United States District Court, Southern District of New York
May 15, 2003
ALICE CLISSURAS AND PATRICIA CLISSURAS, PLAINTIFFS, AGAINST TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEW YORK, PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS/CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PSC-CUNY WELFARE FUND, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shira A. Scheindlin, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs have filed untimely motions for reconsideration of this Court's Opinion and Order in Clissuras v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of New York, Nos. 02 Civ. 8130 and 02 Civ. 8138, 2003 WL 1701992 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003), dismissing their claims against all defendants. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration are denied.
Alice Clissuras and Patricia Clissuras, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on October 11, 2002 against the City University of New York ("CUNY"),*fn1 the Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York ("TRS"), Professional Staff Congress/City University of New York ("PSC-CUNY" or "the Union"), PSC-CUNY Welfare Fund ("the Fund"), and various unnamed and potentially responsible defendants. Plaintiffs alleged various constitutional violations pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42 off the United States Code, as well as claims for breach of contract, fraudulent taking and obstruction of justice.
Both Alice and Patricia Clissuras worked as professors for New York City Technical College ("NYCTC"), a division of the City University of New York. Plaintiffs described a scheme in which the defendants failed to credit them with all their years of service, thereby affecting their pension calculations and reducing their pension payments. In addition, plaintiffs accused defendants TRS, Welfare Fund and the Union of improperly considering them to be New York City public school teachers, rather than professors for the State of New York, when calculating benefits. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendants' categorization of them as city retirees constitutes obstruction of justice and "identity theft."
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Local Rule 6.3 and is appropriate where a court overlooks "controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court." Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The standard for granting . . . a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court."). Alternatively, a motion for reconsideration may be granted to "correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983). There is a ten-day time limit for bringing motions for reconsideration. See S.D.N.Y. R. 6.3 (requiring that a motion for reconsideration or reargument be served within ten days after the docketing of the court's determination of the original motion)
Local Rule 6.3 should be "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Dellefave v. Access Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098, 2001 WL 286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001); see also In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (a Local Rule 6.3 motion "is not a motion to reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved"); Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (purpose of Local Rule 6.3 is to "ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters").
Plaintiffs seek to reargue issues that were already carefully considered by this Court in March 2003. These motions are untimely as the Opinion and Order and Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' Complaints were docketed on March 28 and 31, 2003, respectively. Accordingly, plaintiffs motions could be denied on this basis alone. However, considering plaintiffs' pro se status, I will consider the merits of plaintiffs' motion despite the late date on which they were filed.
Plaintiffs' motions do not raise any issues of fact or law overlooked by this Court. Nor do plaintiffs argue that reconsideration is necessary here to prevent manifest injustice. To the contrary, justice requires that plaintiffs not be permitted to reargue issues that were fully considered by this Court. Because there is absolutely no basis for plaintiffs' untimely motions, they are hereby denied.
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration are denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close these motions.