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June 22, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge


Freeplay Music, Inc. ("Freeplay"), the owner of copyrights in certain musical compositions and sound recordings, brings this action against defendants, corporate owners of various radio stations, charging violations of copyright and related claims. In a separate opinion issued this day, the Court grants in part and denies in part a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by all defendants. This opinion addresses the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by one defendant, Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. ("Beasley"). Freeplay alleges that Beasley's contacts with New York are sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over it. Beasley argues that Freeplay's conclusory allegations merely parrot the relevant statutory language, and that the actual facts alleged in the complaint are facially insufficient to support jurisdiction.*fn1 For the reasons that follow, Beasley's motion will be granted. Freeplay's request for jurisdictional discovery regarding Beasley's contacts with New York is denied.


  Freeplay is a New York corporation which creates musical compositions and sound recordings. Freeplay alleges that Beasley "produced, exploited and distributed in interstate commerce certain radio programming containing certain of [Freeplay's] [c]ompositions and [s]ound [r]ecordings," when Beasley broadcast Freeplay's musical works "synchronized" with other audio works. (Compl. ¶ 17; P. 12(b)(6) Mem. at 3.) Freeplay holds the copyright registrations for the 155 musical compositions and sound recordings at issue in this action. (Compl. ¶ 15; see Compl. Exs. 1-9.) Freeplay contracted with Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), a performing rights society, to license permission to perform these compositions and recordings on Freeplay's behalf. (P. 12(b)(6) Mem. at 6.) Freeplay argues that although Beasley is licensed by BMI to perform the Freeplay musical works in question, that license does not grant Beasley the necessary "synchronization rights" that would allow Beasley to use Freeplay's musical works in the manner alleged. (P. 12(b)(6) Mem. at 3; Fischbarg 12(b)(6) Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) See generally Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5238 (GEL), 2005 WL ______ (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2005). Beasley is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Naples, Florida. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Beasley "produc[es], distribut[es], sell[s] and otherwise commercially exploit[s] radio programming" at its 41 radio stations. (Compl. ¶ 8; Fischbarg 12(b)(6) Decl. Ex. F.) Beasley alleges, and Freeplay does not dispute, that it does not have an office or employees in New York, that it does not own or operate a radio station in New York, and that none of its stations' over-the-air broadcast signals can reach New York. (Beasley Decl. ¶ 7.) Several of Beasley's radio stations, however, have websites accessible in New York through which the stations simulcast their radio broadcasts. (P. Mem. 3; Fischbarg Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. E.)

  In addition to Beasley's websites, Freeplay alleges that Beasley has several other forms of contact with New York. Beasley radio stations syndicate radio programming produced in New York such as "The Howard Stern Radio Show," "Imus in the Morning," "ABC News," and "Bloomberg Radio News." (Fischbarg Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Beasley executives travel to New York approximately four times per year to meet with investment bankers. (P. Mem. 1.) Beasley executives have also spoken at radio industry conferences and seminars in New York at least six times since 2002. (Id. at 2.) New York companies purchase advertising time on Beasley radio stations. (Id.) Beasley also makes payments to performing rights societies based in New York, such as BMI and the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, for licenses to perform certain musical works. (Id.) Beasley has contracted with the New York investment bank Harris Nesbitt in connection with a $25 million stock buy-back scheduled to be completed within the next year. (Id. at 1-2, citing D. Mem. 4.) In March 2004, Beasley announced the completion of a $225 million revolving credit facility, funded by a consortium of lenders, and jointly arranged by two New York banks, Harris Nesbitt and Bank of New York. (Id.) DISCUSSION

  I. Legal Standard

  On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden to establish jurisdiction. In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003). Where no jurisdictional discovery has been conducted, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case, and allegations of jurisdictional fact must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. CutCo Indus. Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986). The motion must be denied if those allegations suffice as a matter of law. Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 206.

  A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the defendant is amenable to process under the law of the forum state. Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996). In New York, a court may exercise general jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary under New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules ("C.P.L.R.") § 301, and long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302. The exercise of personal jurisdiction must also comport with constitutional due process requirements under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., 264 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2001).

  II. General Jurisdiction in New York: C.P.L.R. § 301

  Under C.P.L.R. § 301, a New York court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant "engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of `doing business' in New York as to warrant a finding of its presence in the state." Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998). "A defendant is doing business such that jurisdiction pursuant to § 301 is appropriate if it does business in New York `not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.'" Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), quoting Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990). This standard has been described as "stringent," because a defendant who is found to be doing business in New York in a permanent and continuous manner "may be sued in New York on causes of action wholly unrelated to acts done in New York." Jacobs v. Felix Bloch Erben Verlag fur Buhne Film und Funk KG, 160 F. Supp. 2d 722, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1990).

  Courts have relied on the following "traditional indicia" when "deciding whether a foreign corporation is doing business in New York . . .: (1) the existence of an office in New York; (2) the solicitation of business in New York; (3) the existence of bank accounts or other property in New York; and (4) presence of employees of the foreign defendant in New York." Mantello, 947 F. Supp. at 97, citing Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985). Freeplay contends that its allegations regarding Beasley's activity demonstrate Beasley's legal presence in New York, even though Beasley has no office in New York, and no employees working on a regular basis in New York. Freeplay's allegations, however, do not show that Beasley has a permanent or continuous presence in New York sufficient to justify a finding of general jurisdiction.

  Beasley's licenses and radio programming purchases from New York corporations are insubstantial activity to warrant general jurisdiction in New York. New York courts have held that "obtaining licenses is not `doing business'" for the purposes of general jurisdiction. Mantello, 947 F. Supp. at 98. Further, "the purchase of goods from New York by a [d]efendant, even if on large scale, would not, in an of itself, amount to `doing business' within the state." Agency Rent A Car System, Inc v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 916 F. Supp. 224, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 98 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1996). Therefore, Beasley's purchases of programming and licenses to broadcast copyrighted materials are insufficient to justify general jurisdiction.

  Similarly, Freeplay's allegation that Beasely solicits advertising for its radio stations from New York companies reflects a mere business relationship insufficient to confer general jurisdiction. Reers v. Deutsche Bahn AG, 320 F. Supp. 2d 140, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Solicitation of business contracts can reach a level sufficient to support general jurisdiction only through "extensive conduct directed toward or occurring in New York." Id. at 150. Even actual advertising within New York is not considered to reach the level of substantial solicitation that would suffice for general jurisdiction. See, e.g. Muollo v. Crestwood Vill. Inc., 547 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (2d Dept. 1989) (finding defendant's advertisements in the New York Times and on the radio insufficient to support personal jurisdiction); see also Holness v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 676 N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (1st Dept. 1998) ("New York has no jurisdiction over a foreign defendant company whose only contacts with New York are advertising and marketing activities plus representatives' occasional visits to New York."). Freeplay's allegations do not suggest that Beasley solicited advertising from local New York businesses, or advertising that was directed toward a New York audience, as opposed to advertising from national companies incorporated or headquartered in New York. Freeplay's allegation that Beasley solicits business from New York companies does not show that Beasley solicited that business in New York, or that the solicitation was extensive or substantial. Thus, Beasley's advertising contracts with New York companies are insufficient to justify general jurisdiction.

  Freeplay also alleges (and Beasley acknowledges) that Beasley has a contract with the New York bank Harris Nesbitt for the purposes of a $25 million stock buy-back. Regarding the stock buy-back, New York courts "accord? foreign corporations substantial latitude" in connection with management of their securities on New York-based stock exchanges without subjecting themselves to New York jurisdiction for unrelated occurrences. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 97 (2d. Cir. 2000); see also Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 156 ("[T]he fact that [defendant's] stock may be purchased in New York, and that [defendant] retains New York-based market makers to assist in its sales of stock, is another important factor but is ...

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