The opinion of the court was delivered by: DAVID HURD, District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Plaintiff Ahmed Zahran ("plaintiffs"), on behalf of his minor son,
Ibrahim Zahran ("Ibrahim" or "plaintiffs"), a disabled student, brought
suit against defendants State of New York Department of Education ("DOE")
and Board of Education of the Niskuyana Central School District
("District" or "Board"), alleging causes of action under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(first cause of action), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law (second cause of action),
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (third cause of action), the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (fourth cause of
action), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(fifth cause of action). The district cross-claimed against
DOE, demanding that the state review officer's decision be partially
reversed or modified.
By Memorandum-Decision and Order dated February 10, 2004, the DOE's
motion to dismiss the complaint and cross-claim as against it was
granted. Zahran ex rel. Zahran v. N.Y. Dep't of Educ.,
306 F. Supp.2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). On April 8, 2004, the District moved for
summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. (Docket No. 39.)
Plaintiffs opposed and cross-moved for summary judgment, also pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. (Docket No. 41.) Oral argument was heard on the
summary judgment motions on June 2, 2004, in Albany, New York. Decision
The relevant facts of this case were extensively outlined in the
February 10, 2004, Memorandum-Decision and Order, Id. at
206-08, and will not be repeated here. Familiarity with that decision
("Zahran I") will be assumed.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment must be granted when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56;
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr.
Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999). Facts, inferences therefrom, and ambiguities must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348,
89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Once the moving party has met the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, however, the nonmoving party
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. At that
point, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita
Elec., 475 U.S. at 386. Indeed, to withstand a summary judgment
motion, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that sufficient evidence
exists upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Matsushita Elec., 475
U.S. at 587.
B. Article 89, Americans with Disabilities, and Rehabilitation
Plaintiffs have voluntarily withdrawn their second, fourth,
and fifth causes of action, asserting claims under Article 89
of the New York State Education Law, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (Docket No. 41, Attach. 6, p. 1.)
Accordingly, those claims will be dismissed.
Though Zahran I addressed plaintiffs' claims against just the
DOE, the only defendant which had moved to dismiss, it applies with equal
force to the propriety of plaintiffs' first cause of action
against the District.
In the first cause of action, plaintiffs allege that Ibrahim
was deprived of a free appropriate public education for the 2001-02
academic school year, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"). In Zahran I, it was noted that compensatory education is available as appropriate relief under the
IDEA, but monetary damages are not. 306 F. Supp.2d at 210 (citing
Garro v. State of Conn., 23 F.3d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1994);
Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged ...