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April 4, 2005.

United States, Plaintiff,
Isaac Dayan, Defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: HAROLD BAER, JR., District Judge


On December 21, 2004, Defendant Isaac Dayan ("Dayan") was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Dayan now moves for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, or in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is DENIED.


  On July 12, 2004, Dayan was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud (Count I) and three counts of bank fraud (Counts II, III, & IV) for his involvement in what the Government claimed was a check-kiting scheme between diamond dealers. A jury trial commenced on December 13, 2004 and extended to December 21, 2004. The Government produced testimony from bank officers, Dayan's accountant, and a co-conspirator, Jacob Haas, who had cooperated with the Government. The Government also introduced Dayan's bank records and identified checks made to and from Dayan's companies as well as diagrams to demonstrate his part in the direct and triangular transfers illustrating the conspiracy. Prior to the close of the Government's case, and to expedite the jury trial, the Court deemed Dayan's counsel to have moved for a judgment of acquittal and the Court reserved decision. Dayan was found guilty by the jury of Count I (Conspiracy) and Counts II and IV (Bank Fraud). Through his own testimony, Dayan admitted exchanging checks with other diamond dealers that did not represent business transactions and explained that the exchanges were done, in part, to cover overdrafts in the conspirators' accounts or checks that had been issued by the conspirators and were soon to be presented to the conspirators' banks for payment. Dayan claimed that the practice, which he called "loans and exchanges," was common in the diamond industry and known and accepted by the banks. II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

  A. Rule 29

  When a defendant moves pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, the district court must determine, based on all of the relevant evidence, whether a rational juror "might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). The district court is required to (i) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Government, and (ii) resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury's verdict. United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1991). Or put another way, to succeed on the motion, a defendant must persuade the court that, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, . . . no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1997). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of evidence "bears a heavy burden." United States v. Autori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 821 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction "rarely carry the day").

  B. Rule 33

  Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 provides that "upon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). It confers broad discretion upon a trial court to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial in order to avert a perceived miscarriage of justice. United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992). A defendant seeking a new trial bears the burden of demonstrating the "essential unfairness of the [first] trial." United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956). In adjudicating a Rule 33 motion, a court is entitled to weigh the evidence and, in so doing, to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413. However, courts should only grant new trials in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 1414. "[M]otions for a new trial are disfavored in this Circuit." United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995).


  a. Counts I and II (Conspiracy and Bank Fraud)

  Dayan moves the Court to set aside the jury's verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal or alternatively, order a new trial on Counts I and II, conspiracy to commit bank fraud and bank fraud respectively. Dayan urges that there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish that he (1) made false representations to bank officers concerning checks in his accounts, (2) knew that a purpose of the check exchanges was and did cause or permit others to seek and maintain lines of credit based on false representations, or (3) knowingly deposited worthless checks. The motions must be DENIED.

  The Bank Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, criminalizes participation in "a scheme or artifice 1) to defraud a financial institution; or 2) to obtain any of the money . . . owned by . . . or under the . . . control of a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." Because the statute is phrased in the disjunctive the Government need not satisfy both prongs. Under the first prong, courts have held that "a check-kiting scheme, regardless of its scale or complexity, constitutes a `scheme or artifice to defraud.'" United States v. Burnett, 10 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Stone, 954 F.2d 1187, 1190 (6th Cir. 1992). The second prong requires something more than a simple check-kiting scheme, where the only falsehoods or misrepresentations are the overdraft checks themselves. Id. When the defendant's conduct exceeds the simple check-kiting scheme, or is an "embellished" check-kiting scheme, the false or fraudulent pretenses requirement of the second prong must be satisfied. While this conduct could include false statements to bank managers, it could also be the concealment of control over an account or the careful coordination of deposits to conceal the amount of money in an account during the clearing period, or the float. Id. at 79.

  First, Dayan contends the Government failed to establish that he made false representations to banks. However, the government produced evidence that Dayan's bank accounts showed checks exchanged back and forth in substantially similar amounts without the funds to cover them so as to create a "wash." In addition co-conspirator, Jacob Haas, testified in detail about the check-kiting activity and that he provided checks to Dayan that Haas did not have funds in his account to cover. For purposes of Rule 29, once the jury has rendered its verdict, the Court must construe issues of credibility in favor of the Government. United States v. Abelis, 146 F.3d 73, 80, (2d Cir. 1998). Applying this standard, as I must, there is ample evidence to support a jury's finding of guilt under either prong of § 1344.

  Second, Dayan claims there was insufficient proof at trial to establish that he knew the purpose of the check-kiting scheme was to inflate sales and to increase his line or lines of credit, yet Haas testified that the check exchanges were intended to obtain credit for the conspirators and that he told Dayan, among other things, that if he wanted to obtain increased lines of credit, he should get an accountant to prepare financial statements with inflated sales figures, and Dayan did just that. Thus, it would be reasonable for the jury to find that Dayan knew the purpose of the ...

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