United States District Court, S.D. New York
August 4, 2004.
KEVIN LYNCH, Plaintiff,
FREDERICK MENIFEE, Warden, Otisville Federal Correctional Facility, & DELBERT G. SAUERS, (Former) Inmate Systems Manager, Otisville Federal Correctional Facility, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ANDREW PECK, Magistrate Judge
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Kevin Lynch brings this action under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), alleging that (1) defendants
Frederick Menifee, Warden at the Otisville Federal Correctional
Institution ("FCI Otisville"), and Delbert G. Sauers, former
Inmate Systems Manager at FCI Otisville, transferred Lynch to New
York State custody to face a murder charge without a pre-transfer
administrative hearing in violation of the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers ("IAD"), 18 U.S.C. App. 2, and Lynch's
"constitutional rights to due process of law" (Dkt. No. 2: Compl.
at 2-2c, ¶¶ 2-4); and (2) as a result of this unlawful transfer,
Lynch was mistreated by New York State prison officials and
suffered mental anguish (Compl. at 3c-3e). Lynch seeks monetary
damages and dismissal of his federal sentence, claiming that upon his transfer to state custody, the
federal authorities lost jurisdiction over him. (Compl. at 5;
see generally Lynch Opp. to Defs. Motion to Dismiss.)
Defendants have moved to dismiss Lynch's complaint, arguing
that: (1) Lynch is not entitled to relief under Bivens because
his claim is predicated on a purported violation of the IAD,
which does not constitute an infringement of a constitutional
right and thus his claim is not cognizable under Bivens (Dkt.
No. 14: Defs. Br. at 4-6); (2) Lynch was not entitled to a
pre-transfer hearing under the IAD, the Constitution, or any
other law (Defs. Br. at 6-8); (3) even assuming arguendo that
Lynch could claim relief under Bivens and that defendants were
required to provide a hearing prior to Lynch's transfer to New
York State custody, such failure did not proximately cause Lynch
any cognizable injury, since the state murder charges against
Lynch were ultimately dismissed with prejudice (Defs. Br. at
8-9); and (4) Lynch's claim that defendants violated the IAD by
failing to provide a pre-transfer hearing cannot form the basis
for the habeas-type relief of dismissal of his federal sentence;
such relief could only possibly extend to the state murder
charges, which were dismissed (Defs. Br. at 9-10).
The case was referred to me on May 17, 2004 (Dkt. No. 7), and
the parties consented to disposition of this case by me as a
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. No. 16: §
636(c) Consent; see also Dkt. No. 10: 5/27/04 Hearing Tr. at
For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss
with prejudice is GRANTED in its entirety. FACTS
Plaintiff Kevin Lynch was arrested by United States
Marshals and taken into custody in Prince Georges County,
Maryland on December 10, 1992. (Dkt. No. 2: Compl. at 3; Compl.
Ex. New York District Attorney's Office "Chronology" at
1.)*fn1 On December 23, the New York County District
Attorney's Office indicted Lynch for second degree murder.
(Compl. at 3; Chronology at 1.) On January 11, 1993, Lynch waived
extradition and was taken to New York and arraigned on the murder
charge on January 19. (Compl. at 3; Chronology at 1.) In February
1993, while in New York custody, Lynch was indicted on federal
narcotics charges in Maryland (Compl. at 3; Chronology at 1.)
Between March and September 1993, Lynch was engaged in plea
negotiations with the Maryland U.S. Attorney's Office and the New
York County District Attorney's Office, but in order for the New
York state sentence to run concurrently, federal sentencing
guidelines required that Lynch first be sentenced on the federal
charges, then brought back to New York to face the state murder
charges. (Chronology at 1.)
To accomplish this, on September 21, 1993, Lynch was released
(to the U.S. Marshals) by New York County on $1.00 bail and taken
back to Maryland by the Marshals. (Compl. at 3, 3b; Chronology at
1.) Nine days later, on September 30,*fn2 the New York
District Attorney's Office revoked Lynch's $1.00 bail and filed a detainer*fn3
against Lynch. (Compl. at 3, 3b; Chronology at 1.)
On June 10, 1994, Lynch was convicted after trial in federal
court in Maryland of federal narcotics charges and sentenced to
twenty years imprisonment. (Compl. at 3, 3b; Chronology at 2.) On
June 29, the District Attorney's Office (with the approval of the
state court) served its IAD Form V ("Request for Temporary
Custody") on the federal prison system in order to secure custody
of Lynch to face the New York state murder charge. (Compl. at 3;
Chronology at 2.) On August 6, 1994, the federal correctional
institution ("FCI") in Springfield, Illinois, acknowledged
receipt of the New York District Attorney's Form V and offered to
provide temporary custody of Lynch upon submission of an IAD Form
VI ("Evidence of Agent's Authority to Act for Receiving State").
(Compl. at 3; Chronology at 2.) On December 12, 1994, the
District Attorney's Office received notification that Lynch had
been transferred to FCI Lewisburg (Pennsylvania) and, on January
12, 1995, that New York's IAD Form V was on file at FCI
Lewisburg.*fn4 (Compl. at 3; Chronology at 2.)
Five and a half years later, on July 12, 2000, FCI Otisville
notified the New York District Attorney's Office that Lynch had
been transferred there and that FCI Otisville still had the 1994 IAD Form V on file but that the D.A.'s Office should file a
new request if New York State still wished to obtain custody of
Lynch. (Compl. at 3; Chronology at 2.) The District Attorney's
Office filed a new IAD Form V for custody of Lynch on November 1,
2000. (Compl. at 3; Chronology a 2; Compl. Ex.: 11/1/00 IAD Form
V.) FCI Otisville acknowledged receipt of the new Form V in a
letter from defendant Delbert G. Sauers dated January 10, 2001.
(Compl. at 3; Compl. Ex.: 1/10/01 FCI Letter to D.A.'s Office;
Chronology at 3.) In that same letter, Sauers advised the D.A.'s
Office that "[i]nmates who are temporarily transferred pursuant
to the IADA [Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act] remain under
the primary jurisdiction of federal authorities" and that "under
Article V(e) of the IADA, [New York State was] required to return
[Lynch] to [FCI Otisville] after prosecution on all pending
charges." (Compl. Ex.: 1/10/01 FCI Letter to D.A.'s Office; see
Dkt. No. 14: Defs. Br. at 3.)
One week later, on January 18, 2001, Lynch challenged his
transfer to New York by "caus[ing] to deliver a self-styled
habeas corpus" petition to the New York Supreme Court, "with
copies forwarded to the defendants." (Compl. at 2, 3; see Defs.
Br. at 3.) FCI Otisville forwarded copies of Lynch's pro se state
habeas corpus petition to the District Attorney's Office on
January 23, 2001. (Compl. at 3; Chronology at 3; Defs. Br. at
3.)*fn5 Between January 23 and his transfer to New York on February 9,
2001, Lynch alleges that he spoke with the defendants "on
numerous occasions . . . to discuss his rights to contest New
York's authority to secure him." (Compl. at 3; see Defs. Br. at
3.) According to Lynch, defendant Warden Frederick Menifee
"admitted that he did not `know' the legal procedures concerning
an inmate's rights to challenge" a transfer. (Compl. at 2; see
Defs. Br. at 3.) According to Lynch, defendant Sauers, however,
told Lynch that "he could send [Lynch] to any jurisdiction that
wanted [him] on an untried indictment or information . . .
regardless of any rights [Lynch] `thought' he was entitled to."
(Compl. at 2-2a, 3a.)
Lynch ultimately was transferred involuntarily to New York
State custody on February 9, 2001. (Compl. at 2a, 3a; Chronology
at 3; Defs. Br. at 3.) Soon thereafter, Lynch moved to dismiss
the state murder indictment on the ground that "the People failed
to act in a timely manner . . . to obtain custody of [Lynch] from
federal authorities." (Compl. Ex.: A.D.A. Hurley Aff. in Resp. to
Lynch Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 3.) Specifically, Lynch claimed that "the
People failed to accept temporary custody of [him] after the same
was offered by federal authorities in 1994 and that this failure
require[d] dismissal of the indictment pursuant to Article IV,
Paragraph c of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers." (Compl.
Ex.: A.D.A. Hurley Aff. ¶ 3.) The District Attorney's Office
conceded that Lynch's claim "ha[d] merit" and therefore sought to
adjourn the matter so that the D.A.'s Office could file a
"Recommendation for Dismissal." (Compl. Ex.: A.D.A. Hurley Aff.
¶¶ 4, 5.) On June 8, 2001, the New York indictment against Lynch
was dismissed with prejudice, and Lynch was returned to FCI
Otisville one week later on June 15, 2001. (Compl at 2a, 3a;
Compl. Ex.: IAD Form IX, "Prosecutor's Report on Disposition of Charges";
Defs. Br. at 3-4.)
On or about July 17, 2001, Lynch brought this suit against
defendants Menifee and Sauers pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971).*fn6 (Dkt. No. 2: Compl.)
The matter was referred to me on May 17, 2004. (Dkt. No. 7.)
Presently before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt.
Nos. 13-14), which was filed on or about June 14, 2004. ANALYSIS
I. THE STANDARD GOVERNING A MOTION TO DISMISS*fn7
A district court should deny a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
"`unless it appears to a certainty that a plaintiff can prove no
set of facts entitling him to relief.'" IUE AFL-CIO Pension
Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Ryder Energy Distrib. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities
Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 822, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994).*fn8 A court must accept as
true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party here, the plaintiff.
Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989).*fn9
The "standards for dismissal under [Rule] 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1)
are substantively identical." Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A.,
318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 532 (2003);
see also, e.g., Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165,
169 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1999); Bishop v. Porter, 02 Civ. 9542, 2003 WL 21032011 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8,
2003); Tennant v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 02CV00558,
2003 WL 1740605 at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2003).*fn10
A motion to dismiss challenges only the face of the pleading.
Thus, in deciding a motion to dismiss, "the Court must limit its
analysis to the four corners of the complaint." Vassilatos v.
Ceram Tech Int'l Ltd., 92 Civ. 4574, 1993 WL 177780 at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993) (citing Kopec v. Coughlin,
922 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1991)).*fn11 The Court, however, may
consider documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or
incorporated in the complaint by reference. E.g., Yak v.
Bank Brussels Lambert, BBL (USA) Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 127,
130 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding
L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 960, 1125 S.Ct. 1561 (1992)); Rothman v. Gregor,
220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) ("For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we have deemed a complaint to
include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or
any statements or documents incorporated in it by
reference. . . .").*fn12 Here, Lynch attached to his
complaint copies of several documents, discussed at pages 3-6
above. The Court can properly consider these documents in ruling
on defendants' motions to dismiss.
The Court's role in deciding a motion to dismiss "`is merely to
assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the
weight of the evidence which might be offered in support
thereof.'" Saunders v. Coughlin, 92 Civ. 4289, 1994 WL 88108
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1994) (quoting Geisler v.
Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980)); accord,
e.g., Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. 127, 130-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Kaplan, D.J. & Peck, M.J.). "`[T]he issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'"
Saunders v. Coughlin, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (quoting Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974)). A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted "`only if it is clear that
no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.'" Saunders v.
Coughlin, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (quoting Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984)).
When reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must use less
stringent standards than if the complaint had been drafted by
counsel. See, e.g., LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123
(2d Cir. 1991); Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. at 131;
Saunders v. Coughlin, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (citing Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173 (1980)). However, "[d]ismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding
an element necessary to obtain relief. . . ." 2 Moore's Federal
Practice § 12.34[a], at 12-72.7 (2004). Thus, the "`duty to
liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint [is not] the
equivalent of a duty to re-write it.'" Id., § 12.34[b], at
12-61; see also, e.g., Joyner v. Greiner, 195 F. Supp.2d 500,
503 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (action dismissed because pro se
plaintiff "failed to allege the facts tending to establish" that
defendants violated his constitutional rights).
II. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF LYNCH'S BIVENS
Lynch claims that defendants, acting under color of federal
law, violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"),
18 U.S.C. App. 2, by denying him a pre-transfer hearing in violation
of his constitutional right to due process. (Dkt. No. 2: Compl.
¶¶ 2, 3; Compl. at 2-2c.) Consequently, Lynch alleges that
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), he is
entitled to monetary damages and an injunction terminating his
federal sentence. (Compl. ¶ 4; Compl. at 5.) The Court need not
reach the issue of whether the deprivation of a pre-transfer
hearing constitutes a constitutional due process violation
sufficient to state a Bivens claim, because defendants did not
violate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers by not providing
Lynch a hearing prior to his transfer.
A. Legal Principles Regarding Pre-Transfer Hearings under
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers "establishes two
procedures under which the prisoner against whom a detainer has
been lodged may be transferred to the temporary custody of the
receiving State" to appear for trial in connection with charges
against him. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443,
101 S.Ct. 703, 709 (1981). Under IAD Article III, a prisoner may initiate the transfer by
requesting "final disposition of the criminal charges underlying
[the] detainers" against him. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at
444, 101 S.Ct. at 709. By requesting final disposition, however,
the prisoner waives any right to challenge his transfer by way of
a pre-transfer hearing. 18 U.S.C.A. App. 2, § 2, Art.
III(e);*fn13 see also, e.g., Bethea v. Warden, Metro.
Corr. Ctr., 86 Civ. 289, 1986 WL 13468 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20,
1986) (Prisoner's request for final disposition "triggered the
application of Article III of the IAD and, pursuant to Article
III(e), constituted a waiver of extradition proceedings and a
consent to transfer."). Article III is not involved in this case.
Under IAD Article IV, the prosecutor of the receiving state
(here, New York) may initiate the transfer by filing "written
notice of the custody request" with "the authorities in the
sending State." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 444, 101 S.Ct.
at 710. After the sending state has received the written notice
(i.e., Form V "Request for Temporary Custody"), "there shall be
a period of thirty days . . . before the request [is] honored,
within which period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request for temporary custody or
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the
prisoner."*fn14 18 U.S.C.A. App. 2, § 2, Art.
IV(a);*fn15 see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 444,
101 S.Ct. at 710. Article IV(d), meanwhile, reads in pertinent
part: "Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to
deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest
the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof. . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. App. 2, § 2, Art. IV(d).
The Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Adams stated that although
there is "nothing in the Detainer Agreement [i.e., IAD]
explicitly provid[ing] for a pretransfer hearing," the prisoner's
argument that "prisoners who are involuntarily transferred under
Art. IV are entitled to greater procedural protections than those
who initiate the transfer procedure under Art. III" had
"substantial support in the language of the Detainer Agreement."
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 444-45, 101 So. Ct. at 710. A textual analysis of Article III(e) provided the
basis for applying the procedures of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act ["UCEA"] to the IAD:
Article III(e) [of the IAD] provides that "[a]ny
request for final disposition made by a prisoner
[under this Article] shall also be deemed to be a
waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or
proceeding contemplated thereby. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) The reference to "waiver of extradition" can
reasonably be interpreted to mean "waiver of those
rights the sending state affords persons being
extradited." Since Pennsylvania has adopted the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, those rights would
include the rights provided by § 10 of that Act.
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 445, 101 S.Ct. at 710. Section
10 of the UCEA, codified in Pennsylvania at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
9131 (Supp. 1980), provided:
"No person arrested upon such warrant shall be
delivered over to the agent whom the executive
authority demanding him shall have appointed to
receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith
before a judge of a court of record in this
Commonwealth who shall inform him of the demand made
for his surrender and of the crime with which he is
charged and that he has the right to demand and
procure legal counsel, and, if the prisoner or his
counsel shall state that he or they desire to test
the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court
of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed
him within which to apply for a writ of habeas
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 443 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. at 709 n.
11 (quoting UCEA § 10, emphasis added).*fn16
After analyzing the legislative history of both the IAD and the
UCEA, the Supreme Court interpreted Article IV(d) as a
"suggestion . . . that a prisoner transferred against his will
under Art. IV should be entitled to whatever `safeguards of the
extradition process' he might otherwise have enjoyed. Those
safeguards include the procedural protections of the Extradition
Act (in those States that have adopted it)." Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U.S. at 448, 101 S.Ct. at 711 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court "conclude[d] as a matter of federal law that
prisoners transferred pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement
[i.e., IAD] are not required to forfeit any pre-existing rights
they may have under state or federal law to challenge their
transfer to the receiving State." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S.
at 450, 101 S.Ct. at 712.
B. Application to Lynch's Case
This case is distinguishable from Cuyler in one key aspect:
whereas the prisoner in Cuyler contested his transfer from one
state to another, Lynch contests his transfer from federal to
state custody. The IAD applies to the federal government as well
as to the states, and for the purposes of the IAD, the United
States is considered a "State."*fn17 The United States,
however, is not a signatory to the UCEA. App. I Unif. Crim.
Extradition Act § 1 (listing "jurisdictions wherein [UCEA] has
been adopted"); see, e.g., Mann v. Warden of Eglin Air
Force Base, 771 F.2d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he United
States has not adopted" the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017, 106 S.Ct. 1200 (1986); Wilson
v. Fenton, 684 F.2d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he United
States is not a party to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, so
that whatever protections are afforded under the Act could not be
applied to Wilson, a federal prisoner."). On this basis alone,
the holding in Cuyler does not extend to Lynch. See Cuyler
v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 448, 101 S.Ct. at 711-12 ("a prisoner
transferred against his will under Art. IV should be entitled to
whatever `safeguards of the extradition process' he might
otherwise have enjoyed. Those safeguards include the procedural protections of the [Uniform Criminal]
Extradition Act (in those States that have adopted it).")
Twenty-two years ago, Judge Gagliardi of this Court ruled on
this same issue based on facts nearly indistinguishable from
those presented by Lynch's case:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 2241. Petitioner William
Sorenson seeks an order enjoining federal officials
from transferring him from federal to state custody
on the ground that such transfer would violate his
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
18 U.S.C. App. (the "Detainer Agreement"). . . .
Petitioner's principal contention is that under the
decision of the Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Adams,
449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981),
he is entitled to a judicial hearing before being
transferred to the temporary custody of the state
pursuant to the Detainer Agreement. This contention
is without merit. In Cuyler, the Court held that
"prisoners transferred pursuant to the provisions of
the (Detainer) Agreement are not required to forfeit
any pre-existing rights they may have under state or
federal law to challenge their transfer to the
receiving State." 449 U.S. at 450, 101 S.Ct. at 712.
The prisoner in Cuyler was incarcerated in a
jurisdiction that had adopted the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act (the "Extradition Act"). Because the
prisoner was entitled to a pre-transfer judicial
hearing under the Extradition Act, the Court
concluded that his transfer without a hearing to
another jurisdiction pursuant to Article IV of the
Detainer Agreement was unlawful. Id. The
Extradition Act, however, has not been adopted by the
United States and therefore does not confer any
rights on petitioner. Nevertheless, petitioner, who
is represented by counsel, cites no other
constitutional or statutory provisions that might
entitle a federal prisoner to a judicial hearing
prior to being transferred to state custody. In the
absence of any such provision, Cuyler clearly does
not require a judicial hearing prior to a transfer
pursuant to the Detainer Agreement.
Sorenson v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 865, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Mann v. Warden of
Eglin Air Force Base, 771 F.2d at 1454; Wilson v. Fenton,
684 F.2d at 251-52; Atkinson v. Hanberry, 589 F.2d 917
918-20 (5th Cir. 1979) (Pre-Cuyler federal prisoner has no
constitutional or statutory right to a hearing prior to transfer
from federal to state custody pursuant to the IAD). The Court agrees with Sorenson v. United States. Lynch,
like Sorenson, has cited to no statutory or constitutional
provision that might entitle a federal prisoner to a judicial
hearing prior to being transferred to state custody. Cuyler v.
Adams does not require a judicial hearing prior to a transfer
from a federal prison pursuant to the IAD, since the United
States has not adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
There has been no statutory, much less constitutional, violation
here. Thus, no Bivens claim exists.
For the reasons discussed above, defendants' motion to dismiss
is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing
this action with prejudice.