United States District Court, S.D. New York
July 7, 2005.
LUIS HILDAGO-REYNOSO, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: DENISE COTE, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On June 30, 2005, the petitioner, Luis Hidalgo-Reynoso
("Hidalgo-Reynoso") moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Hidalgo-Reynoso entered his guilty plea on
December 28, 2001, and was sentenced on April 5, 2002.
Hidalgo-Reynoso appealed his conviction but withdrew his appeal
on January 15, 2003.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") provides for a one-year period of limitations for a
federal inmate to file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The limitations period runs from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a
motion created by governmental action in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A federal prisoner's conviction becomes final under Section
2255 "when the United States Supreme Court denies the prisoner's
petition for a writ of certiorari." Green v. United States,
260 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Given that
Hidalgo-Reynoso withdrew his appeal to the Second Circuit on
January 15, 2003, his conviction can be considered final as of
that date. Therefore, unless one of the above exceptions applies,
his petition is barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations.
The one-year limitations period for Section 2255 petitions may
be equitably tolled, however, where a petitioner shows that
"extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his
petition on time" and that he "acted with reasonable diligence
throughout the period he seeks to toll." Baldayaque v. United
States, 338 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2003). To show that
extraordinary circumstances were present, the petitioner
must demonstrate a causal relationship between the
extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for
equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his
filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the
petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could
have filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary
In his petition, Hidalgo-Reynoso provides no explanation for
his delay in filing. Accordingly, he is directed to show cause by
affirmation by August 19, 2005, why the one-year statute of
limitations should not bar his petition. No answer shall be
required at this time, and all further proceedings shall be
stayed for 60 days from the date of this Order. If
Hidalgo-Reynoso fails to comply with this Order by August 19,
2005, his petition will be dismissed as time-barred.
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