a member of C &
C's "security" forces and participated in several organization-related
murders.
Initially the C & C organization and its members were investigated
and charged by the Bronx District Attorney. Petitioner was indicted in
the New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, for a number of murders
and attempted murders. Plea negotiations ensued. Eventually petitioner
entered into a plea agreement with the state prosecutors. Petitioner
promised to provide information and testimony with respect to C & C.
In return, the state prosecutors agreed to accept petitioner's plea of
guilty to two separate murder charges, to recommend to the state trial
court an agreed-upon sentencing range with respect to those two murders,
and to forego prosecution of three other murders and two attempted
murders for which petitioner had been indicted. Resp. Aff. at 3; Pet.
Mem. at 5, A. 1-22.*fn1
This promised sentence is in exchange for Mr.
Williams' full cooperation in the prosecution of any
and all matters under investigation now or in the
future. Mr. Williams will hold himself available to
testify at any stage, in any forum where the
prosecution deems it necessary to call him as a
witness. Mr. Williams will testify in a truthful,
forthright and candid manner whenever he is called to
testify.
Pet. Mem. at A. 6. In return for that cooperation, the state prosecutors
agreed to recommend two concurrent sentences with minimum terms between
15 and 25 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.*fn2 The prosecutors
further agreed to make known to the sentencing court the extent of
petitioner's cooperation pursuant to the agreement. A. 7, 17-19.
Petitioner was retained in state custody.
Eventually the depredations of the C & C organization became the
subject of a joint federal-state law enforcement task force
investigation. A federal indictment charging petitioner and numerous
other C & C members under, inter alia, the criminal RICO statute was
filed in this Court bearing docket number 94 Cr. 313 and assigned to me
for trial and related proceedings. In January 1994 petitioner was
transferred from state custody to the federal Metropolitan Correctional
Center. Federal prosecutors, who were working with state prosecutors
designated as special federal assistants in preparing the case for
trial, advised petitioner of their desire to obtain his cooperation as
well.
In support of the present petition. Williams asserts that in the spring
of 1994 he learned that he was HIV positive. The shortened life
expectancy resulting from this diagnosis caused petitioner to become
concerned that he would derive no benefit from his plea agreement with
the state, which subjected him to a minimum sentence of 15 years.
Petitioner says in an affidavit that "I understood that my life
expectancy was reduced substantially," and that "I knew that if I was
sentenced to a period of time of somewhere between 15 years and life that
I would probably die in prison," A. 33, 34-35, a fate that would come to
pass if petitioner pleaded to a federal charge (as the federal prosecutors
were insisting that he do) and then had to serve the 15 years to life
state sentence to which he had agreed as part of the 1993 state plea
bargain. It had also become clear to petitioner by this time that his
state case would not be transferred to federal court and folded into a
new federal indictment.
In these circumstances, petitioner avers, further discussions took
place between petitioner, his federal attorney, federal prosecutors, state
prosecutors, and city detectives. Petitioner says in his affidavit:
Before pleading guilty in federal court to
racketeering charges, including murder, I talked with
the detectives and prosecutors what would happen me
[sic] and to my state case. In front of federal and
state prosecutors and my attorney, I was told by New
York City detectives that I should not worry about my
Bronx case because it would be taken care of. It was
obvious to me that all these people at these
discussions were aware that I was being told that I
would not get a greater penalty in the Bronx case
should I continue my cooperation with the joint
federal and state prosecution. . . .
I was told that the way for me to receive less than 15
years to life in the Bronx County would be for my
pleas to murder in the second degree to be vacated and
for me to be allowed to plea [sic] to manslaughter in
the first degree. I was explained to this by Mr.
Barocas and some of the prosecutors. Since this was
the only way not to get a 15 to life sentence, I
assumed that the promises made that I would be taken
care of and not "fucked" meant that I would be allowed
to withdraw my plea to the murder charges and be
sentenced after pleading guilty to manslaughter in the
first degree.
A. 33-35. These assurances and reassurances were oral. They were neither
memorialized nor mentioned in any writing. Petitioner does not contend
otherwise.*fn3
Petitioner continued his cooperation with the federal prosecutors and
the state prosecutors assisting them. On November 23, 1994, petitioner
pleaded guilty to a superseding criminal information in this Court, S6 94
Cr. 313. While petitioner did not testify at the trials generated by the
federal C & C indictment, he gave valuable cooperation to the
prosecutors. Assistant United States Attorney Margery Feinzig submitted a
5K1.1 letter to me before I sentenced petitioner on his federal plea.*fn4
She stated that with his inside knowledge of how the organization
operated, petitioner had "played an essential role in the Government's
investigation and prosecution of the members of C & C"; she credited
petitioner's cooperation with leading to the conviction of twenty
defendants in all. AUSA Feinzig added that petitioner had provided
"valuable information that led to the prosecution of numerous extremely
dangerous individuals," and that by doing so, had placed himself "at
grave risk." Having come to know members of the C & C organization, I
have no trouble believing that assertion.*fn5
On January 29, 1997, I sentenced petitioner to a three-year term of
imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. During the
sentencing hearing I recommended (having no power to make an order) that
when the state court imposed the state sentence on petitioner, it be made
to run concurrently with the federal sentence.*fn6
Petitioner was again brought before the state court for sentencing on
his initial 1993 plea to the two state murder charges. The state
prosecutors refused to consent to petitioner withdrawing his plea to the
murder charges and substituting a plea of guilty to manslaughter, stating
that they would continue to recommend that the state court impose the
minimum 15 year term of imprisonment contemplated by the 1993 plea
agreement. Dissatisfied with that response, petitioner moved
unsuccessfully in the state trial court for an order permitting him to
withdraw his original plea or, in the alternative, for specific
enforcement of the state prosecutors' "new promises." Pet. Main Brief at
12. On August 5, 1999 Justice Marcus, accepting the recommendation of the
prosecutors, sentenced petitioner to two terms of 15 years to life, to run
concurrently with each other and with the previously imposed federal
sentence.
The state courts have denied petitioner any post-sentencing relief, in
rulings further described in Part II.A., infra. This federal habeas
petition followed. Petitioner's constitutional claim is that his due
process rights were violated when the state trial court refused either to
enforce the promise the state prosecutors made to him to induce his
continued cooperation with the federal prosecutors, or to permit him to
withdraw his state guilty plea. As for relief, petitioner asks this Court
to direct the state court "to either (i) specifically enforce the promise
by permitting petitioner to withdraw his current plea and to re-plead to
first-degree manslaughter with a minimum sentence of no more than 10
years' incarceration; (ii) permit petitioner to withdraw his guilty
plea; or (iii) immediately release petitioner from custody." Main Brief at
29-30.
Respondent raises a threshold procedural bar to this habeas petition.
He argues that the state courts rested their judgments on an adequate and
independent state ground, thereby precluding this ...