at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1995).
Here, Parrish has not come forward with sufficient allegations or evidence of these factors to warrant treating Sollecito's dealership's as one entity in the employment context. In fact, it is only the fourth factor which Parrish sufficiently alleges, and the second crucial factor is the most deficiently supported. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court will not allow reopening of discovery to delve into this complicated inquiry and potentially give rise to a new round of litigation and motion practice, as this information could have been pleaded in the original complaint and addressed during the normal course of pretrial discovery.
Although the court in Story held that the single entity theory applied to both the imposition of liability and determining the size of the statutory cap to be imposed, and that discovery to that effect should be undertaken, the Court is not persuaded that such legal precedent is controlling here. 214 F. Supp.2d at 1210. First, the Story court admits that "[a] good argument can be made that [these] two concepts are not the same, because the congressional purposes under the two statutes are not necessarily identical." Id. at 1210. However, the district court deemed itself bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent to apply the same legal standard for imposing liability and determining the applicable statutory cap. Id. In sofar as this issue has not been resolved by the Second Circuit, such precedent is not controlling in this Circuit and this Court is not bound by it. Moreover, the facts in Story reflect a more persuasive case for finding the defendant in that case and its affiliated companies to be a single entity. The defendant in Story sold the same products as its affiliates and maintained consolidated financial statements, maintained a common company directory,*fn2 and the related entities essentially were separated only by geography. See Id. at 1211. Here, although all owned or controlled by Sollecito, the dealerships were clearly separate franchises as they sold various lines of cars of different manufacturers.
Moreover, in order to increase the applicable cap, Parrish has presented the relevant employer theory in this case too late in the proceedings — after a trial on the merits has been concluded — to justify amending the complaint, further discovery or a hearing. As Defendants point out, even complaints that include such allegations have been dismissed in comparable circumstances where sufficient specificity is not provided. See, e.g., Coraggio, 1995 WL 242047, at *3. Such precedent emphasizes the importance of including such allegations in the complaint and prior to trial to allow proper defense. In Greenbaum, for instance, the plaintiff requested that the caption be changed to include the name of the parent company during the trial because of the issue of the statutory cap, and the trial court permitted presentation of evidence as to the size of the parent company during the trial. Id. Therefore, additional post-trial discovery, and the resultant prejudice to defendants who are not respondents in the action or allotted an opportunity to present defenses at a trial, was not at issue in Greenbaum.
A motion to amend the complaint may be denied, at the discretion of the district court, because of futility of the amendment, undue delay on the part of the movant, had faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed or undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerford Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1994). It is clear in this case that permitting Parrish to essentially amend the complaint by adding new respondents after a jury trial on the merits has been completed would prejudice Defendants, who did not have a fair opportunity to defend against the claims. See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 40 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's denial of plaintiffs request to amend complaint, two months after completion of trial, where additional defendants would not have had an opportunity to defend against claims at trial); Campbell v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 5129 LTSTHK, 2003 WL 660847, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.27, 2003) ("Prejudice is inferred if a party did not have a fair opportunity to defend against the new claims"); Miwon v. Nissho-Iwai American Corp., No. 80 Civ. 4731-CSH, 1984 WL 363, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1984). Parrish can show no cause for the untimeliness of her efforts, as this information and her counsel's awareness of the statutory cap existed years ago when Parrish's complaint was first filed. Such an unjustified delay manifestly would prejudice Defendants in this case and will not be permitted by the Court.
Moreover, because the jury has already been dismissed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 49 does not permit Parrish to take further discovery at this time and request that the Court make findings of fact. Rule 49 allows the Court to make factual findings if it inadvertently omits a necessary factual issue in the verdict sheet "raised by the pleadings or by the evidence" and the parties do not object to that omission. Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a). In this case, Parrish never raised the issue of a single entity theory until her post-trial motion. She cannot bypass normal proceedings concerning unexplored factual issues, which were not even alleged in the complaint, by delay. Accordingly, for the various reasons iterated above, Parrish will not now be permitted to amend her complaint to include Sollecito's other dealerships as defendants or to conduct discovery into whether such dealerships constitute a single employer.
Defendants have submitted a sworn affidavit indicating that Acura and Honda together employed less than 100 persons during the relevant time period, although arguably the relevant employer here is Acura alone since it is the only dealership found liable for retaliation. Consequently, the punitive damage award in this case is capped at $50,000, since no future compensatory or non-pecuniary damages were awarded by the jury. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) ("in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year, $50,000"). The Court disagrees that Gallagher's affidavit is insufficient to determine the number of employees at a dealership at which he is the General Manager. Moreover, it is reasonable that a single car dealership, or even two dealerships, would not have more than 100 employees.
D. DUE PROCESS PROPRIETY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
Finally, with regard to the propriety of punitive damages, the Court directed the parties to address the question of whether the punitive damages awarded in this case, $500,000, comports with the dictates of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Both parties have addressed this issue in their submissions. Although the $50,000 statutory cap determined by the Court to be applicable here mitigates the extent of the due process issue at stake, the Court will address this issue to determine, based on the factors developed by the Supreme Court and outlined in detail below, the proper monetary range for a remedial punitive damages award in this case.
As a starting point for this inquiry, the Court calls attention to another case decided contemporaneously with the action at hand in which the Court addressed at length the multiple issues and complexities entailed in determinations of punitive damage awards in light of the most recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. See TVT Records v. The Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp.2d 413, 2003 WL 22056308 (2003). Because the analysis there bears significantly on the issues and considerations now before the Court and compel the Court's resolution of this case, a reiteration of the most pertinent portions of that discussion is appropriate here.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "unlimited discretion . . . in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). The Haslip court evaluated the sufficiency of the procedures and guidance that governed the trial and appellate review of punitive damages awards, endorsing standards that had been applied by the state courts in the case as sufficiently definite and meaningful to constrain trial courts and juries. Among the criteria assessed for examining the propriety of the amount of punitive damages awarded were:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the harm
likely to result from the defendant's conduct, as
well as the harm that actually has occurred;
(b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's
awareness, any concealment, and the existence and
frequency of similar past conduct;