TRAVESSI v. SAKS FIFTH AVENUE INCORPORATED

The opinion of the court was delivered by: FRANK MAAS, Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

In this pro se suit, plaintiff Nerry Travessi ("Travessi")*fn1 alleges that Saks Fifth Avenue Incorporated ("Saks"), retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., by refusing her request for seasonal employment once it realized that she previously had filed a complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights ("NYCCHR"). Saks has moved to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Docket No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the motion should be denied. II. Facts

  During the 1998 Christmas season, Travessi completed an application for seasonal employment with Saks. (Id. ¶ 2). A few days later, a Saks representative telephoned Travessi, and informed her that there were positions available, for which she would be given priority due to her prior work experience at Saks. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4). Indeed, the representative told Travessi "please Nerry, hurry up. We need you." (Id. ¶ 4). During a subsequent interview, the Saks representative received a telephone call, after which she advised Travessi that there had been a "mistake" and that no positions were available. (Id. ¶ 6).

  Although Travessi's form complaint alleges "national origin retaliation," (Compl. ¶ 7), her grievance appears to be that Saks allegedly refused to hire her in 1998 simply because she had filed a complaint against Saks eleven years earlier. (See Compl. ¶ 8). Travessi also contends that Saks retaliated against her by giving other potential employers untrue, negative references. (Travessi Aff. Ex. 1).

  B. Procedural History

  On January 28, 1999, Travessi filed a verified complaint with the NYCCHR, in which she claimed that Saks had unlawfully retaliated against her. (Id. Ex. 2). On December 21, 1999, after an investigation, the NYCCHR dismissed this complaint for lack of probable cause. (Id. Ex. 3). Although Travessi requested further review on January 13, 2000, the NYCCHR affirmed its earlier decision and dismissed her complaint on April 27, 2000. (See id. Exs. 4, 5).

  On July 3, 2000, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") sent Travessi and Saks a letter, which stated that the EEOC had approved Travessi's request to withdraw her complaint ("Withdrawal Letter"). (Id. Ex. 6). Saks contends that Travessi's voluntary withdrawal of her complaint against Saks sounds the death knell for this suit because Travessi failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. (See Saks' Mem. of L. ("Saks Mem.") at 4-7). Travessi disagrees. She states in her affidavit that she "never requested that [the] charge with the EEOC be withdrawn, nor did [she] sign any papers for the withdrawal of the charge." (Travessi Aff. ¶ 11). After receiving the Withdrawal Letter, Travessi called the EEOC, which advised her that it had been sent in error and that a right to sue letter would be issued. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 15). The EEOC sent Travessi that right to sue letter on August 11, 2000. (Id. Ex. 7). After receiving the right to sue letter, Travessi commenced this action. Her complaint was received by the Pro Se Office of this Court on October 3, 2000; thereafter, it was filed on November 27, 2000. (See Decl. of Richard Granofsky, Esq., dated April 13, 2001, Ex. A). Saks' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was filed on April 13, 2001. (See Docket No. 10). The matter was referred to me nearly three years later to report and recommend on the motion. (See Docket No. 15).

  III. Discussion

  A. Standard of Review

  Saks has moved to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(h)(3) motions are subject to the same standards as motions to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Peterson v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 246, 248-249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); International Paving Sys., Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 682, 688 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Accordingly, I have construed Saks' motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

  Under Rule 12(b)(1), a case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court is not limited to the face of the complaint and may consider evidence outside the pleadings. See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2001); Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986). Ultimately, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1996).

  Additionally, when a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the complaint must be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). This Court, therefore, has an obligation to read pro se pleadings liberally and "interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). In cases where the plaintiff alleges a violation of civil rights, such as this one, this principle is particularly applicable. See, e.g., Weinstein v. ...