The opinion of the court was delivered by: CONSTANCE MOTLEY, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Kevin Morris brings claims of sex discrimination, pursuant to
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), 20 U.S.C. § 1681
et seq., and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), as well as various
common law claims, against defendant Fordham University ("Fordham").
Plaintiff, a former Head Coach of Women's Basketball at Fordham
University, alleges disparate treatment and disparate impact in relation
to allegedly inferior resources and opportunities available for the
women's basketball team in comparison to the men's basketball team.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant subjected him to "disproportionate
funding for the women's basketball team, both individually (salary and
benefits), as a women's basketball coach, and collectively (assistant
coaches, equipment, uniforms, supplies, recruitment funds, team travel,
post-season opportunities, and tutoring)." Plaintiff alleges that "[i]n
violation of federal and state law," defendant "base[d] the Plaintiffs
salary, benefits, career development, and the funding of the women's
athletic programs (specifically the women's basketball team) on the
Plaintiff's gender and the gender of the student athletes Plaintiff
coached." Plaintiff also alleges that defendant breached a contract with
plaintiff by terminating him prior to the end date of his contract, and
that, by failing to provide plaintiff with a promised long term contract,
defendant committed fraud.*fn1 Finally, plaintiff alleges in his
complaint that, "[b]y virtue of the existence of a hosfile work environment," defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as injunctive relief, including "100% compliance with Title IX."
Plaintiff filed a complaint on January 24, 2003, and an amended
complaint on May 7, 2003. On June 13, 2003, defendant moved to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow,
defendant's motion is granted in part, and denied in part.
Fordham is a Jesuit institution of higher learning located in New York
City. Fordham is a member of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
Division I and competes in the Atlantic 10 Conference in, among other
sports, women's and men's basketball. Plaintiff held the position of Head
Coach of Women's Basketball at Fordham from 1993 until in or about March
2000.
A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
On a motion to dismiss, a court must read the complaint generously, and
draw all inferences in favor of the pleader. Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8,
11 (2d Cir. 1989). The court must accept as true the material facts
alleged in the complaint. Grandon v. Merrill Lynch, 147 F.3d 184, 188 (2d
Cir. 1998). The court must not dismiss the action unless "`it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Cohen v. Koenig,
25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957)); Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20 (2d Cir.
2000). Thus, a plaintiff need only plead "`a short and plain statement of
the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355
U.S. at 47 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). This standard is applied in
employment discrimination lawsuits, where the complaint need not contain
specific facts establishing a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512,
122 S.Ct. 992, 998 (2002). In deciding such a motion, the "issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Bernheim v. Litt,
79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). The court
must limit itself to a consideration of the facts alleged on the face of
the complaint, and to any documents attached to the complaint as exhibits
or incorporated in it by reference. Cosmos, 886 F.2d. at 13. Even where a
document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless
consider it where the complaint "relies heavily upon its terms and
effect," which renders the document "integral" to the complaint. Chambers
v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). If, as in the
present case, extraneous material is presented by one or more of the
parties, the court must exclude it from consideration. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b). B. PLAINTIFF'S DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Title IX provides, in part:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a). There is an implied private right of action for
gender-based discrimination under Title IX. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Gender-based
employment discrimination by educational programs receiving federal
financial support comes within the prohibition of Title IX. North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299
(1982). Additionally, the remedy of damages is available to an individual
in an action to enforce Title IX. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 76, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1038, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992).
Defendant claims that plaintiff lacks standing for his Title IX claim,
on the grounds that plaintiff seeks, in part, to adjudicate the interests
of third parties, namely former members of the Fordham women's basketball
team, and that, in any event, plaintiffs Title IX employment
discrimination claim is preempted by Title VII. Defendant also claims
that plaintiffs Title IX claim is premised not on plaintiffs gender, but
on the gender of the students he coached.
Plaintiff claims that he has standing to assert a claim under Title IX
"because he seeks to enforce his own rights and that of the program for
which he was an integral part-Head coach," and that "as a federal
taxpayer, Plaintiff has an implied right to insure that an entity
receiving federal funding properly dispenses such funds in a
non-discriminate [sic] manner." Plaintiff argues that his Title IX claim
is not preempted by Title VII, because defendant never advised plaintiff
of the procedure and right to file a Title VII claim, and because
plaintiff "wished to rectify the discriminatory animus practiced by the
Defendant in its distribution of federal funding, both individually and
for the Women's Basketball program; these are remedies Title VII cannot
provide." Similarly, plaintiff claims that "Title VII could not address
the discriminatory nature in which the Defendant ran its athletic
department or dispensed federal funding." He "brought claims of
enforcement of Title IX provisions, enforcement that cannot be remedied
under Title VII."
"It is by now well settled that `the irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an `injury in fact' an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . Third,
it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision." United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
742-43, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992) (citations
omitted). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Particularized
"mean[s] that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1
(internal quotation marks omitted). "At the pleading stage, general
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may
suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we `presum[e] that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support
the claim.'" Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990)). A plaintiff "generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State.
Inc., 454 U.S. ...