The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sidney Stein, District Judge.
Plaintiff Jenny Gruber brings this employment discrimination action against her employers (collectively "Louis Hornick"), alleging that she was subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law. Defendants have moved to compel arbitration and stay further judicial proceedings pending arbitration. For the following reasons, that motion is granted.
Plaintiff was employed by Louis Hornick, a curtain and draperies manufacturer, for 10 months — from April 2001 to January 2002 — as an Assistant Designer in its New York City office. As a condition of employment, Louis Hornick requires its employees to sign an "Undertaking and Inducement to Louis Hornick & Co., Inc.," ("Agreement") that contains the following agreement to arbitrate:
Any dispute or controversy between the Company and
Applicant relating to or arising out of the employment
of Applicant or the termination of such employment for
any reason and under any circumstance . . . shall be
determined in arbitration in the City of New York
pursuant to the Commercial Rules then in effect of the
American Arbitration Association . . . The arbitration
award shall be final and binding upon the parties and
judgment may be entered thereon in the Supreme Court
of the State of New York or in any other court of
(Anatole Aff. Ex. A ¶ 3). On April 4, 2001, plaintiff signed the Agreement, acknowledging that she had read and understood it.*fn1
On January 18, 2002, for reasons that are in dispute, Gruber was terminated by Louis Hornick. She claims that she was sexually harassed and terminated in retaliation for raising complaints. Defendants argue that Gruber was terminated for proper business reasons. Six months after being terminated, Gruber filed this action, asserting claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq., and the New York City Civil Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code §§ 8-107 et. seq. Defendants have now moved to compel Gruber to arbitrate their disputes.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that "an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. There is a strong federal policy favoring alternative means of dispute resolution, and in light of that policy, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Arakawa v. Japan Network Group, 56 F. Supp. 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) and Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). In determining whether to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA, a court considers: 1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; 2) what the scope of the arbitration agreement is; and 3) whether Congress intended the federal statutory claims asserted by the plaintiff to be nonarbitrable. See Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kaiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987).
In response to defendants' motion to compel arbitration, Gruber contends her claims are nonarbitrable because first, she did not knowingly and willfully enter into the agreement to arbitrate, and second, the arbitration provisions with respect to costs and attorney's fees render the agreement unenforceable in the context of a Title VII suit. The litigants do not dispute the scope of the arbitration agreement.
A. Gruber Agreed to Arbitrate
In determining whether panics have agreed to arbitrate, courts apply generally accepted principles of contract law. See id. at 845. A person who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents and assent to them. See Arakawa, 56 F. Supp.2d at 352; Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Securities, 967 F. Supp. 91, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Plaintiff is bound by the agreement to arbitrate unless she can show special circumstances, such as duress or coercion, which would justify non-enforcement of the contract. Arakawa, 56 F. Supp.2d at 352 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1655, L.Ed.2d 26 (1991)).
Gather contends that she signed the Agreement under duress. She asserts that she was hired on Friday, March 30, 2001, and left her prior employment to begin work for Louis Hornick the following Monday. (Gruber Aff.). In support of her contention of duress, she states merely that the Agreement "was not discussed with me. I was told I had to sign it and return it." (Gruber Aff. ¶ 3) and that, when she was given the Agreement two days after starting work, "I was told that if I did not sign the Agreement, I would not be able to work for [Louis Hornick]" (Gruber Aff. ¶ 5).
In order for a party to show that a contract was signed under duress, she must show "(1) a threat, (2) which was unlawfully made, and (3) caused involuntary acceptance of contract terms, (4) because the circumstances permitted no other alternative." DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613 (DLC), 1996 WL 44226 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) ("DeGaetano I"). Despite the inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees, conditioning employment upon an agreement to arbitrate does not by itself constitute duress. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33, 11 S.Ct. 1647. Nor does conditioning further employment to a current employee's agreement to arbitrate by itself constitute duress. See Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp.2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding arbitration agreement invalid because of coercive circumstances of employer's presentation of agreement to employees); see also Arawaka, F. Supp.2d at 352 (holding arbitration agreement was not invalid because employee signed it in order to keep her job, absent other allegations of unfairness, oppression or unconscionability.
Here, Gruber has failed to establish or even allege the additional circumstances required to establish that she lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether or not to sign the Agreement. Her sole allegation is that she was told that if she did not sign, she would not be able to work for defendants. (Gruber Aff. ¶ 5). In contrast to cases where duress has been found in the signing of agreements to arbitrate employment disputes, there are no allegations that plaintiff was not given sufficient time to read the agreement or that defendants misled her about its contents. See Brennan, 198 F. Supp.2d at 383 (holding arbitration agreement invalid due to duress where plaintiff given insufficient time to review agreement and defendant used additional pressure tactics); Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Securities, 942 F. Supp. 963, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ordering discovery on issue of whether plaintiff agreed to arbitrate where plaintiff alleged that he ...