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DECRISTO v. CITY OF NEW YORK

United States District Court, S.D. New York


May 25, 2004.

JUAN DECRISTO, Plaintiff, -against- THE CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICER CORNEILUS SULLIVAN, POLICE OFFICER CAPOLINO, and UNIDENTIFIED NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, and AGENTS, Defendants

The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORETTA PRESKA, District Judge

OPINION & ORDER

On or about March 1, 2004, plaintiff, Juan Decristo, agreed to withdraw all claims against the City of New York and the unnamed "John Doe" defendants. On or about March 31, 2004, the remaining two defendants, Corneilus Sullivan and Craig Capolino, moved for an order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff submitted no opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, and on or about May 19, 2004, I ordered that defendants' motion would be deemed fully submitted.

Plaintiff's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and excessive force are barred by the three year statute of limitations for claims brought under Title 42 United States Code section 1983. Plaintiff's false arrest and imprisonment claim accrued at the time of plaintiff's arrest on October 4, 1998, more than three years before plaintiff's complaint was filed on March 13, 2003.*fn1 See Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1999). The actions giving rise to plaintiff's excessive force claim are alleged to have occurred November 1, 1999, and, therefore, were required to have been brought no later than November 1, 2002. Accordingly, these claims are time-barred.

  Plaintiff's state tort law claims are barred by section 50-i of the General Municipal Law, which requires that all personal injury claims brought against a city or its officers, agents or employees be brought within one year and ninety days from the event upon which the claim is based. See Singleton v. City of Newburgh, 1 F. Supp.2d 306, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). None of the events upon which plaintiff bases his tort claims occurred within one year and ninety days of plaintiff's filing of his complaint. Accordingly, these claims are also time-barred.

  Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution fails to state a claim. Plaintiff has offered no facts upon which a jury could determine that there was a lack of probable cause to commence the proceedings against him nor has plaintiff demonstrated any facts upon which a jury could find actual malice motivated any of the defendants' actions. See Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed.

  For the reasons stated above, Sullivan's and Capolino's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (docket no. 13) is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall mark this action closed and all pending motions denied as moot.

  SO ORDERED


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