The opinion of the court was delivered by: SIDNEY STEIN, District Judge
Plaintiff Patrick Ellis challenges the decision of the
Secretary of the United States Department of Labor to dismiss
Ellis's administrative complaint alleging fraudulent activities
in the February 2000 statewide election for officers of the Civil
Service Employees Association (the "CSEA"). Ellis seeks a
declaratory judgment voiding that election as well as an
injunction directing the Secretary of Labor to conduct a new
statewide election for CSEA officers in New York. Because this
Court finds that the Secretary's decision to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with the law," her motion for
summary judgment is granted.
Shortly after this litigation was commenced in 2001, the
parties cross-moved for summary judgment; this Court granted
summary judgment to the Secretary and denied plaintiff's motion
as well as his request for leave to amend the Complaint. See
Ellis v. Chao, 2001 WL 1550809, 169 L.R.R.M. 2016 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 2001). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit subsequently affirmed the denial of summary judgment to
Ellis, but vacated and remanded the grant of summary judgment to
the Secretary as well as this Court's denial of Ellis's motion to amend. See Ellis v.
Chao, 336 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2003). Upon remand, the parties have
once again cross-moved for summary judgment.
Three candidates vied for the position of president of the
statewide CSEA organization in the February 2000 election: the
incumbent Danny Donohue and two challengers plaintiff and Bill
Walsh. Pursuant to a contract with CSEA, True Ballot, Inc. was
responsible for the design, printing and mailing of the ballots,
collecting and securing the returned ballots, and tallying the
votes. True Ballot in turn contracted with NewKirk Products, Inc.
to print ballots designed by True Ballot and to mail those
ballots to CSEA members. The ballots were sent to union members
in January of 2000.
On February 8, 2000, True Ballot obtained the returned ballots
from Trustco Bank the custodian of those returned envelopes
and began the vote tallying process. For this exercise, a
conference room was reserved in an Albany hotel. Plaintiff and a
number of individuals associated with the other candidates were
present as observers to monitor the vote tallying. As True Ballot
made an initial automatic tally by scanning the returned ballots,
monitors in the conference room showed projections of the
election results. Apparently based on one such projection, a news
release was issued on February 9 that the incumbent Donohue had
been re-elected with 51% of the votes. At that time, the
projection showed that Ellis had come in second with
approximately 15,000 votes.
As the tallying process progressed, True Ballot discovered that
the vote count had become skewed due to systematic misreading by
the scanning machines, apparently the result of mistakes in the
design and printing of the ballots. After consultation with the
election committee, True Ballot undertook various corrective
measures, including recounting the votes manually. Because CSEA had to vacate the conference room,
the manual tally was halted on February 10 and resumed on
February 22 at the same location.
The entire tallying process, including an audit of the results,
was completed by February 25, when True Ballot provided the
election results to the election committee: Donohue, the
incumbent, had been re-elected with more than 19,000 votes,
plaintiff received approximately 14,000 votes and Bill Walsh
received approximately 3,000 votes.
Through his observations, Ellis believed that the tallying
process had been infected with a number of improprieties,
including unreasonable restriction on the observers' right of
access and failures to comply with relevant protocols. Ellis
filed four internal protests with CSEA's statewide election
committee (the "election committee"), alleging various violations
of CSEA's electoral procedures and of the provisions of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the "LMRDA"),
29 U.S.C. § 401, et. seq. and regulations promulgated thereunder,
29 C.F.R. § 452, et. seq. The election committee dismissed all
four protests in a March 14 determination sent to Ellis.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint with the Office of Labor and
Management Standards of the United States Department of Labor,
seeking a review of the election pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).
That provision permits a union member who has exhausted his
internal union remedies to file a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor, who must then conduct an independent investigation of the
union member's complaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 482 (b), 521. Ellis
alleged numerous violations of the LMRDA, including improper
ballot design and mailing, Walsh's receipt of unlawful funding,
restriction on observers' right of access, errors in vote
tallying, and the failure of the election committee to monitor
and control the conduct of the election. Ellis's complaint was
subsequently dismissed for the reasons provided in a "Statement of Reasons for Dismissing the Complaint of Patrick
Ellis concerning the Election of Union Officials of the CESA"
(the "Statement of Reasons").
This action was then commenced, seeking a declaratory judgment
as well as an injunction directing the Secretary to bring a civil
suit to compel a new election pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 482(b). As
noted above, summary judgment was granted to the Secretary. Upon
appeal, the Second Circuit found that the Secretary's Statement
of Reasons was "obviously conclusory" and "not sufficient for
[the court] to be able to determine whether the Secretary's
[decision was] arbitrary and capricious." See Ellis v. Chao,
336 F.3d at 123. Specifically, the Second Circuit noted that
Secretary had failed to provided explanations as to why certain
substantiated allegations, such as the restrictions of observers'
rights, could not have altered the outcome of the election,
failed to describe the investigation her agency undertook, failed
to provide a verified final vote tally, and failed to address
certain allegations asserted by plaintiff, such as the improper
exclusion of over 2,000 votes. See id., 336 F.3d at 124. As a
result, the Second Circuit remanded the action and directed this
Court to require the Secretary to present a more substantive
statement of reasons "explaining not only what the Secretary's
ultimate determination was, but also the process that led to, and
the basis for, that decision." See id., 336 F.3d at 127.
Approximately eight months after the remand, the Secretary
issued a "Supplemental Statement of Reasons for Dismissing the
Complaint of Patrick Ellis Concerning the Election of Union
Officers of the CESA" (the "Supplemental Statement of Reasons"),
which sets forth defendant's factual findings and conclusions in
greater detail. It contains findings both as to the accuracy of
plaintiff's allegations and as to their sufficiency. In the first
category, it states that the Secretary's investigation only
substantiated five of the allegations asserted by Ellis and found 11 allegations to be inaccurate. And as of those five
allegations substantiated in the investigation, she found that it
was improbable that any of them could have affected the outcome
of the election. Consequently, the Secretary concluded that she
did not have a statutory duty to initiate a civil action to void
the February 2000 election because "there was no violation of
[29 U.S.C. § 481] that may have affected the outcome of the
election." See Supplemental Statement of Reasons ("Supp.
Stmt.") at 16.
II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the record,
considered as a whole, "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In evaluating a
motion for summary judgment, the Court will construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
inferences in his or her favor. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
v. Jones Chemical ...