Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action
Plaintiff's Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action, which are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986, respectively, incorporate by reference all of the preceding allegations of the Cameron II complaint. In the Seventh Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to deprive him of rights for reasons that were racially or politically discriminatory or retaliatory; in the Eighth Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants knew of the conspiracy and failed to prevent it. The underlying deprivations of rights were, as shown at length above, the subject of Cameron I. The core elements of these claims thus rest on the same transactions and occurrences that underlay Cameron I. They are barred by res judicata.
Clearly, "the facts essential to [the Cameron II proceeding] were already present in [Cameron I]." Kiryas Joel, 207 F.3d 105, 110-11 (citation omitted); Carr v. Health Ins. Plan, 111 F. Supp.2d 403, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Because Plaintiff's Cameron II claims are ones that were resolved on their merits in Cameron I, Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing them here. Res judicata operates to preclude claims, rather than particular configurations of parties; Plaintiff's addition of new defendants, in the context of allegations of their involvement in the series of alleged deprivations, does not entitle him to revive the previously-dismissed claims. See Waldman v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp.2d 370, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (government officials are in privity with the governmental entity that they serve for purposes of preclusion analysis); Official Publications v. Kable News, 811 F. Supp. 143, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Where the `new' defendants are sufficiently related to one or more of the defendants in the previous action which arise from the same transaction all defendants may invoke res judicata."). The complaint will therefore be dismissed in its entirety, as to all Defendants.
In addition to the bar on res judicata grounds, Plaintiff's Section 1985 and 1986 conspiracy claims are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine provides that the officers, agents and employees of a single corporate or municipal entity, each acting within the scope of his or her employment, legally are incapable of conspiring together. See Rini v. Zwirn, 886 F. Supp. 270, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Intracorporate immunity has also been extended to the context of conspiracies between a public entity and its employees.") (citations omitted). Here, the Defendants' actions were all allegedly taken in their capacities as officers or employees of the defendant County. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine thus bars Plaintiff's Section 1985 claim because the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment for the County of Westchester. As no actionable conspiracy existed, Plaintiff's Section 1986 claim fails because it requires a valid Section 1985 claim. See Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Section 1986 imposes liability on an individual who has knowledge of discrimination prohibited under § 1985. Hence, a § 1986 claim is contingent on a valid § 1985 claim.") (citation omitted).
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, on grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.