United States District Court, S.D. New York
June 30, 2004.
IQBAL A. PASHA, Plaintiff,
WILLIAM M. MERCER CONSULTING, INC., Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT SWEET, Senior District Judge
Plaintiff pro se Iqbal A. Pasha ("Pasha") has moved under
Rule 59(e), Fed.R. Civ. P., to alter or amend the judgment
entered March 23, 2004 (the "Judgment") upon the opinion of
February 2, 2004 (the "Opinion") granting the summary judgment
motion of defendants William M. Mercer Consulting Inc. and Mercer
Consulting Group Inc. (collectively, "Mercer") to dismiss the
complaint of Pasha. The motion is denied.
Pasha commenced the instant action on October 31, 2000,
alleging Mercer's discriminatory refusal to hire on the basis of
national origin and age. Following more than two years of
document discovery, interrogatories and depositions, discovery
closed on May 27, 2003. On May 30, 2003, Mercer moved for summary
judgment dismissing each of Pasha's claims. Submissions were
completed on or about October 6, 2003. On February 2, 2004, the
Court rendered its Opinion granting Mercer's summary judgment
motion, stating that (i) Pasha failed to establish a claim of
national origin or age discrimination; (ii) even if Pasha had
made out a prima facie case of discrimination, Mercer had
articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its refusal
to hire him; and (iii) Pasha failed to show that the reasons
articulated by Mercer were pretextual. Pasha v. William M. Mercer Consulting, Inc., No. 00
Civ. 8362 (RWS), 2004 WL 188077 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2004).
Judgment was entered on March 11, 2004, and Pasha brought the
instant motion on March 23, 2004.*fn1 In addition to his
notice of motion and memorandum of law, Pasha filed a
"supplementary" "Statement of Material Facts with Genuine Issues
to be Tried," along with copies of his memoranda of law submitted
in opposition to Mercer's original motion. After further
briefing, the motion was deemed fully submitted.
Motions to alter or amend judgments under Rule 59(e) and for
reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 are evaluated under
the same standard. See Word v. Croce, No. 01 Civ. 9614 (LTS),
2004 WL 434038, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004); Williams v. New
York City Dep't of Corr., 219 F.R.D. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Griffin
Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp.2d 365, 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). On a motion made pursuant to either rule, "`the
moving party must demonstrate controlling law or factual matters
put before the court on the underlying motion that the movant
believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be
expected to alter the court's decision.'" Word, 2004 WL 434038,
at *2 (quoting Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F. Supp.2d 713, 715
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83.
Alternatively, "`reconsideration may be granted to correct clear
error, prevent manifest injustice or review the court's decision
in light of the availability of new evidence.'" Word, 2004 WL
434038, at *2 (quoting Parrish, 253 F. Supp.2d at 715).
Neither Rule 59(e) nor Local Civil Rule 6.3, however, is an
appropriate vehicle for a party dissatisfied with a court's
ruling to secure a rehearing on the merits with respect to issues
already decided, see USA Certified Merchants, LLC v. Koebel,
273 F. Supp.2d 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Parrish, 253 F. Supp.2d
at 715; Griffin Indus., 72 F. Supp.2d at 368, or to advance
"`new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the
court.'" Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83 (quoting Wechsler v. Hunt
Health Systems, Ltd., 186 F. Supp.2d 402, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
It is thus well settled that such rules should be "`narrowly
construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive
arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the
Court,'" Word, 2004 WL 434038, at *2 (quoting Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83), and "to prevent the
rule from being used as a substitute for appealing a final
judgment." USA Certified Merchants, 273 F. Supp.2d at 503.
"Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an `extraordinary
remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of scarce judicial resources.'" Montanile v.
National Broad. Co., 216 F. Supp.2d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(quoting In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Secs. Litig.,
113 F. Supp.2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also USA Certified
Merchants, 273 F. Supp.2d at 503.
The issues, facts and legal arguments identified by Pasha in
his memorandum of law submitted in support of his Rule 59(e)
motion were considered and discussed in the Opinion.
In particular, with respect to his national origin claim, Pasha
has sought reconsideration on three arguments that also were
considered by the Court on the underlying motion: (i) that Mercer
does not maintain national origin information for its employees;
(ii) that Mercer does not employ any Pakistanis in the United
States; and (iii) that Asghar Alam, the Pakistani leader of
Mercer's investment consulting practice during the pertinent
period, was inherently biased against Pasha. Despite the Court's
finding that Pasha failed to make out a prima facie case on
either his age or national original discrimination claim, the
Opinion addressed in some detail both the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Mercer for its decision
not to hire Pasha, and his arguments that such reasons were pretextual Pasha, 2004 WL
188077, at *7-10.
Pasha's contentions that the Court improperly drew inferences
in favor of the movants and usurped the role of the jury in
reaching the conclusions expressed in the Opinion are belied by
the Opinion itself and do not establish that reconsideration is
warranted here. See generally USA Certified Merchants,
273 F. Supp.2d at 504 (denying a motion for reconsideration and
reiterating that "a motion for reconsideration is not designed to
accord an opportunity for the moving party, unhappy with the
results, to take issue with the Court's resolution of matters
considered in connection with the original motion"); Davidson v.
Scully, 172 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying a
motion for reconsideration of a grant of summary judgment where
"plaintiff's arguments amount to nothing more than a
`disagreement between an understand-ably disappointed litigant
and the court'") (quoting Aquilio v. Police Benevolent Ass'n of
New York State Troopers, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 325, 1994 WL 494639,
at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1994)).
As Pasha has failed to point to any controlling law or factual
matter overlooked in rendering the Opinion, his motion for
reconsideration is denied. See Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais,
292 F. Supp.2d 518, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); USA Certified
Merchants, 273 F. Supp.2d at 504. It is so ordered.