United States District Court, S.D. New York
April 11, 2005.
United States of America,
Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: MIRIAM CEDARBAUM, Senior District Judge
The Court of Appeals has partially remanded this case in order
to give me the opportunity to decide whether to modify defendant
Stewart's sentence. In accordance with the teaching of United
States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005), after obtaining
the views of counsel in writing, I have decided not to resentence
in this case because I am satisfied that if the Sentencing
Guidelines had been advisory at the time of sentencing, I would
have imposed the same sentence. I am satisfied that the sentence
in this case was reasonable and appropriate even if not mandated
by the Guidelines.
Defendant Stewart should not be treated differently from any
other person convicted of the crimes of which she was convicted.
The sentence I imposed was the minimum under the Sentencing
Guidelines. I considered it appropriate under all of the factors
set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In my opinion, the sentence I
imposed was particularly needed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just
punishment. Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, I
see no reason to modify the sentence.
Defendant Stewart has not only requested resentencing, but
seeks extensive modification of the conditions of home detention
and the term of supervised release. Home detention is imposed as
an alternative to imprisonment. It is designed to be confining. The gravamen of defendant Stewart's application for modification
of the usual conditions of home detention is that these
conditions make it inconvenient for her to perform certain
business arrangements that she made after she was sentenced. The
business arrangements entered into by defendant Stewart prior to
or during her time in prison were made with full knowledge on her
part, and on the part of the other parties to those arrangements,
of the terms of her supervised release, including five months of
home detention. Neither she nor they had any right to expect that
those business arrangements would persuade me that the conditions
of home confinement or the term of supervised release should be
changed. The argument is circular, to say the least.
Accordingly, defendant Stewart's applications are denied.
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