United States District Court, S.D. New York
March 31, 2004.
BEVERLY RIDDLE, Plaintiff, -against- LIZ CLAIBORNE, INC., et al., Defendants
The opinion of the court was delivered by: HENRY PITMAN, Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
By notice of motion dated August 20, 2003 (Docket Item 145) plaintiff
moves for reconsideration of my Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
August 13, 2003 which denied eighteen (18) identical motions made by
plaintiff seeking discovery sanctions in the aggregate amount of $18
million. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
To the extent that the motion is made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
and 60(b), plaintiffs' motion is procedurally defective. Rules 59(e) and
60(b) address motions seeking to amend judgments and relief from
judgments, respectively. My August 13, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order
is not a judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a), and thus is not a
proper subject of a motion made pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b).
To the extent that the motion can be construed as a motion for
reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3, the motion also fails.
Motions for reconsideration are appropriate only in limited
Motions for reargument "are granted when new
facts come to light or when it appears that
controlling precedents were overlooked."
Weissman v. Fruchtman, 658 F. Supp. 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). The proponent of such a motion is
not supposed to treat the court's initial decision
as the opening of a dialogue in which that party
may then use [Local Civil Rule 6.3] to advance new
facts and theories in response to the court's
rulings. The purpose of the rule is "to ensure the
finality of decisions and to prevent the practice
of a losing party examining a decision and then
plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional
matters." Lewis v. New York Telephone,
No. 83 Civ. 7129, slip op. at 2, 1986 WL
1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) cited in Carolco
Pictures Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169
McMahan & Co. v. Donaldson. Lufkin & Jenrette
Securities Corp., 727 F. Supp. 833, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
" [T]o be entitled to reargument under Local [Civil Rule 6.3], [a
party] must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions
or factual matters that were put before the Court on the underlying
motion." American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co.,
163 F.R.D. 211, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd on other grounds,
92 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 1996), citing Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. Dew,
151 F.R.D. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Fulani v. Brady,
149 F.R.D. 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd sub nom., Fulani v.
Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1994); East Coast Novelty Co. v.
City of New York, 141 F.R.D. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); B.N.E.
Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 791 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Novak v. National Broad. Co., 760 F. Supp. 47, 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Ashley Meadows Farm. Inc. v. American Horse Shows
Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 856, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Thus, "a
party in its motion for reargument `may not advance new facts,
issues or arguments not previously presented to the court.'" In re
Integrated Resources Real Estate Limited Partnerships Sec. Litig.,
850 F. Supp. 1105, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), quoting Litton Indus.,
Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 6447 (JMC), 1989
WL 162315 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992). Accord Caribbean Trading
& Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp.,
948 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Woodard v. Hardenfelder,
845 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Motions for reargument should not be
used to permit a party "to reargue those issues already considered when
a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved." In
re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Plaintiff cites no controlling facts or controlling legal principles
that were called to my attention and overlooked in connection with her
initial motions. Accordingly, plaintiff
has failed to meet the stringent standard that would support a
motion for reconsideration.*fn1