The opinion of the court was delivered by: HOWARD MUNSON, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
On August 9, 1999, the Clerk's Office for the Northern District
of New York received correspondence from pro se plaintiff,
Grant D. Langdon ("Langdon"), which included a notice of motion
and an affidavit in support of his request for sanctions for full
recovery of damages, presumably made pursuant to Rule 11(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against defendants.
Previously, on July 14, 1999, the court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure holding that Langdon and his
son's case was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See
Langdon v. Proper, 1999 WL 263554 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 1999).
Judgment was entered for defendants the same day. Dkt. No. 41.
Plaintiff never appealed the court's order of dismissal to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, thus rendering this court's
judgment final and the case closed.
On June 1, 2004, the court received a Mandate from the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied Langdon's mandamus
petition to compel the district court to decide Langdon's motion
for sanctions. The Second Circuit noted that Langdon had "failed
to submit evidence that the motion for sanctions, which is
neither reflected on the district court's docket sheet nor
present in the record, was actually filed in the district court . . .
If [Langdon] wishes to contest the accuracy of the district
court's records, application should be made to that court." Dkt.
On June 4, 2004, the court received correspondence from Langdon
in which he contested the accuracy of the district court's records. Langdon cited his
motion papers dated August 4, 1999, and noted that in reply to
his motion for sanctions, counsel for defendants had submitted an
affidavit in opposition. After review of Langdon's submissions,
the court determines that Langdon submitted a motion for
sanctions that should have been filed and surmises that, due to
clerical error, plaintiff's motion for sanctions was never file
stamped and thereafter remained in the correspondence section of
the case file.*fn1 The court will now address Langdon's
motion for sanctions.
I. Plaintiff's Pro Se Status
Because plaintiff proceeds pro se in this matter, the court
must hold his submissions to "less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); accord
Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e read
[the pro se party's] supporting papers liberally, and will
interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest."). This liberal standard, however, does not excuse a
pro se litigant from complying with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law. See Traguth v. Zuck,
710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
II. Alleged Sanctionable Conduct
In his August 9, 1999, affidavit, Langdon alleges that
"[l]awyers for the defendant and the named defendants Obstructed
Justice by destruction Of evidence, the willful withholding of
evidence and filing a frivolous motion To conceal the illegal
actions of the County of Columbia and the defendants." In his
June 4, 2004, affidavit, Langdon alleges that James Resila, Esq.,
counsel for defendants, submitted affidavits he knew to be false. Langdon
further alleges that Resila withheld exculpatory evidence from
the Grand Jury and District Attorney. Langdon requests that the
court award "sanctions covering the full damages caused by the
defendants" in the amount of $50 million and bar Carter, Conboy,
Case, Blackmore, Napierski & Maloney, P.C. from appearing before
the Federal Courts and practicing law within the State of New
York. Langdon Aff. August 9, 1999; Langdon Aff. June 9, 2004.
III. Rule 11 Procedural Requirements
As noted above, Langdon failed to specify under or upon which
statute he was bringing his motion for sanctions against
defendants. Based upon the allegations contained in Langdon's
affidavits, as summarized above, the court infers that Langdon
brought his motion pursuant to Rule 11(b) and Rule 11(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b)(3) states
By representing to the court . . . a pleading,
written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, (3) the allegations and other
factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery.
Rule 11(c) states "[i]f after notice and a reasonable opportunity
to respond, the court determines that [Rule 11](b) has been