United States District Court, S.D. New York
May 10, 2004.
BORYS DIAZ, Petitioner
VICTOR HERBERT Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility, Respondent
The opinion of the court was delivered by: VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
Pro se prisoner Borys Diaz ("Diaz") petitions this Court
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§
2254"). Diaz was convicted by a jury in New York State Supreme Court of
murder in the second degree and of conspiracy in the second degree, for
which he was sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment from 25
years to life and from 8 1/3 years to 25 years for the two charges
respectively. Diaz alleges that his rights under both the federal and New
York State Constitutions were violated during different portions of his
criminal proceedings in state court. Specifically, Diaz asserts four
grounds for relief: (1) his absence during certain off-the-record sidebar
conferences during the voir dire of four prospective jurors violated his
right to be present at all material stages of his trial; (2) the New York
State appellate court failed to correct alleged errors in the trial
court's accomplice corroboration charge to the jury; (3) his sentences
for the two charges for which he was convicted should have been imposed concurrently rather than
consecutively; and (4) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the
trial by stipulating to the unavailability of an unindicted
co-conspirator, thereby permitting the admission of out-of-court
statements; and that his appellate counsel was likewise ineffective for
failing to challenge on appeal the actions of trial counsel. Respondent
Victor Herbert, Superintendent of the Attica Correctional Facility (the
"State") where Diaz is imprisoned, interposes both procedural and
substantive arguments in opposition to Diaz's petition. For the reasons
discussed below, Diaz's petition is denied in its entirety.
A. FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY*fn1
On December 14, 1993, Lillian DeJesus ("DeJesus") was killed by a
single gunshot wound to the head as she walked out of her place of
employment in Bronx County, New York. DeJesus was the newly-hired Chief
Financial Officer of Promesa, a non-profit organization that provides community services related to substance
abuse, among them, financial assistance to individuals suffering from
substance abuse problems. Diaz, who also worked at Promesa, and two
co-defendants, Jeffrey Rivera ("Rivera") and Wayne Haywood ("Haywood"),
all were charged with DeJesus's murder and with conspiracy to commit the
According to the Indictment and the evidence adduced at Diaz's trial,
Diaz conspired with others to murder De Jesus for about a month before
the shooting occurred. On the day of the murder, to carry out the crime,
Diaz provided Rivera and Haywood with the pistol used in the shooting and
transported his accomplices to where DeJesus worked. Rivera and Haywood,
lying in wait outside Promesa's headquarters, shot and killed DeJesus
when she emerged from the building with two co-workers. Diaz paid Rivera
and Haywood moments later. Diaz apparently had DeJesus murdered because
DeJesus had initiated an investigation into discrepancies in Promesa's
accounting records. At the time of the murder, the investigation had
revealed that large sums of money were unaccounted for in a division of
Promesa where Diaz worked as a caseworker and where he had access to
A New York State Supreme Court jury convicted Diaz on charges of murder
in the second degree and conspiracy in the second degree.*fn2 For the murder conviction, the court (the
"trial court") sentenced Diaz to an indeterminate term of imprisonment
from 25 years to life. For the conspiracy conviction, Diaz received an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from 8 1/3 years to 25 years, to
be served consecutively with the sentence for the murder charge.*fn3
With new counsel, Diaz appealed his conviction to the New York State
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department (the "Appellate
Division"). Diaz raised four arguments on direct appeal: (1) his absence
from sidebar conferences with prospective jurors that were excused from
jury service violated his right to be present at all material times
during his trial; (2) the trial court committed errors in its accomplice
corroboration charge to the jury; (3) his sentences should have been
imposed concurrently rather than consecutively; and (4) the sentences
imposed were unduly harsh and excessive in light of his criminal history.
Diaz's appellate counsel did not raise an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim on direct appeal to the Appellate Division.
The Appellate Division held Diaz's sentence in abeyance and remanded the case to the trial court for a reconstruction
hearing on the first issue, namely, to determine whether four members of
the venire that were called to off-the-record sidebar conferences in the
presence of counsel for both parties were ultimately dismissed for cause
or on consent. See People v. Diaz, 690 N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1999). The trial court held the reconstruction hearing on
October 22, 1999, where the assistant district attorney who prosecuted
Diaz at trial (the "ADA") and Diaz's trial counsel testified with regard
to the discussions held at sidebar regarding the four particular
After considering the testimony at the reconstruction hearing, and
based upon its own recollection of the trial, the trial court concluded
that the four members of the jury pool in question, whose excusals form
the grounds for Diaz's claim that he was not present at all material
stages of his proceedings, were excused for cause, notwithstanding that
the trial court stated on the record that they were excused on consent.
(See Hearing Tr. at 39:16-40:10.) Specifically, the trial court
found that during the voir dire, these four potential jurors were excused
because they represented that they had some connection with law
enforcement and upon further questioning, they expressed doubt as to
whether they would be able to weigh the testimony of a law enforcement
officer on the same basis as that of any other witness and/or as to whether,
based upon their ties to law enforcement, they could maintain
impartiality while deliberating. (See id. at 41:6-43:4.)
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed Diaz's conviction. See
People v. Diaz, 706 N.Y.S.2d 23 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000). In
affirming, the court found no basis to disturb the trial court's holding
that these venire persons were, in fact, excused for cause and that "such
excusals are in the nature of an uncontested excusal for cause, and thus
defendant could not have made a meaningful contribution to any of the
sidebar discussions with the jurors. . . ." Id. at 23 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
Diaz, through his appellate counsel, then requested leave to appeal the
first three issues raised before the Appellate Division to the New York
State Court of Appeals, namely, his absence from sidebars during
questioning of prospective jurors, the alleged errors in the trial
court's corroboration charge, and the propriety of the trial court's
imposition of consecutive sentences. In a decision without published
opinion, the New York Court of Appeals denied Diaz's leave to appeal.
See People v. Diaz, 735 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 2000).
In September 2001, Diaz proceeded to file his pro se habeas
corpus petition before this Court asserting the same issues raised to the Appellate Division with the exception of the
excessive sentence claim. The following year, Diaz filed a pro
se petition before the Appellate Division for a writ of error
coram nobis. In this petition and subsequent amendment thereto,
Diaz asserted an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim on a
host of grounds, among them, his counsel's failure to raise on appeal
trial counsel's ineffectiveness for stipulating to the unavailability of
three co-defendants, which permitted the admission at trial of
inculpatory out-of-court statements. (See Addendum at Att. B.)
Diaz sought and obtained from this Court a stay of his habeas corpus
petition until he could exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim through his writ of coram nobis. The Appellate Division
denied Diaz's coram nobis petition in a decision without a
published opinion. See People v. Diaz, 762 N.Y.S.2d 866 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2003). Diaz again filed leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals, and again, leave was denied without a published
opinion. See People v. Diaz, 798 N.E.2d 353 (N.Y. 2003). Diaz
then filed an addendum to his habeas corpus petition to add his claim of
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, which the Court
considers together with his original petition.
B. DIAZ'S HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
As discussed above, Diaz advances four arguments in the instant petition. First, Diaz contends that he was deprived of his
federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to be present at
all material stages of his trial when he was not present at four
off-the-record sidebar discussions with individual members of the jury
pool. (See Petition at 25-29.) The State counters that this
claim is unexhausted for habeas corpus review, and is otherwise
meritless. (See St. Mem. at 2-7.)
Second, Diaz argues that the trial court provided the jury an erroneous
charge on the issue of accomplice corroboration in violation of the New
York State Constitution and the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses of
the United States Constitution. (See Petition at 29-36.) The
State argues that the Court should decline to review this claim because
it was rejected by the Appellate Division on independent and adequate
state grounds, and because such a claim is not cognizable on habeas
corpus review. (See St. Mem. at 8-13.)
Third, Diaz argues that the Appellate Division failed to modify the
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences and that this alleged
error violated his rights under the federal and New York State
Constitutions. According to Diaz, the act that formed the basis of the
murder conviction was also a material element of the conspiracy
conviction, and thus, the sentences for these two crimes should have been imposed
to run concurrently. (See Petition at 37-39.) The State argues
that such a claim is not proper for review under habeas corpus and that
the sentences imposed were not in violation of applicable New York State
law. (See St. Mem. at 14-16.)
Finally, Diaz contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
stipulating to the unavailability of an unindicted co-conspirator who
made incriminating out-of-court statements about Diaz to an accomplice.
These out-of-court statements were introduced through the accomplice who
testified at trial. (See Addendum at 3-5.) Diaz also raises a
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on the grounds that
his appellate counsel failed to raise his trial counsel's alleged errors
on direct appeal. The State opposes this basis for relief on the grounds
that Diaz has failed to make the requisite showing for such a claim.
(See St. Mem. at 17-21.)
A. STANDARD FOR HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
1. General Principles
A petitioner in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court is
entitled to habeas relief only if he can show that his detention violates
the United States Constitution or federal law or treaties of the United States. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The purpose of federal habeas review of state court
convictions is to "assure that when a person is detained unlawfully or in
violation of his constitutional rights he will be afforded an independent
determination by a federal court of the legality of his detention, even
though the issue may already have been decided on the merits by a state
tribunal." United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court of New
York, 459 F.2d 745, 748 (2d Cir. 1972).
2. Exhaustion Doctrine
Generally, a petitioner must have exhausted the remedies available to
him in state court before seeking habeas corpus relief unless there is no
state corrective process or it otherwise appears that such process would
be ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights. See
28 U.S.C. § 2554 (b)(1). In order to meet this exhaustion requirement,
a petitioner must present "the essential factual and legal premises of
his federal constitutional claim to the highest state court capable of
reviewing it." Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 237 (2d Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). In other words, a habeas petitioner must have
"fairly presented" in state court the claims that are raised in the
habeas petition. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971);
see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995);
Strogov v. Attorney General of New York, 191 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1999); Gonzalez
v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 1991). A federal court,
however, retains discretion to entertain the merits of a petitioner's
federal claim even if it is not exhausted in state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2554 (b)(2).
3. Standard of Review
Pursuant to the various sub-sections of § 2254, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, this Court's review is guided by certain
restrictions on the nature and extent of review that a federal court can
conduct in considering a habeas petition. Under § 2254, if a state
court adjudicates a petitioner's federal claim on the merits, a federal
court on habeas corpus review must defer to the state court's
determination of that claim unless such adjudication resulted in a
decision that was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States" or was "based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court adjudicates a petitioner's federal claim "on the merits,"
and thus triggers the highly-deferential AEDPA standard of review, when
it: (1) disposes of the claim on the merits; and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment.
See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001). In so
doing, the state court need not explicitly refer to either the particular
federal claim or to any federal caselaw. See id. The only
requirement is that the claim be finally resolved, with res judicata
effect, on substantive rather than procedural grounds. See id.
If the state court does not adjudicate a petitioner's federal claim on
the merits, the state court's decision on the federal claim is entitled
to no deference and instead, the federal court must apply a pre-AEDPA
de novo review to the state court's disposition of the federal
claim. See Cotto, 331 F.3d at 230 (citing Aparicio v.
Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2001)).
4. Factual Determinations by the State
Under § 2254, factual determinations made by the state court are
presumed to be correct, and the petitioner carries the burden to rebut
this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). Consequently, this Court presumes that the
factual findings of the New York courts are correct and will not set
aside those findings unless "the material facts were not adequately
developed" or the factual determinations are not fairly supported by the
record. Smith v. Mann. 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999). 5. Independent and Adequate State Grounds
Finally, under the doctrine of "independent and adequate state
grounds," a federal court should not address a petitioner's habeas corpus
claim if the state judgment can be sustained on state law grounds that
are independent of the federal questions raised and that are adequate to
support the judgment. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375
(2002) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991));
see also Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1999). In
cases where the highest state court that rendered a judgment in the case
"clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state
procedural bar," such procedural default constitutes independent and
adequate state grounds to deny habeas relief. Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted);
see also; Levine v. Commissioner of Corr. Servs., 44 F.3d 121,
126 (2d Cir. 1995). This doctrine is prudential rather than
jurisdictional. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522-23
A procedural default may be excused, however, if the petitioner
demonstrates either cause for the default and actual prejudice from the
alleged violation of federal law; or that the failure to consider the
claims will "result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice."
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In this context, "cause" is defined
as "`some objective factor, external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts'
to raise the claim in state court." McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
A miscarriage of justice occurs "in an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, . . . ." Murray, 477 U.S. at 496;
see also Dixon v. Miller, 293 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2002). A
petitioner establishes actual innocence by demonstrating that "in light
of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him." Dixon, 293 F.3d at 81 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In this context, "`actual innocence'
means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998) (citing Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)).
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Under the United States Supreme Court's test enunciated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a criminal
defendant must meet a two-prong test in order to successfully make out a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must
demonstrate "errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
`counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id.
at 687. This burden entails overcoming the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."
Id. at 689 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court
must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
counsel "failed to exercise the skills and diligence that a reasonably
competent attorney would provide under similar circumstances." Boria
v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). The applicable standard of counsel's conduct is
"reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Wiggins v.
Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (citation omitted).
Under the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must
demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that counsel's
error altered the result of the proceeding. See Strickland 466
U.S. at 691 ("An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if
the error had no effect on the judgment."); accord United States v.
Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that both
Strickland prongs must be met in order for a petitioner to
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). A reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The
"prejudice" prong under Strickland is not simply outcome
determinative, but rather, it focuses on the impact of counsel's
performance on the overall integrity of the proceeding. See Lockhart
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993); Aeid v. Bennett,
296 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2002).
The determination of prejudice is made with the benefit of hindsight,
unlike the determination of whether counsel committed egregious errors in
the first place, which is judged under the circumstances at the time of
the representation. See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372; see
also United States v. Eyman, 313 F.3d 741, 743 (2d Cir. 2002);
Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1994).
Ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland implicates
a criminal defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. See Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78,
95 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Occasionally, the performance of defense counsel is
so dismal that it ripens into the deprivation of counsel altogether and
potentially violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights."). Despite
the implication of a defendant's right to counsel, the
Strickland test imposes a heavy burden on defendants who assert
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382
(1986) (referring to the Strickland test as "highly
demanding"). This burden is designed "to deter a baseless attack on the
performance of counsel in a last-ditch effort to avoid a conviction or
reduce the sentence." Percan v. United States, 294 F. Supp.2d 505,
511 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Strickland standard applies
equally to appellate counsel as it does to trial counsel. See Clark
v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 321 (2d Cir. 2000).
Against these legal standards, the Court turns to each of Diaz's claims
in his petition.*fn4
1. Absence from Sidebar Conferences
As discussed above, Diaz asserts that his absence from four
off-the-record sidebar conferences with individual members of the venire
violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to be present at all
material stages of his trial. Each of these four sidebar discussions
focused on the venire member's ability to serve as an impartial juror in
light of his or her connection to law enforcement. The four candidates were excused from jury service in Diaz's trial.*fn5 The trial
judge, the ADA, and Diaz's trial counsel were present at each sidebar
conference. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Diaz requested
to be present at the sidebars or that he objected to his absence.
While Diaz challenges his absence from all four sidebar conferences, he
focuses his challenge on his absence from the fourth sidebar voir dire.
This venire member indicated that his wife was a police officer and that
he was a member of the Blue Knights, an fraternal organization that has
many police officers as members. (See Petition at 25-26.)
According to Diaz, had he been present at this sidebar, he would have
instructed his attorney to permit this person to sit on the jury because
a police officer's spouse would
know that police officers are no less human than
any civilian. They would have heard stories of
possible dishonesty from fellow police personnel.
They would have had contact with other police
personnel and have realized that not all police
are truthful and honest. They would know that
overzealous police officers do exist.
(Id. at 26.) Thus, Diaz contends that he would have
benefitted from having this prospective juror sit on his jury.
The State argues that the Court should decline to entertain this claim
because it is unexhausted. Specifically, the State asserts that while Diaz argued to the Appellate Division,
both prior to and after the reconstruction hearing, that these jurors
were excused on consent, Diaz now argues to this Court that whether they
were excused for cause or on consent is a matter of semantics and does
not affect his right to be present. (See St. Mem. at 3-4.)
Although the State is technically correct as to the change in the tenor
of Diaz's argument on this claim between the time of his direct appeal to
the Appellate Division and his petition before this Court, the Court
doubts that Diaz failed to "fairly present" the claim to the highest
state court that issued a judgment. It is clear that the Appellate
Division was fairly appraised that Diaz was challenging his absence from
these sidebar conferences on both federal and state constitutional
grounds. (See St. Aff. at Ex. 1, pp. 23-27.) The Court need not
belabor the exhaustion issue on this point, however, because as will be
discussed below, this claim suffers from other technical and substantive
While Diaz invokes the federal constitution, it is clear from Diaz's
submissions that the legal principle upon which he anchors his claim is
the rule announced by the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1992). (See Petition at
26-28.) In Antommarchi, the Court of Appeals held that a
criminal defendant has a right to be present during a sidebar voir dire of a potential juror when the
questioning pertains to the potential juror's background, i.e.,
matters that touch upon the ability to objectively weigh the evidence.
See id. at 97. In a vacuum, this decision may seem to be
factually on-point with the present case. For the purpose of federal
habeas review, however, Antommarchi does not provide a basis
for granting Diaz the relief he seeks.
As discussed above, for purposes of Diaz's habeas corpus petition, the
Court need only determine whether Diaz's federal constitutional rights
have been violated. In an attempt to justify habeas relief, Diaz asserts
that Antommarchi is "embedded in Federal Law, as decided by the
Supreme Court." (Petition at 26.) The Court does not agree. Subsequent
decisions of the New York Court of Appeals make clear that the
Antommarchi rule is not a result of federal constitutional or
statutory mandate, but rather, is grounded in New York Criminal Procedure
Law § 260.20 ("§ 260.20"), which states that a "defendant must
be personally present during the trial of an indictment;. . . ." N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 260.20 (McKinney 2004). See, e.g., People v.
Maher, 675 N.E.2d 833, 835-36 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that a
defendant's right to be present at a sidebar with a potential juror is
"governed exclusively by New York statutory law"); People v.
Vargas, 668 N.E.2d 879, 884 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that under
Antommarchi, defendants have a statutory right under § 260.20 to be present
at voir dire sidebars and thus, the rule is "not rooted in the
Constitution"); People v. Mitchell, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1385
(1992) (discussing that the Antommarchi rule was a recognition
of a statutory violation of § 260.20 and thus, "is not compelled by
Federal law. . . .").
Indeed, the Antommarchi court did not discuss any
constitutional basis for its holding, citing only § 260.20 for the
proposition that a defendant has a fundamental right to be present at a
material stage of a trial. See Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
Thus, even if Diaz's rights under Antommarchi were violated, it
does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation.
Therefore, any alleged violation of these rights is not cognizable on
Even considering the merits of Diaz's claim, the Court finds no basis
to grant relief. Generally, a criminal defendant has a right to be
present at all material stages of his trial under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985). The empaneling of a jury is a material stage of a
trial that requires the defendant's presence. See Norde v. Keane,
294 F.3d 401, 411 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)
(2). This right, however, is not absolute. Rather, it arises only when the defendant's presence "has a
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to
defend against the charge." Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). In other words, "[t]he constitutional right to be
present at trial, . . .[applies] only to the extent that a fair and just
hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant's] absence." United
States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
The Court finds that as a purely practical matter, Diaz's claim on this
point is wholly lacking in merit. The record of the reconstruction
hearing established that the venire members at issue here were in fact
excused because of an expressed bias against Diaz based on
their ties to law enforcement. Specifically, the ADA testified on
cross-examination that, based on his notes during the voir dire, these
four members of the venire expressed that they could not be fair to Diaz,
although the ADA could not independently recall with certainty.
(See Hearing Tr. at 23:18-22.) ("[T]hese [four] people came up
and said, you know, you don't want me on this case, because I'm going to
convict him."); (see also id. at 25:19-21.) Diaz's trial
counsel, on the other hand, could not recall if the four individuals
expressed a bias against Diaz, although he thought that at least one of
them did. (See id. at 9:8-12.) Based on this testimony, and on its own recollection,
the trial court judge concluded that these four venire members were
excused for cause. (See id. at 39:16-23.)
As discussed above, for the purposes of habeas review, the trial
court's factual finding (and the Appellate Division's affirmation) that
the four venire persons were excused for cause are presumed to be
correct. Diaz carries the burden to rebut this presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). Diaz's
conclusory argument in his petition that the trial court engaged in a
"dialogue of semantics" when it determined that the prospective jurors
were excused for cause rather than on consent is insufficient to rebut
the presumption of correctness that attaches to the factual findings of
the trial court. Accordingly, the Court presumes that the four venire
members in question were excused for cause.*fn6 The Court's own review
of the record supports this conclusion.
Presuming that the four members of the venire were excused for cause on
the grounds the trial court found sufficient, it would be incongruous for Diaz, had he been present
at these sidebar conferences, to have advised his counsel to allow those
individuals to serve on his jury, as that result would have worked to his
detriment and surely supplied grounds the obverse of what he
argues here to challenge his conviction on the basis of potential
juror bias. Moreover, even if Diaz for some inexplicable reason would
have attempted to retain some of those individuals for jury service, it
is highly improbable that the trial judge, in the proper discharge of his
duties, would have allowed such a prospect, given the potential for bias
that was expressed. Thus, it is clear from the record that Diaz's
presence at the sidebar conferences here in contention would have served
no useful purpose and thus, it is highly unlikely that Diaz was
prejudiced in any way. In short, Diaz's presence at the sidebars would
have been "useless, or the benefit but a shadow." Snyder, 291
U.S. at 106-07.
Other federal courts facing similar challenges have denied habeas
relief on these grounds. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Donnelly, No.
02 Civ. 6259, 2003 WL 21146651, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2003) (finding no
federal right implicated by the defendant's Antommarchi claim
and stating that when the venire person is excused for cause, the
defendant could not have made any contribution to the sidebar);
Brown v. Edwards, No. 96 Civ. 3444, 1998 WL 1286349, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1998)
(discussing that Antommarchi is a state statutory rule and that
no federal law violation occurs when a potential juror is excused for
Even if Diaz's absence from the sidebar conferences in question somehow
implicated a recognized federal right, the error would be, at best,
harmless. Generally, a denial of a defendant's right to be present at all
material stages of a trial is reviewed for harmless error. See
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-19 (1983); United States v.
Evans, 352 F.3d 65, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2003). When a defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated due to trial error, habeas
relief is warranted only if the error "`had substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
Indeed, Second Circuit decisions reviewing a direct appeal from a
federal criminal trial have applied such a standard to claims factually
similar to the one Diaz raises here. For example, in United States
v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit held
that the absence of the defendant from sidebar discussions with
prospective jurors during voir dire was, at best, harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt that did not require reversal of his conviction. See id. at 112. The Feliciano court
considered the fact that the defendant was present during the
on-the-record portion of the voir dire, which was more extensive than the
brief sidebars; and that the defendant had access to his attorney during
the entire process. See id.
Similarly, in Sanchez v. Duncan, 282 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2002),
the Second Circuit found only harmless error in the absence of the
defendant from off-the-record sidebar discussions with members of the
venire when the defendant's counsel was present at all the sidebars, the
defendant was present throughout the voir dire process, and the defendant
could consult with his attorney before and in between the particular
sidebars. See id. at 82-83. In light of the Sanchez
court's holding that the defendant's absence from these sidebars was,
at best, harmless error, it did not decide whether a defendant has
a federal constitutional right to be present at these sidebars.*fn7
See id. at 83 n.4; see also Gaiter v. Lord,
917 F. Supp. 145, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the defendant's presence
at sidebar conference of a venire person is not mandated under federal
Because similar circumstances existed during the voir dire in Diaz's
trial, the Court discerns no federal constitutional violation sufficient in degree to grant Diaz the
habeas relief he seeks. Diaz's speculative assertion that he would have
successfully argued to retain these four members of the venire is
insufficient to establish a violation of his constitutional rights to
warrant granting his petition.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Diaz's contention that he was denied his
right to be present at all material stages of his trial because he was
not present at sidebar conferences with the four members of the venire
referred to in this claim.
2. Accomplice Corroboration Charge
Diaz alleges that the Appellate Division failed to correct errors in
the trial court's charge to the jury regarding the corroboration
requirement under New York State law. Specifically, Diaz challenges the
trial court's charge relating to New York Criminal Procedure Law §
60.22 ("§ 60.22"), which does not permit the testimony of an
accomplice to form the basis of a conviction unless the state offers
independent corroborating evidence that tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 60.22(1) (McKinney 2004). According to Diaz, the trial court's
instruction permitted the jury to convict him upon insufficient evidence
in violation of the New York State Constitution and the Due Process and
Confrontation Clauses of the United States Constitution. (See
Petition at 29-32.) The Court finds that Diaz's claim on this issue can be summarily denied
under the doctrine of independent and adequate state law grounds. Because
Diaz failed to raise his objection to the jury charge at trial, the
Appellate Division found this claim unpreserved for appellate review.
See People v. Diaz, 706 N.Y.S.2d 23, 23-24 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2000). As discussed above, a procedural default at the state level is
grounds for denial of habeas relief. See Rhagi v. Artuz,
309 F.3d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2002). Non-compliance with New York's
contemporaneous objection rule, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
470.05(2) (McKinney 2004), is an adequate and independent state ground to
deny habeas relief. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87
(1977); Glenn v. Bartlett, 98 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir. 1996).
Although Diaz may seek to excuse this default by showing cause and
actual prejudice, he has failed to make any such showing, and the Court
finds nothing in the record to support any inference that there is cause
to excuse Diaz's default. Diaz has also failed to make a showing of
actual innocence to support the "miscarriage of justice" basis to excuse
a procedural default. The Court's review of the trial transcript finds
ample evidence (some of which is discussed below) upon which the jury
could have convicted Diaz beyond a reasonable doubt of the two crimes for
which he was charged. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a sufficient basis to
deny habeas relief on these grounds.
In addition, the Court agrees with the State that this claim is purely
a challenge to New York's corroboration requirement under § 60.22
a requirement not mandated by federal law. See United States
v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the
testimony of an accomplice can be the sole basis of a conviction "so long
as that testimony is not incredible on its face and is capable of
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Under federal law, accomplice testimony that is
uncorroborated goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its
admissibility. See id. Thus, Diaz's claim does not arise under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States to warrant
habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a); see also Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) ("federal habeas corpus relief
does not lie for errors of state law.").
Notwithstanding these obstacles, the Court will review the substance of
Diaz's claim in an abundance of caution and to assure that there has been
no miscarriage of justice. Where, such as here, a petitioner challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at his state trial, a habeas
court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and the petitioner is entitled to relief only if "no rational trier
of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the
evidence adduced at trial." Ponnapula v. Spitzer, 297 F.3d 172,
179 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979)). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at a
state trial "is essentially a question of state law and does not rise to
federal constitutional dimensions, . . . absent a record so totally
devoid of evidentiary support that a due process issue is raised."
Mapp v. Warden, New York State Corr. Inst. for Women,
531 F.2d 1167, 1173 n.8 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Accordingly, a petitioner "bears a `very heavy burden' in
convincing a federal habeas court to grant a petition on the grounds of
insufficient evidence." Ponnapula, 297 F.3d at 179 (citation
More particularly, errors in state jury instructions do not generally
give rise to habeas relief. See Gilmore v. Taylor,
508 U.S. 333, 344 (1993). For a federal court to grant habeas relief in these
instances, the petitioner must demonstrate not only that the instruction
misstated the applicable law, but also that the error was so egregious
that he was deprived of a right under federal law. See Sams v.
Walker, 18 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1994).
The Court finds that Diaz has failed to meet this burden. First, Diaz has not shown that the instruction was an incorrect
statement of state law nor that he was deprived of any federal right.
Furthermore, upon review of the record, the Court finds that the specific
evidence Diaz challenges satisfies the state statutory requirement for
corroboration under § 60.22. At Diaz's trial, the most damaging
testimony came from the State's main witness, Jesus Ortiz ("Ortiz").
Ortiz was a teenager who joined the conspiracy to kill DeJesus, although
he later changed his mind and did not take part in the shooting. Ortiz
testified that in November of 1993, he had a conversation with Carlos
Ocasio ("Ocasio"), who disclosed to Ortiz that he was involved in a
failed attempt to kill DeJesus on November 18, 1993. (See Trial
Tr. at 302:18-303:13.) Ortiz further testified that in December of 1993,
he had a second conversation with Ocasio whereby Ocasio attempted to
recruit him to participate in a second attempt to murder DeJesus, the
attempt that ultimately succeeded. (See id. at 303:20-304:14.)
According to Ortiz, when he asked Ocasio why they were going to murder
DeJesus, Ocasio replied that it was because she "owed money to Borys."
(Id. at 304:5-14.)
Ortiz's testimony continued when the ADA elicited details as to how
the participants in the conspiracy to kill DeJesus attempted to solicit
Ortiz's participation on the day of the murder. (See id. at
311:9-313:9.) Specifically, Ortiz testified that he, Ocasio, and Rivera met Haywood near Haywood's
residence, where they all proceeded to meet with Diaz, who pulled up in
his vehicle. (See id. at 312:8-314:7.) According to Ortiz,
everyone entered Diaz's vehicle, and Ortiz witnessed Diaz hand a firearm
to Haywood and tell all of them: "You gotta kill the lady now."
(Id. at 313:10-314:18.) Ortiz testified that at this point, he
and Ocasio decided that they did not want to participate in the plot.
Ortiz and Ocasio exited Diaz's vehicle, leaving only Haywood and Rivera
to carry out the crime. (See id. 314:18-20; 316:13-15.) Ortiz
then testified that at some later time, he saw Diaz return to the area
alone in his vehicle and then saw Haywood and Rivera arrive in a taxi
cab. (See id. at 316:16-317:11.) According to Ortiz, Rivera
then placed the murder weapon in the back of Diaz's vehicle and Diaz
handed money to Haywood and Rivera. (See id. at 317:11-318:3.)
During its charge to the jury, the trial court first instructed the
jury that Ortiz was an accomplice as a matter of law. (See id.
at 724:24-725:6.) The jury was then instructed that it may consider
either of the following as corroborating Ortiz's testimony: (1) the
testimony of Elizabeth Jimenez ("Jimenez"), another Promesa employee who
was leaving the building at the time of the shooting and observed a
vehicle matching a description of Diaz's vehicle near the scene of the crime shortly after the shooting occurred; or
(2) the testimony of a State cooperator, Adolphus Cooper ("Cooper"), a
fellow inmate of Diaz to whom Diaz made inculpatory statements while in
pre-trial detention. (See id. at 726:23-727:16.) Cooper
testified at Diaz's trial that Diaz told him that he had murdered a woman
for investigating some stolen money from a drug program, and that when
she was shot, "she fell like a bag of rocks." (See Trial Tr. at
Diaz argues that the trial court "committed error when it marshaled the
evidence in an itemizing process" during the jury charge on corroborating
evidence. (See Petition at 31.) Diaz contends that the trial
court failed to instruct the jury that Jimenez's testimony that she saw
Diaz's vehicle in the vicinity of the shooting on the day DeJesus was
killed was, by itself, insufficient to corroborate Ortiz's testimony.
(See id. at 29-30.) Diaz essentially argues that Jimenez's
testimony lacks probative value because evidence that Diaz's vehicle was
seen in the vicinity of the shooting is explained by the fact that Diaz
was also a Promesa employee, and thus, the presence of his vehicle at the
Promesa building at the time of the shooting was "purely innocent."
(Id. at 31.)
The Court does not agree. The record in this case makes clear that
Jimenez's testimony is sufficiently probative to independently corroborate Ortiz's testimony. While Diaz argues that
because he was a Promesa employee, it would be logical to find his
vehicle near the scene of the crime, the uncontested evidence adduced at
trial established that Diaz did not work at the Promesa headquarters
where DeJesus was killed. Rather, Diaz was employed as a caseworker at
the satellite Promesa facility located on Clay Avenue, which was
approximately two miles away from where the crime occurred.
(See Trial Tr. at 147:5-16; 148:13-18.) While it is not
inconceivable that Diaz, as a Promesa employee, may have had a legitimate
reason to be at the Promesa headquarters, the record is devoid of any
explanation as to why his vehicle may have been at the headquarters
building at the time that the shooting occurred despite the fact
that Diaz's actual work location was two miles away. The absence of
contrary evidence on this question renders Jimenez's testimony
independently probative and certainly sufficiently probative to
corroborate Ortiz's testimony under § 60.22, which does not require
that the corroborating evidence, by itself, prove that the defendant is
guilty, but only that the evidence "tend[s] to connect the defendant with
the commission [the]. . . offense." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22
In connection with Diaz's challenge to the corroboration charge, he now
asserts for the first time, that the trial court erred when it admitted Cooper's testimony. (See Petition
at 31.) Because this claim was never raised in the state proceedings, and
there has been no showing of cause or prejudice, the Court need not
consider it. Nevertheless, it is clear that this argument also lacks
merit. Diaz presumes that the jury must have disregarded Cooper's
testimony because Cooper had also testified that he (Cooper) had
cooperated in other cases in similar fashion and had received some
benefit from the State, thereby demonstrating the potential for bias.
(See Petition at 31; Trial Tr. at 428:10-435:18.) As the State
correctly points out, however, because Cooper testified during
cross-examination about his past cooperation in other criminal cases and
the benefits he received therefrom, the jury could have considered
Cooper's possible bias and afforded his testimony whatever weight it
deemed proper. The Court discerns no error or prejudice to Diaz with the
admission of Cooper's testimony.
In short, the record in this case establishes that, as to these two
counts, there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial for a rational
jury to find Diaz guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Diaz has failed to
carry his burden to convince this Court otherwise. The record supports
the Court's finding that Diaz was not denied a fair trial as a result of
the trial court's marshaling of the evidence during its charge. See Johnson v. Scully, 727 F.2d 222, 227 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("The marshalling of evidence is not subject to an equal time
requirement, . . .") Moreover, the evidence that the trial court
enumerated during its charge was sufficient to corroborate the
accomplice's testimony. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds
that Diaz's due process guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment were
not violated by the trial court's corroboration charge to the jury, and
the Appellate Division's subsequent denial of this claim. Accordingly,
the Court rejects this basis for habeas corpus relief.*fn8
3. Consecutive Sentences
Diaz alleges that his federal due process rights were violated when the
trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the murder and conspiracy
convictions. (See Petition at 37-39.) Specifically, Diaz argues
that because the act forming the basis of the murder conviction,
i.e., the shooting of DeJesus, constitutes a material element
of the conspiracy conviction, the two sentences should have been imposed
concurrently under New York law. See N.Y. Penal Law §
70.25(2) (McKinney 2004) ("§ 70.25(2)"). The Appellate Division's single-line statement that Diaz's claim is
"meritless," see People v. Diaz, 706 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 2000), is more than likely sufficient to trigger the AEDPA
deferential standard of review. See Miranda v. Bennett,
322 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing that if the record is clear that
a claim was preserved for appellate review, a final determination by the
Appellate Division can be considered to be "on the merits" even if the
decision does not expressly discuss the merits). Nevertheless, because it
is clear that this claim is based on Diaz's misunderstanding of the
elements of the two offenses for which he was convicted, the Court can
dispose of it summarily on the merits.
As with Diaz's other claims, the Court is concerned here only with any
alleged violation of Diaz's federal constitutional rights and not
necessarily with adherence to any state statutory requirements.
Nevertheless, the Court looks to the application of New York law on this
issue because "[n]o federal constitutional issue is presented
where . . . the sentence is within the range prescribed by state law."
White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992).
Diaz asserts that the act forming the basis of one conviction is a
material element of the other conviction because the conspiracy charge in
the indictment, which the trial court read to the jury during its charge, lists the actual
shooting of DeJesus as one of the overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. According to Diaz, the shooting of DeJesus also forms the
basis of the murder conviction, and therefore, the sentences should have
been imposed concurrently. (See Petition at 38.)
This line of reasoning misapprehends the elements of the two offenses.
The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find Diaz guilty on
the charge of conspiracy in the second degree, it must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) between November 18, 1993 and December 14,
1993, Diaz agreed with others to murder DeJesus; (2) Diaz made such an
agreement with the intention that the act be performed; and (3) at least
one of the co-conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. (See Trial Tr. at 754:20-758:9.) This instruction
comports with the elements of the applicable New York penal statute.
See N.Y. Penal Law § 105.15 (McKinney 2004). The jury was
then instructed that it may consider any of the 11 overt acts charged in
the indictment, of which one was the actual shooting of DeJesus.
(See Trial Tr. at 758:10-760:4.) The other overt acts that the
jury could consider included the acts that the co-conspirators performed
about a month prior to the murder and the acts performed on the day of
the murder. (See id.) Similarly, the trial court instructed the jury that in order to find
Diaz guilty of the charge of murder in the second degree, it must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) on December 14, 1993, Diaz, acting in
concert with Haywood and Rivera, shot DeJesus; (2) Diaz acted with intent
to cause the death of DeJesus; and (3) the shooting of DeJesus caused her
death. (See id. at 748:5-750:5.) This instruction is likewise
in accordance with the applicable New York statute. See N.Y.
Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 2004).
It is clear that there is no directly overlapping element in these two
crimes. The actual shooting of DeJesus, which is a material element of
the murder charge, is only one of several overt acts that could satisfy
the third element of the conspiracy charge. Because the actual commission
of a murder is not an element of the conspiracy charge, the act forming
the basis of the murder conviction is not a material element of the
conspiracy conviction. The shooting of DeJesus was not a necessary
predicate to a finding of guilt on the conspiracy charge, and thus, the
crimes committed were separate and distinct. The trial court instructed
the jury to consider the two charges separately. (See Trial Tr. at
753:10-14; 754:3-8.) The jury heard testimony regarding the numerous
overt acts alleged in the indictment, any one of which could have
satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that an overt act was committed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Diaz's consecutive
sentences do not violate § 70.25(2).
The Court concludes that there is no federal constitutional violation
to warrant habeas relief from the trial court's imposition of consecutive
sentences because the sentences do not violate state law. See
White, 969 F.2d at 1383. Accordingly, the Court rejects Diaz's
challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences for the crimes for
which he was convicted.
4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Diaz challenges the effectiveness of his trial counsel for
stipulating to the unavailability of Ocasio, whose damaging out-of-court
statements regarding Diaz were introduced at trial through Ortiz's
testimony. (See Addendum at 3.) Diaz further challenges the
effectiveness of his appellate counsel for failing to raise this alleged
error on direct appeal to the Appellate Division. (See id.)
Ocasio's statements were admitted as statements of a co-conspirator made
in the furtherance of the conspiracy and as statements against penal
interest. (See Trial Tr. 289:10-24.) The parties agreed that
Ocasio was unavailable because if called to testify, he would assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (See id.
At the outset, the Court notes that Diaz raised this claim in his coram nobis petition to the Appellate
Division. The Appellate Division denied Diaz's petition summarily and
without a written opinion. Hence, it is difficult for this Court to
determine whether this issue was decided on the merits, which would
trigger the deferential AEDPA standard of review. On the other hand, the
record does not suggest any reason why the Appellate Division would have
denied Diaz's coram nobis claim on procedural grounds.
Consequently, it would appear that the Appellate Division's denial of the
petition both disposed of the claim on the merits; and reduced its
disposition to judgment to satisfy the requirements of an adjudication on
the merits under the AEDPA. See Sellan v. Kuhlman,
261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001). However, given that the Appellate Division's
ruling is devoid of any discussion on the matter, the Court will grant
Diaz the benefit of the doubt and consider this claim de novo
to assure that there has been no miscarriage of justice in denying
After due consideration of the parties' arguments in light of the
United States Supreme Court's Strickland test and the record in
this case, the Court finds that Diaz's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, like his other claims, is baseless. In order to assess the
performance of Diaz's counsel at both the trial and appellate levels, it
is necessary to first address the underlying acts or omissions that
Diaz is alleging gave rise to his counsel's ineffectiveness.
As discussed above, the Court's analysis on habeas review must be
confined to a federal constitutional or statutory provision as mandated
by § 2254. In this case, Diaz raises this challenge under the
Confrontation Clause and right to counsel contained in the Sixth
Amendment. (See Addendum at 3, 5.) With regard to the
invocation of the Confrontation Clause, Diaz asserts that he was denied
this right when Ocasio's out-of-court statements were introduced at his
trial. (See id.) The Court interprets Diaz's claim here as a
thinly veiled challenge to the admissibility of the statements.
On habeas review, the Court need only determine whether the challenged
statements run afoul of the Confrontation Clause. See Glenn v,
Bartlett, 98 F.3d 721, 728 (2d Cir. 1996). In Clenn, the
Second Circuit made clear that "even if [the] admission of [a
co-conspirator's] statement violated New York law which unlike
federal law requires independent indicia of reliability for a co
conspirator's statement the statement does not offend the federal
Confrontation Clause if it falls within [Federal] Rule [of Evidence]
801(d)(2)'s co-conspirator exception."*fn9 Id. This holding is
consistent with prior United States Supreme Court precedent. See Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987).
The admission of a co-conspirator's statement under the hearsay
exception embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)
("Rule 801(d)(2)") requires a court to find that: (1) there was a conspiracy;
(2) the conspiracy had as its members both the declarant and the person
against whom the statements are being offered; and (3) the statements
were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). These are factual inquires for the court to find by a
preponderance of the evidence. See id. (citing
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-76)).
The trial court found these elements satisfied and accordingly,
admitted Ocasio's statements through Ortiz's testimony.*fn10
(See Trial Tr. at 289:10-290:3.) As discussed above, this Court
presumes the correctness of any factual findings of the trial court. Diaz
makes only conclusory statements regarding those findings and
accordingly, has not persuaded this Court that they are erroneous. Thus,
Diaz has failed to carry his burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence. The Court's own review of the record in this case supports a finding that Ortiz's
statements would fall within the hearsay exception of Rule 801(d)(2).
Because the admission of Ortiz's out-of-court statements satisfy the
requirements of Rule 801(d)(2) for co-conspirator's statements, the
Court finds that Diaz's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated
when Ocasio's statements were admitted at trial.*fn11 See United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986) (discussing that a
co-conspirator's statements made during the conspiracy are not easily replicated
in the courtroom and noting that " [c]onspirators are likely
to speak differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand").
Even if the admission of Ocasio's statements at trial somehow violated
Diaz's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the Court finds that the
error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Ortiz
testified as to what Ocasio told him with regard to the previous attempt
to murder DeJesus, Ortiz also testified as what he saw and heard on the
day of the murder . . . testimony that is independent of Ocasio's
statements and equally probative of Diaz's guilt on both the conspiracy
and murder charges. Specifically, Ortiz testified that he was with
Haywood, Rivera, and Ocasio when Diaz pulled up in his vehicle.*fn12
(See Trial Tr. at 312:8-31315.) Ortiz recalled getting into the
vehicle with the others, observing Diaz hand a gun to Haywood, and
hearing Diaz say: "You gotta kill the lady now." (See id. at
314:8-18.) It was at this point that Ortiz and Ocasio backed out of the
plot and exited the vehicle. (See id. at 314:18-20.) Ortiz
testified that sometime later, he observed Rivera place the gun in Diaz's vehicle and Diaz hand money to Haywood and Rivera. (See id.
The Court finds that Ortiz's non-hearsay account of the events on the
day of the murder, corroborated by Jimenez's and/or Cooper's testimony,
together with the testimony of the other witnesses,*fn13 is sufficient
for a jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Diaz was guilty
of both the conspiracy and murder charges. While Ocasio's statements may
have provided additional support for the State's conspiracy case against
Diaz, it was hardly the linchpin. Accordingly, if Diaz's Confrontation
Clause rights were violated by the admission of Ocasio's statements, the
totality of all the other evidence adduced at trial amply supports the
conviction, and hence, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 547 (1986) (stating that
although a Confrontation Clause violation occurred, it did not "foreclose
the possibility that [the] error was harmless when assessed in the
context of the entire case against [the defendant]") (citation omitted).
Turning to Diaz's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is clear that Diaz has not rebutted the "strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance" as required by the first
Strickland prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. For
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a declarant who makes clear that he
will assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination if
called to testify is considered an unavailable witness to both parties.
See Latins v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1166 (2d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Cacique, 844 F.2d 942, 950-51 (2d Cir. 1988).
The same rule applies under New York State law. See People v.
Sauvignon, 791 N.E.2d 401, 405 (N.Y. 2003) ("[A] witness who on
Fifth Amendment grounds refuses to testify will be considered
`unavailable' although the witness's presence is known and
apparent . . . An accomplice (whether charged as such or not) who can be
expected to invoke a privilege would similarly be unavailable.").
The record in this case makes clear that Ocasio, who was an unindicted
co-conspirator involved in the first attempt on DeJesus's life, would
have asserted his Fifth Amendment rights if called to testify. In fact,
Ocasio was produced at Diaz's trial by subpoena for the purpose of
testifying, but upon discussions between the parties, it was determined
that he would assert his rights against self-incrimination.*fn14
(See Trial Tr. at 189:19-191:19.) Under these circumstances,
Diaz's trial counsel had little in the way of options. Thus, it was
neither unreasonable nor a serious lapse in judgment for Diaz's trial
counsel to stipulate to Ocasio's unavailability.
Moreover, to the extent that Diaz's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is rooted in his trial counsel's alleged failure to prevent the
admission of Ocasio's statements, the record indicates that trial
counsel, in fact, did object to the introduction of these out-of-court
statements on the grounds that they were not co-conspirator statements or
statements against penal interest subject to a hearsay exception. The
trial court overruled the objection. (See Trial Tr. at
286:19-290:1; 306:5-20; 498:14-501:19.) Thus, Diaz has failed to
demonstrate a serious deficiency in the conduct of his trial counsel to
satisfy the first prong of Strickland.
The Court likewise finds that Diaz has failed to demonstrate, under the
second Strickland prong, that there is a reasonable probability
that the alleged error by his counsel changed the result of the trial. As
discussed above, Diaz's guilt was adequately established even without Ocasio's out-of
court statements. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that any
alleged error by trial counsel in stipulating to Ocasio's unavailability
was prejudicial. Because the Court concludes that Diaz's trial counsel
was not ineffective on the asserted grounds, it follows that Diaz's
appellate counsel was likewise not ineffective for failing to raise an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim before the Appellate
Division based on the same circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds no merit to any of Diaz's
grounds upon which he seeks a writ of habeas corpus. The petition is
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the petition of Borys Diaz ("Diaz") for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED in its entirety.
As Diaz has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, the Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. SO ORDERED.