The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORETTA PRESKA, District Judge
Plaitiffs Moukaddas Iouldacheva and Masouda Iouldasheva bring this
action against defendants City of New York (the "City"), New York City
Police Department ("NYPD"), Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the
City of New York ("PBA" or "defendant", and various individual NYPD
officers (the "Officers") for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985,
1988, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Consutituion of the United States. The PBA moves to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The PBA also asks that plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint further be
denied as futile.
Plaintiffs allege that on or about January 6, 2002 at 10:00 p.m., they
were in apartment 3A at 143 West 75th Street, (Compl. ¶ 15), with
Irene Lapchina (Compl. ¶ 16). The Officers knocked on the door and, when
they demanded that the door be opened, Ms. Lapchina asked to see the
Officers' badge numbers., Compl. ¶ 16.) The Officers left without giving
their badge numbers but allegedly returned shortly thereafter with a
battering ram with which they broke down the apartment door. (Compl. ¶
Upon entering, the Officers arrested Ms. Lapchina, who was in the midst
of calling 911. (Compl. ¶ 18., Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Lapchina wrote
the log number of the 911 call on One back of her attorney's business
card, (Compl. ¶ 17), and that when Moukaddas Iouldacheva wrote the
Officers' badge numbers on the back of the same business card, the
Officers threatened plaintiffs with eviction and deportation, (Compl. ¶
20.) The officers are said to have ignored plaintiffs' attempts to
explain in English that they lawfully resided in the apartment. (Compl.
¶ 20.) The Officers then allegedly grabbed Moukadas Iouldacheva twisted
her arms behind her back and threw her onto the ground to handcuff and arrest her. (Compl. ¶ 21.) They are said to
have then repeatedly hit her head and face into a coffee table until she
lost consciousness. (Compl. ¶ 22.)
According to the complaint, Masouda Iouldacheva received similar
treatment when the Officers allegedly hit her in the chest and threw her
out of the apartment and onto the railing of a staircase before throwing
her onto the trunk of their patrol car. (Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.) As the
Officers were taking Moukaddas Iouldacheva to the patrol car, one of them
allegedly searched through her pockets and removed and ripped up the
business card on which the Officers' badge information and the 911 log
number were written. (Compl. ¶ 25.)
Upon reaching the precinct, the Officers are said to have handcuffed
and locked Moukaddas Iouldacheva in a cell and refused her water or
medical attention even after she vomited in her cell. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27.)
The Officers allegedly harassed Moukaddas Iouldacheva by drinking water
in front of her. (Compl. ¶ 23.) One of the Officers is alleged to have
stated at the precinct that, "It's three Russians against one of ours."
(Compl. ¶ 29.)
Nowhere in the complaint do plaintiffs allege that any PBA
representative or official was present during any of the events leading
up to the arrest, during the arrest itself, or during any of the
post-arrest events alleged to have occurred at the precinct station house. Nor does the Complaint allege that a
PBA representative or official met with, provided advice to, or otherwise
had contact of any kind with any of the Officers an any time whatsoever.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), I must, accept
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and draw
all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. In order to avoid dismissal,
plaintiff must do more than plead mere "[c]onclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masqueraning as factual conclusions." Gebhardt v. Allspect,
Inc., 96 F. Supp.2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.34[a][b] (3d ed. 1997)). Dismissal is
proper only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), accord Cohen v. Koenig,
25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994).
In order to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution of
the United States, a plaintiff must have suffered in "injury in fact."
The Supreme Court has defined an "injury in fact" as an injury that is
"(a) concrete and particularized and by actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Fnvironmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (1999). Furthermore, the injury must be
"fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and [it must
be] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision." Id.; see also Jaghory v. New York
State Department of Education, et al., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997).
In a § 1983 action, "[l]ability may not be imposed where the causal
connection between [defendant's] conduct and the constitutional injury is
remote rather than direct." Trivedi v. Thayer, 97 Civ. 1377, 1998 WL
799181, *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 901 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965, 1999 quoting Taylor v. Brentwood Union
Free School District, l-?3 F.3d 679, 686 (2d Cir. 1998)). A plaintiff
must prove chat the defendant caused a violation or deprivation of the
plaintiff's rights. Taylor, 143 F.3d at 685. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals has consistently held that a plaintiff must state an injury that
is "both concrete in nature and particularized" to the plaintiff. In re
U.S. Catholic Conference, 385 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (2d Cir. 1989).
Here, plaintiffs each bring two constitutional claims against the PBA.
The first is Count XI on behalf of Moukaddas and XI on behalf of ...