United States District Court, S.D. New York
April 5, 2005.
SHELLEY HNOT, et al., Plaintiffs,
WILLIS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD., WILLIS NORTH AMERICA INC., et al. Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Heidi Scheller brings this employment discrimination
action against her former employer Willis Group Holdings, and its
affiliated entities (collectively, "Willis"). Plaintiff alleges
that she was underpaid and constructively discharged due to her
sex, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 et seq. ("Title VII").*fn1 In an Opinion
and Order dated March 18, 2005, this Court granted a motion by
Scheller and Shelley Hnot for class certification. Hnot v.
Willis Group Holdings Ltd., 01 Civ. 6558 (GEL), 2005 WL 659475
(S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2005). Defendants now move for summary
judgment against plaintiff Scheller's individual claims on the grounds that they are
time-barred, and that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case or demonstrate that defendants' alleged non-discriminatory
reasons for their actions were pretextual. For the reasons below,
defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in
Heidi Scheller was hired by Willis, an insurance brokerage
company, in August 1993 as an Account Executive with the officer
title of Vice President, to work in the Boston, Massachusetts
office. (Scheller Dep. 7, 26; Brown Aff. Ex. D.) When she joined
Willis, Scheller brought with her a lucrative account, Thermo
Electron Corporation ("Thermo"), and three other clients.
(Scheller Aff. ¶ 16-22.) In early 1994, Scheller was appointed
the "international resource" for Willis in Massachusetts, to
advise colleagues and clients about overseas insurance issues.
(Scheller Dep. 138-140.) She was promoted to Senior Vice
President in 1997. (Brown Aff. Ex. F.) Scheller reported to Jay
Sarrey and the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Massachusetts,
David Jollin.*fn3 (Scheller Dep. 20, 33.)
During Scheller's employment, she received a base salary, which
increased each year (except 1997 when there was a salary freeze).
(Profeta Aff. Ex. 13.) Scheller's salary was lower than the base
salaries of a number of male producers/account executives.
Scheller was also eligible to receive incentive compensation.
(Sarrey Aff. ¶ 36.) In 1996 and 1997, she had an Incentive Bonus
Plan where she was paid ten percent of any new business she
garnered, plus ten percent of any net annual increase in renewal business. (Scheller
Aff. ¶ 94, Ex. 25, 26.) Each employee had his or her own
individualized incentive plan. Defendants allege that Scheller's
total compensation was one of the highest in the office.*fn4
(D. Reply 15.)
Willis's contact at Thermo, Richard Somerville, closely
monitored how Willis handled the account, and he was a demanding
client. (Scheller Aff. ¶ 36; Jollin Dep. 254.) During the first
few years at Willis, Thermo generated large revenues for Willis
under Scheller's management. (Scheller Aff. ¶ 35.) Defendants
claim that Somerville eventually began expressing dissatisfaction
with the account's management, and with Scheller's negative
attitude. (Sarrey Aff. ¶ 16-17, 23, Ex. A.) Scheller avers,
however, that in 1997, she began experiencing difficulties with
the Willis Thermo team, including threats of staff departures.
(Scheller Aff. ¶ 38.) She contends that it was only after
Somerville learned that a critical employee on the team might be
transferred to other duties in January 1998 that he requested
that Sarrey oversee the Thermo account. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Willis
then reorganized staffing of the Thermo team, and Sarrey assumed
overall responsibility for the account. (Scheller Dep. 186-87.)
At the end of August 1998, Scheller was on bereavement leave.
When she returned on September 3, 1998, Jollin informed her that
she would have to take a paid 30-day leave of absence. (Scheller
Aff. ¶ 65.) Defendants allege that after the reorganization of
the Thermo team, Scheller refused to accept Sarrey's authority
over the Thermo account and was disruptive and insubordinate, and
that the leave was intended to give her time to adjust and
reconcile herself to the new management structure. (Sarrey Aff. ¶
29, Ex. A.) Scheller's leave was later extended to 90 days. (Scheller Dep. 226-27.) In a letter from her then
attorney dated November 30, 1998, Scheller resigned, effective
December 2, 1998. (Sarrey Aff. Ex. C.)
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
A "genuine issue of material fact" exists if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving
party. Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.
2001). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must
"resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."
Cifarelli v. Vill. Of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
The nonmoving party, however, may not rely on "conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas,
143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). The non-moving party must make
a "showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every]
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
II. Statute of Limitations
Title VII claims must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of
the alleged discriminatory act.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).*fn5 Under Title VII, each discrete act of discrimination "constitutes a separate actionable `unlawful
employment practice.'" Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). A plaintiff can "only file a charge to
cover discrete acts that `occurred' within the appropriate time
period." Id. Recovery is precluded for acts outside the time
period, even if related acts occurred within the statutory time
period. Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d
Scheller's constructive discharge claim is unquestionably
timely. The "date that [an employee's constructive discharge]
claim accrue[s] [is] the date when she gave definite notice of
her intention to [leave]." Flaherty v. Metromail Corp.,
235 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). Scheller resigned by letter dated
November 30, 1998. (Sarrey Aff. Ex. C.) Since that date is within
300 days of August 26, 1999, when plaintiff filed her EEOC
charge, plaintiff's constructive discharge claim is timely.
Scheller asserts that the statute of limitations for her
disparate compensation claims is governed by the "continuing
violation" doctrine. "[I]f a plaintiff has experienced a
continuous practice and policy of discrimination, . . . the
commencement of the statute of limitations period may be delayed
until the last discriminatory act." Washington v. County of
Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Fitzgerald
v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359 (2d Cir. 2001). A continuing
violation is conduct that is "composed of a series of separate
acts that collectively constitute one `unlawful employment
practice.'" Morgan, 536 U.S. at 103.
Disparate pay claims, however, do not constitute a continuing
violation. In a different context, the Supreme Court has reasoned
that "[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a
[disadvantaged class member] than to a similarly situated
[favored class member] is a wrong actionable under Title VII,
regardless of the fact that [the] pattern was begun prior to the
effective date" of the statute. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96
(1986). The Second Circuit has applied this reasoning to hold
that pay disparity claims under the Equal Pay Act involve
discrete claims for each pay period, and not a continuing
violation reading back before the limitations period. See
Pollis v. The New Sch. For Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d
Cir. 1997) ("A cause of action based on receipt of a paycheck
prior to the limitations period is untimely and recovery for pay
differentials prior to the limitations period is barred
irrespective of subsequent, similar timely violations.").
Most courts in this district have found that the reasoning in
Pollis applies to Title VII claims. See, e.g., Hernandez
v. Kellwood Co., No. 99 Civ. 10015 (KNF), 2003 WL 22309326, at
*14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2003) ("It is clear from Morgan and
the relevant Second Circuit case law that . . . pay disparities . . .
are to be considered discrete acts and, therefore, cannot be
lumped together to form a `continuing violation.'"); Quarless v.
Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 228 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 n. 2
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that in light of Morgan, Pollis
applies to Title VII claims); Gross v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc.,
232 F. Supp. 2d 58, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that Morgan is
in accord with Pollis). Therefore, Scheller's pay disparity
claims are subject to Title VII's statute of limitations, and
Scheller may sue only as to pay periods that are within the
Plaintiff argues that the applicable filing date for statute of
limitations purposes should be July 8, 1999, when defendants
received notice of plaintiff's intention to file a charge with
the EEOC, rather than August 26, 1999, the actual date her charge
was filed. (P. Mem. 27 n. 14; Profeta Aff. Ex. 36.) Defendants
requested that she postpone her filing after an effort to resolve
the matter, and in good faith, plaintiff only filed her charge
after these negotiations broke down. (Profeta Aff. Ex. 37, 38; P. Mem. 28 n. 14.) Plaintiff requests
that the court apply equitable tolling principles to calculate
the statute of limitations period with reference to July 8, 1999.
The filing requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite, but is subject to waiver and tolling
when equity so requires. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982); Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth, 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). When determining whether
equitable tolling is applicable, a district court must consider
whether the person seeking application of the equitable tolling
doctrine (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time
period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the
circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should
apply. Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F. 3d at 80-81. Here, plaintiff
has acted with reasonable diligence. Additionally, "where the
defendant assures the plaintiff that he intends to settle, and
the plaintiff in reasonable reliance on that assurance, delays
bringing his suit until after the limitations period has run, the
defendant may be estopped to rely on the limitations defense."
Robinson v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 70,
73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Therefore, it is appropriate to deem
Scheller's EEOC charge filed as of July 8, 1999. Although
Scheller was on a paid leave of absence starting in early
September 1998 (Scheller Dep. 215-19), her employment did not
terminate until December 2, 1998, when she submitted her
resignation. Accordingly, Scheller's pay claims between September
11, 1998 (300 days before July 8, 1999) and December 2, 1998 are
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore granted
with respect to any pay disparity claims prior to September 11,
1998, and denied for all claims properly within the statute of
limitations. III. Gender Discrimination Claims
A. Legal Standard
In Title VII discrimination cases, the courts have established
a complex burden-shifting framework based on McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to determine whether a
plaintiff's claim survives summary judgment. A plaintiff has the
initial burden of demonstrating that she (1) belonged to a
protected class, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) suffered
an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse employment
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discriminatory intent. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128,
137-38 (2d Cir. 2003).
The burden of establishing a prima facie case is not onerous,
and is frequently described as minimal. Scaria v. Rubin,
117 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1997). See e.g., St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506. No evidence of discrimination
is needed, and showing a preference for a person not in the
protected class is enough to raise an inference of
discrimination. James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149,
153-54 (2d Cir. 2000).
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; James, 233 F.3d at 154. That
burden "requires the defendant to produce admissible evidence
showing `reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier
of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination
was not the cause of the employment action.'" Eatman v. United
Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), quoting
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507 (1993) (emphasis in
original). If the employer fails to present such a reason,
plaintiff prevails. The plaintiff is then required to show that the proffered
reason is a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell,
411 U.S. at 804. When the employer has proffered an explanation and the
plaintiff has attempted to refute it, the Court must "examin[e]
the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could
satisfy his `ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.'" Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir.
2000), quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
B. Constructive Discharge
To establish a claim of constructive discharge, a plaintiff
must show that an employer "deliberately makes an employee's
working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
into an involuntary resignation." Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat,
702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983). A court must dismiss unless the
evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to infer that
the "working conditions . . . were `so difficult or unpleasant
that a reasonable person in the [plaintiff's] shoes would have
felt compelled to resign.'" Stetson v. NYNEX Serv. Co.,
995 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1993), quoting Pena, 702 F.2d at 325.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in a deliberate
course of conduct that made her employment intolerable. (P. Mem.
6.) She contends that Willis's interference with staffing of the
Thermo account undermined her authority, and upset Somerville so
that he was induced to demand involvement by someone who had
greater control and authority. (Scheller Aff. ¶ 44-47.) According
to Scheller, her supervisor, Sarrey, usurped her role on the
account (P. Mem. 12), and Scheller was subsequently demoted
during restructuring (P. Mem. 12; Scheller Aff. Ex. 15), left
with only a small part of her prior workload. (Scheller Aff. Ex.
14; Sarrey Dep. ¶¶ 60-61.) On September 2, 1998, Sarrey stated that there were sufficient
grounds for plaintiff's termination (Scheller Aff. Ex. 11), and
he informed Scheller the next day that she would have to take a
30-day leave. (Scheller Aff. ¶ 65).
Defendants assert that no reasonable jury could find that
Scheller's working conditions were so intolerable as to amount to
constructive discharge. Disappointment or a mere reduction or
change in job responsibility do not constitute constructive
discharge. Cooper v. Wyeth Ayerst Lederle, 106 F. Supp. 2d 479,
497 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Grant v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y.,
638 F. Supp. 1528, 1539 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). However, a court must
examine the whole record because a combination of factors could
constitute constructive discharge, even if each taken alone would
not. Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). For example, in Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd.,
148 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 1998), the court found sufficient evidence of
constructive discharge where plaintiff's largest account was
transferred to a younger individual, and the supervisor admitted
that the company was trying to force plaintiff out. Id. at 161.
On the other hand, in Neale v. Dillon, 534 F. Supp. 1381
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), the court found that an employer's transfer of
plaintiff from a supervisory to non-supervisory position, even
when she had no office after she returned from maternity leave,
did not constitute constructive discharge. Id. at 1390.
Here, defendants assert that neither plaintiff's rank nor pay
was reduced. (D. Mem. 3.) However, plaintiff points out that a
reduced role on the Thermo account would affect her book of
business, and thus her bonus compensation.*fn6 (P. Mem. 13;
Scheller Aff. ¶ 72.) Moreover, after the restructuring, there was considerable tension between
plaintiff and her supervisor. Plaintiff and defendants dispute
who is to blame. Defendants accuse plaintiff of insubordination
which undermined their efforts to meet Somerville's demands on
the Thermo account. (Sarrey Aff. ¶¶ 26-30.) Plaintiff, on the
other hand, blames Willis for Somerville's initial
dissatisfaction, and claims that Sarrey actively worked to oust
her from any involvement with Thermo.*fn7 (Scheller Aff. ¶¶
59-60.) A reasonable factfinder could believe defendants'
version, but they need not. Drawing reasonable inferences in
favor of plaintiff, a jury could find that Scheller was forced
out through defendants' actions.
Nevertheless, plaintiff's constructive discharge claim is
unsuccessful. A plaintiff must present evidence that her alleged
constructive discharge "occurred in circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination." Bennett v. Watson Wyatt & Co.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 236, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Even if it were found
that Sarrey undermined Scheller and took over the Thermo account
for himself, there is no evidence that this maneuvering was due
to Scheller's gender, and the circumstances give rise to a strong
inference of a self-interested financial motivation. Based on
Scheller's own evidence, Sarrey had a financial incentive to take
over the Thermo account. An examination of the record reveals two facts for which a jury
arguably could draw inferences of gender discrimination. First,
in a deposition of Willis's Massachusetts CEO, Jollin, indicates
that the only two executives who were advised to take leaves were
both women, Scheller and Carol Ottaviani. (Jollin Dep. 264-67.)
However, plaintiff does not dispute Jollin's testimony that
Ottaviani later returned to Willis and retained her same
accounts. (Id.) Second, plaintiff's allegations that she lacked
institutional support are similar to plaintiff Hnot's claims and
could reflect a broader discriminatory practice. But while such
evidence may be relevant to Scheller's compensation claims, it is
insufficient to establish that Sarrey's alleged usurpation of the
Thermo account was based on Scheller's sex rather than on
Sarrey's self-interest or Somerville's discontent with Scheller.
Even if a plaintiff was treated unfairly, such treatment does
not constitute a cause of action under Title VII, unless the
unfair treatment was based on discriminatory animus. There is no
evidence here that Scheller's demotion had to do with gender.
Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment on Scheller's
constructive discharge claims is granted.
C. Pay Disparities
Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination
in compensation. She is a female, and thus a member of a
protected class under Title VII, and was qualified for her
position. Defendants argue that Scheller was one of the most
highly compensated individuals in the Boston office. (See D.
Reply 15.) However, plaintiff received a lower base salary than
many of her male colleagues. (See Profeta Aff. Ex. 14.) In
addition, Scheller's bonus plan in 1996 and 1997 awarded her 10%
of the new business she produced, but other male colleagues were
awarded 15-30% on new business. (P. Mem. 23; Scheller Aff. Ex.
28, 29.) While each bonus plan varied according to each individual, and defendants
plausibly argue that Scheller's bonus was primarily tied to
servicing the Thermo account rather than to generating new
business, a jury would not be required to accept defendants'
Defendants allege that plaintiff compares herself to others who
are not similarly situated. (D. Mem. 21.) Plaintiff identified
six individuals she thought were comparable to her during her
deposition (Scheller Dep. 70-78), and then later identified
several other men as comparators. (P. Mem. 18-19.) Individuals
that plaintiff compares herself to must be similarly situated in
"all material aspects," such as holding the same position and
reporting to the same supervisor. Graham v. Long Island R.R.,
230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv.,
118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997). Scheller points out that most of
the individuals she points to (e.g., Doyle, Grant, Ives, and
Probolus) were categorized in defendants' discovery materials as
producers, producer/account executives, and account executives,
as was she. (Profeta Aff. Ex. 22.) An organizational chart
presented by plaintiff demonstrates that several of the
comparators also had Sarrey as a supervisor. (See Profeta Aff.
Ex. 21.) In addition, even if Scheller is compared with all the
individuals discussed by both plaintiff and defendants, her base
salary was lower than almost all. (Profeta Aff. Ex. 14.) Whether
employees are similarly situated is ultimately a question of fact
for the jury, Graham, 230 F.3d at 39, and plaintiff satisfies
the "all material aspects" test for the purposes of a prima facie
case. Accordingly, Scheller has provided sufficient evidence to
meet the minimal requirements of a prima facie case.
Defendants offer non-discriminatory reasons for the higher
salaries of certain individuals. For example, defendants explain
that Jack Tarbell had twenty years of experience in the insurance
industry prior to his Willis employment (Sarrey Aff. ¶ 50), John
Probolus had more production-oriented responsibilities (id. at ¶¶ 53-54), Stephen
Grant was an expert in construction surety, a specialized skill
(Sarrey Reply Decl. at ¶ 7), and James Doyle had a longer tenure
at Willis. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Even assuming that defendants
adequately meet their burden of setting forth non-discriminatory
reasons for the pay disparities, Scheller presents sufficient
evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find these reasons
Scheller's evidence creates genuine issues of material fact
regarding the adequacy of defendants' alleged rationale.
Plaintiff presents plausible evidence that absent discrimination,
she should have been paid at least as well as her male peers.
Defendants' witnesses, Sarrey and Jollin, described job
performance, revenue, amount of business handled, skill set,
professional development, marketplace, and peer salaries in the
Boston area as important factors in salary compensation. (Sarrey
Dep. 100, 102, 139; Jollin Dep. 96.) Employing these criteria,
plaintiff presents substantial evidence that she was equally or
more qualified than her peers. For example, Scheller's "book of
business" was among the highest in the Boston office. (P. Mem.
20-21; Scheller Aff. Ex. 18-19.) She had solid performance
appraisals (Scheller Aff. Ex. 6-8), and was recognized by the
head of International Practice for Willis as the most experienced
broker in the Boston office capable of servicing and producing
international business. (Scheller Aff. Ex. 3 at 2.) In 1995, she
was named to Willis's Exceptional Producers' Council. (Scheller
Aff. Ex. 2.) Defendants argue that compensation differences, and
bonus plans in particular, were "individually negotiated
arrangements." (Def. Mem. 8.) However, the very lack of any
attempt at internal equity could be seen by a jury as supporting
a finding of pretext.
Plaintiff's statistical evidence lends further support to an
inference of discrimination. The statistics tend to show that
women in general were paid much less than comparable men. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Mark Killingsworth, analyzed officers and
employees who hold functional titles equivalent to officers.
Controlling for the exact position held, employing company, years
of service, education, and other factors, Dr. Killingsworth found
statistically significant differences between men and women both
in base salary and in total compensation. (Webber Aff. Ex. 107;
Webber Aff. Ex. 108 at tbls. A, B.) The parties' respective
arguments about the probative force of Dr. Killingsworth's
evidence are discussed in the class certification opinion, and
need not be further detailed here. See Hnot, 2005 WL 659475,
at *2-6. Suffice it to say that the arguments go to the weight of
the testimony and are for a jury to resolve.
Plaintiff also provides anecdotal evidence sustaining an
inference of discriminatory intent. Scheller alleges that her
efforts to manage and grow her account were often unsupported and
undermined. (Scheller Aff. ¶¶ 100-06.) For example, she claims
she was denied adequate support staff, unlike male
producer/account executives. (Id. at ¶ 104.) In addition,
Scheller alleges that when she asked to be considered for a
management role in the office, her requests were not taken
seriously, while such requests from similarly-situated men were.
(Id. at ¶ 109.) While she acknowledges that she was appointed
to an advisory committee, plaintiff contends that this was solely
a sounding board without decision-making authority. (Id.)
Defendants contest these allegations, but if believed by a jury,
could contribute to a finding of discriminatory intent. For these
reasons, plaintiff's compensation claims survive summary
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect
to plaintiff's constructive discharge claim, and with respect to
any pay disparity claims accruing prior to September 11, 1998.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to plaintiff's pay disparity claims arising after that date.