United States District Court, S.D. New York
May 25, 2004.
JUAN DECRISTO, Plaintiff, -against- THE CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICER CORNEILUS SULLIVAN, POLICE OFFICER CAPOLINO, and UNIDENTIFIED NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, and AGENTS, Defendants
The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORETTA PRESKA, District Judge
OPINION & ORDER
On or about March 1, 2004, plaintiff, Juan Decristo, agreed to withdraw
all claims against the City of New York and the unnamed "John Doe"
defendants. On or about March 31, 2004, the remaining two defendants,
Corneilus Sullivan and Craig Capolino, moved for an order of dismissal
pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff
submitted no opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, and
on or about May 19, 2004, I ordered that defendants' motion would be
deemed fully submitted.
Plaintiff's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and excessive
force are barred by the three year statute of limitations for claims
brought under Title 42 United States Code section 1983. Plaintiff's false
arrest and imprisonment claim accrued at the time of plaintiff's arrest
on October 4, 1998, more than three years before plaintiff's complaint was filed on March 13, 2003.*fn1 See Covington v. City of New
York, 171 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1999). The actions giving rise to
plaintiff's excessive force claim are alleged to have occurred November
1, 1999, and, therefore, were required to have been brought no later than
November 1, 2002. Accordingly, these claims are time-barred.
Plaintiff's state tort law claims are barred by section 50-i of the
General Municipal Law, which requires that all personal injury claims
brought against a city or its officers, agents or employees be brought
within one year and ninety days from the event upon which the claim is
based. See Singleton v. City of Newburgh, 1 F. Supp.2d 306, 316-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). None of the events upon which plaintiff bases his tort
claims occurred within one year and ninety days of plaintiff's filing of
his complaint. Accordingly, these claims are also time-barred.
Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution fails to state a claim.
Plaintiff has offered no facts upon which a jury could determine that
there was a lack of probable cause to commence the proceedings against
him nor has plaintiff demonstrated any facts upon which a jury could find
actual malice motivated any of the defendants' actions. See Russell
v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this claim must also be
For the reasons stated above, Sullivan's and Capolino's motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (docket no. 13) is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall mark
this action closed and all pending motions denied as moot.