United States District Court, S.D. New York
March 29, 2004.
LEROY A. MOSES, a/k/a JAWAD AMIR MUSA, Petitioner -against- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT PATTERSON, Senior District Judge
OPINION and ORDER
On December 15, 2003, Petitioner Leroy A. Moses, also known as Jawad
Amir Musa, filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's denial of
his habeas corpus petition. See Moses v. United States, 1998 WL
255401 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1998). In a motion dated February 29. 2004
Petitioner requests appointment of pro bono counsel to assist him.
"In deciding whether to appoint counsel . . . the district judge should
first determine whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of
substance." Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.
1986). "Even where the claim is not frivolous, counsel is often
unwarranted where the indigent's chances of success are extremely slim."
Id. at 60 (quoting Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir
Here, Plaintiff has filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion seeking relief
from a judgment of the Court dated May 20, 1998, because of a change in
intervening law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). Because "a
change in the applicable law after a judgment has become final in all
respects is not a sufficient basis for vacating the judgment,"
(Tomlin v. McDaniel, 865 F.2d 209,
210 (9th Cir. 1988)), Petitioner's position does not seem likely to
be "of substance" (Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61). Moreover, to gain
relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), Petitioner must demonstrate
"extraordinary circumstances." Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisistion Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988). Given the high
standards that Petitioner must overcome to succeed on a Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b) motion, Petitioner's chances of success are "extremely slim."
Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60.
Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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