The opinion of the court was delivered by: SHIRA SCHEINDLIN, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court's December 22, 2003
Opinion and Order dismissing her case in its entirety. See Knoll v.
Equinox Fitness Clubs, No. 02 Civ. 9120, 2003 WL 23018807, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003). Plaintiff argues that her fraudulent inducement
claim was erroneously dismissed as a matter of law and that this Court
overlooked facts favoring plaintiff and construed disputed facts in
defendants' favor with regard to her repudiation claim. Plaintiff also
argues that the Court erred in dismissing her Fourth and Fifth Claims.
For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 6.3 and
are committed to the sound discretion of the
district court. See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft, No. 01 Civ.
4872, 2004 WL 309150, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004). Reconsideration is
an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of
finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." In re Health
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp.2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Range
Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp.2d 390, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The . . . limitation on motions for reconsideration is
to ensure finality and to prevent the practice of a losing party
examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of the lost motion with
additional matters.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under Local Civil Rule 6.3, "the moving party must demonstrate
controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying
motion that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might
reasonably be expected to alter the court's decision." Montanile v.
National Broad. Co., 216 F. Supp.2d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
aff'd, 2003 WL 328825 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2003) (unpublished). The
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict so as to
prevent repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly
considered by the court. See In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997,
1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
A motion for reconsideration is not a substitute for appeal. See
RMED Int'l, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 207 F. Supp.2d 292,
296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Nor is it a vehicle "to reargue those issues already
considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was
resolved." In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. at 1001.
Accordingly, the moving party may not "advance new facts, issues or
arguments not previously presented to the Court." Morse/Diesel, Inc.
v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 768 F. Supp. 115, 116
A. Plaintiff's Fraudulent Inducement Claim
Plaintiff argues that the Court overlooked facts and law concerning the
validity and enforceability of the Release. Specifically, plaintiff
claims that defendants failed to provide her with timely notice under the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA") and
affirmatively misled her concerning her COBRA rights. See
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
("Pl. Rec. Mem.") at 8 ("The uncontroverted evidence in this case
indicates that the Benefits Administrator, a `fiduciay' under ERISA,
misled Plaintiff to believe she would have no health insurance at all if
she did not sign the release. Specifically, `the Benefits Administrator
told [her] that she only had 30 days to get COBRA.'").
In particular, plaintiff claims that this Court overlooked controlling
law holding that when the employer and the plan administrator are the
same person, the required notice must be made within fourteen days of
termination. Plaintiff also claims that this Court overlooked facts
contained in plaintiff's declaration where she claims she was
affirmatively misled by defendants as to her COBRA rights.
1. Affirmative Misrepresentation
While it may be true that defendants failed to timely provide plaintiff
with the required COBRA notice, the claim that plaintiff was misled by
the Benefits Administrator is supported only by plaintiff's declaration
which was submitted after she was deposed. See 8/22/03
Declaration of Monica Knoll Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 ("Knoll
Decl.") ¶ 11 ("After I was terminated, the Benefits Administrator at
Equinox told me that I only had 30 days to get COBRA. I asked for
information about COBRA, but I never received anything in response.").
The following deposition testimony, cited by plaintiff as further
evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation by Equinox, indicates only a
mistaken belief on plaintiff's part:
Q: Do you know how long you waited between
executing the release and the time that you
first received it?
A: I know there was an e-mail that Kathy
I had sent to Kathy dated October that I think
I sent her in mid October saying that, at that
time, I still hadn't
received anything on COBRA. So it had to
have been after the 12th, and I just, you know,
I just know there was some back and forth on
the corrections, but we got closer and closer
to the date of November 1, and in my
understanding, I just thought that there was 30
days to COBRA. . . . I thought that there
was no time to even have the conversation, and
it was November 1. I had
Q: Was your concern that you wouldn't be eligible
for COBRA or that you wouldn't have the money
to pay for it?
A: I was concerned that I wouldn't have insurance
after on November 1 without signing
A: That I missed the 30-day mark or something.
I felt that if I didn't sign this, then I
wouldn't have insurance, . . .
3/13/03 Deposition of Monica Knoll ("Knoll Dep.") at 152-54
Q: Did you have any concern that you wouldn't be
able to avail yourself of COBRA if you didn't
Q: Because you wouldn't be able to pay for it or
because you wouldn't be
Q: When you say both, what do you mean? I think
you are reading my mind here.
A: I thought that if I was if I
didn't sign this ...