The determination whether an affidavit in support of a motion
to recuse is legally sufficient is made by the judge whose
recusal is sought. See, e.g., Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 32 (1921) (it "is imposed upon the judge the duty of
examining the affidavit to determine whether or not it is the
affidavit specified and required by the statute and to determine
its legal sufficiency"); National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978) ("a judge has an
affirmative duty to inquire into the legal sufficiency of such an
affidavit and not to disqualify himself unnecessarily . . ."),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); United States v.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("It is well settled
that the involved judge has the prerogative, if indeed not the
duty, of passing on the legal sufficiency of a Section 144
challenge."), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Eisler v.
United States, 170 F.2d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ("[T]he judge
has a lawful right to pass on the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit."), cert. granted, 335 U.S. 857, cert. dismissed,
338 U.S. 883 (1949); American Brake Shoe and Foundry Co. v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 6 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
1933) ("[W]hen such an affidavit is filed, the recused judge is
restricted to a determination of its timeliness and legal
sufficiency."). Moreover, rulings against a litigant "almost
never" are sufficient to make out a legally sufficient claim of
bias or prejudice. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).