The opinion of the court was delivered by: FREDERICK SCULLIN, Chief Judge, District Page 2
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINED ATTORNEY NAMES.]
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on December 31, 2002,
alleging that Defendants engaged in unfair and discriminatory lending
practices in violation of federal banking laws and the United States
Constitution. More specifically, she alleges violations of the Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. She also alleges violations of the Fair Housing Act
("FHA"), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the Community
Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), and the Truth-in-Lending Act ("TILA").
See 42 U.S.C. § 3603; 15 U.S.C. § 1691;
12 U.S.C. § 2901; 15 U.S.C. § 1601;*fn1 respectively.
Plaintiff, an African-American resident of Binghamton, filed her
pro se complaint on December 31, 2002, and her amended complaint
on February 26, 2003. She alleges that Defendants discriminated against
her based on her gender and race by declining to extend her business
credit, personal credit, or a home mortgage loan. She also alleges that
Defendants have systematically discriminated against African-Americans by
denying them personal and business credit on the basis of race.
Presently before the Court are all Defendants' motions to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A. Standard for Dismissal
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Burnette v. Carothers,
192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999). Hence, dismissal is appropriate only if "`it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" Sheppard v.
Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). This
standard is "applied with particular strictness when the plaintiff
complains of a civil rights violation." Branum v. Clark,
927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Where a litigant proceeds pro se, the court must construe the
allegations in the complaint liberally and dismiss the complaint only
where the litigant could prove no set of facts entitling her to relief.
See Lerman v. Ed. of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.
With these standards in mind, the Court will address Plaintiff's
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases and controversies." See,
e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). Part of this
limitation on federal court jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff have
standing to bring her claim. See id. at 99-100. A plaintiff only
has standing if she can show that she is "a proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue. . . ." Id. at 100. A
plaintiff can demonstrate that
she has standing by showing that (1) she has sustained an injury;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to a defendant's conduct; and (3) the
injury may be redressed through the relief that the plaintiff seeks.
See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998)
(citations omitted). To demonstrate an injury, a plaintiff must show that
she sustained an actual, concrete injury that is neither ""`conjectural
or hypothetical.'"" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quotation omitted).
Defendant BSB Bank & Trust Co. ("BSB") asserts that Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring her claim because she did not apply to it for credit.
According to Defendant BSB, it has no record of Plaintiff applying for
credit in January, 2003. Defendant BSB contends instead that Plaintiff
solicited it for funds to support Enable ...