Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


June 3, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: RICHARD ARCARA, District Judge



Defendant is charged in a one count indictment with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, alleging that he deprived another person of her civil rights under color of law. More specifically, it is alleged that on July 21, 2004 at the Rainbow Bridge border crossing, defendant, a Border Protection Officer, assaulted Zhao Yan, a Chinese national, by macing her, kicking her in the head and striking her head onto the pavement. Immediately prior to his encounter with Zhao Yan, defendant had intercepted a man who was attempting to smuggle several pounds of marijuana into the United States. Defendant contends that he believed that Zhao Yan and two other women were with the smuggler and that he simply attempted to apprehend them.

  On September 30, 2004 defendant filed an omnibus motion seeking, inter alia, dismissal of the indictment on the grounds of selective prosecution. On January 10, 2005 Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott issued a Report and Recommendation recommending, among other things, that defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment be denied.

  On January 31, 2005, defendant filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the motion to dismiss based on selective prosecution should be denied. The defendant did not object to the remainder of the Report and Recommendation. The government filed a response to the defendant's objections on February 22, 2005. Oral argument was scheduled for May 4, 2005, but was deemed submitted on that date without argument.


  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections have been made. Upon a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, and after reviewing the submissions from the parties, the Court adopts the proposed findings of the Report and Recommendation.

  The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Anderson, 517 U.S. 456, 463, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996), stated that a selective prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the underlying criminal charge, but "an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." Id. The standard to establish such a claim, or even to obtain discovery on such a claim, is a demanding one, as
[t]he presumption of regularity supports . . . prosecutorial decisions and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties.
Id. at 464 (internal citation and quotations omitted). However, a prosecutor's discretion is not unfettered and "the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Id. at 464 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
  In order to establish a claim of selective prosecution, the defendant must show:
(1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and
(2) that the government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based on such impermissible considerations as race, religion or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights.
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). These two prongs are sometimes referred to as "discriminatory effect" and "discriminatory purpose or intent." See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531 (1985). The defendant here fails to satisfy either prong of the test for a claim of selective prosecution.

  1. Discriminatory Effect

  Defendant must demonstrate that others similarly situated to him have generally not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which he is being prosecuted. As defendant notes, similarly situated does not mean identically situated and others must have committed "the same basic crime in substantially the same manner as the defendant." United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800 (11th Cir. 2000).

  In support of his motion to dismiss the indictment, defendant claims that eleven officers were "involved" in the incident at the Rainbow Bridge. See Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support (Dkt # 12, Attachment 9) at 1. In his reply to the government's response to his motion, defendant provides a list of only four "witnesses" to the incident. See Reply (Dkt # 19) at 11. There is no evidence, however, that any other officer engaged in conduct similar to defendant's alleged conduct.

  Two of the officers defendant names as witnesses, Arcuri and Zinnerman, were interviewed by the investigating agents, and the agents' summaries of Arcuri's and Zinnerman's statements were included in the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint against defendant. Both Arcuri and Zinnerman stated that they responded to defendant's call for assistance, that they observed defendant struggling with Zhao Yan, that they attempted to assist defendant in restraining Zhao Yan and that they witnessed defendant shove her into a wall, administer pepper spray into her face, kick her in the head and strike her head onto the pavement. Defendant has provided no evidence that any other officer engaged in conduct similar to that of which he is accused.*fn1

  Defendant has failed, therefore, to demonstrate that other officers engaged in conduct similar to his ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.