United States District Court, S.D. New York
September 19, 2005.
RABBI DAVID SHAIN and BELLA PARNES Plaintiffs,
CENTER FOR JEWISH HISTORY, INC. Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: NAOMI BUCHWALD, District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Bella Parnes and Rabbi David Shain bring this action
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Title VII"),
the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296, et
seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative
Code of the City of New York, Section 8-101, et seq. for
alleged religious discrimination in their workplace. Plaintiffs
worked for the Center For Jewish History, Inc. (the "Center"), an
institution comprising five Jewish charitable organizations.
Plaintiffs allege that Center employees, the vast majority of
whom are either Jews who are less observant than plaintiffs or
are non-Jews, subjected them to discrimination because of bias
against plaintiffs' level of religious observance, and that they were terminated by the Center for discriminatory reasons and
were subjected to a religiously hostile work environment.
Plaintiff Parnes also complains of sex and age discrimination,
and brings this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.
(the "ADEA") and pursuant to the gender discrimination provisions
of Title VII, as well as under the aforementioned provisions of
New York State and New York City Human Rights Law.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment against all of
plaintiffs' claims. For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's
motion is granted in part and denied in part.
A. Plaintiff Shain
Rabbi David Shain is an Orthodox Hasidic Jew of the Chabad
Sect. He therefore observes Jewish religious laws strictly,
including wearing a yarmulkeh on his head, wearing tzitzis
(religious fringes) showing on the outside of his clothing, and
refraining from cutting his beard.
The Date Palm Café ("Café") is the Center's cafeteria.
Village Crown, a catering company, ran the Café for some time
until March of 2002. From January through March of 2002, Shain
worked in the Café as a Mashgiach, a person who supervises food preparation to
make sure it abides by kashruth, the Jewish dietary laws. When
Village Crown left the Café, Shain proposed to Michael Winter,
Chief Operating Officer of the Center, that he take over the
operation of the café with the backing of an investor. Instead,
Winter hired Shain as the Center's employee to manage the Café
as well as to be its Mashgiach.
In mid-May 2002, Bruce Slovin, Chairman of the Board of the
Center, visited the Café, and suggested to Shain that he trim
his beard. Shain explained that his religious practice forbids
him to do so. Slovin responded by commenting that when he was a
child he ate only kosher food and thought he would die if he ate
non-kosher food, but when he grew up a friend convinced him to
eat non-kosher food and he survived. Am. Compl. ¶ 17; Shain
Affirmation 3; Otero Affidavit ¶ 2.
Slovin visited the Café again in June 2002 and criticized the
appearance of some salads, and remarked to Shain that he should
let Angela Otero, Shain's non-Jewish subordinate at the Café,
dress food platters because, "as a non-Jew she knew more about
food presentation." Shain Affirmation ¶ 7. Some time during the
summer of 2002, Slovin allegedly came to the Café, pointed to
Shain's tzitzis and said "I used to wear those when I was a
child." Shain Affirmation ¶ 9.
From the beginning of Shain's employment at the Center, Philip
Wilner, the manager of the Center gift shop, berated him for his supposedly unkempt appearance and that of the Café. Otero
Affidavit ¶ 9-14. Wilner is an Orthodox Jew, but is not Hasidic.
During the summer or fall of 2003, Shain alleges that Wilner's
criticisms of his appearance and the appearance of the Café
increased. At the same time, the Café's clientele increased
substantially, especially its clientele of Hasidic Jews. Otero
Affidavit ¶ 14-18. Wilner indicated to Otero that Slovin did not
want Hasidic Jews coming to the Café and preferred a wealthier
clientele that would donate money to the Center. Otero Affidavit
In October 2002, Parnes allegedly overheard Slovin remark to
Rabbi Joshua Plaut, the Executive Director of the Center, that
Shain "looks sloppy with his tzitzis" and that he did not want
anyone with a beard or tzitzis working in the Café. Am. Compl.
¶ 37; Parnes Affirmation ¶ 30. Parnes also heard Slovin tell
Rabbi Plaut that the Orthodox rabbinical organizations that give
hechschers (rabbinical approval indicating that food has been
prepared in accordance with kashruth) are thieves.
In December 2002, Slovin noticed two employees of one of the
Center's partner organizations who were eating in the Café.
Slovin approached the employees and spoke with them for a few
minutes, then stood up and said in a loud voice: "I'm against
organized religion." Shain Affirmation ¶ 13. He then walked over
to Shain, demanded a glass of ice water and "gave [him] a dirty
look." Id. When Shain asked one of the people to whom Slovin
had been speaking what had happened, she told Shain that Slovin had criticized Shain's beard
and told her that he intended to get a new caterer. Id.
In early January 2003, James Burke, a colleague of Ira
Berkowitz, the Chief Financial Officer of the Center, told Shain
that the Center intended to fire him whether or not it found a
new caterer, but would keep Otero and the other Café employees.
Shain Affirmation ¶ 15.*fn2 Around the same time, Placid
Dingue, who worked for Mr. Berkowitz in the Center's business
office, told Shain the Café was beginning to make money. Otero
Affidavit ¶ 26. Shain spoke with Slovin and asked him about the
Café's finances, explaining that Winter had meddled in a
decisions about which vendors to use and that Burke had not given
him the financial information he needed to monitor the Café's
profitability. Shain Affirmation ¶ 16.
On January 6, 2003, Berkowitz called Shain into a meeting with
himself, Wilner, Burke and Winter. Berkowitz told Shain that
Wilner would be supervising the Café from that point forward.
Shain Affirmation ¶ 18. When Shain questioned the decision,
Berkowitz yelled that he was about to fire Shain, and asked if
Shain could work with Wilner. Id. Shain said that he could.
Id. Wilner then announced that he wanted to change the music to
music like that he played in the gift shop. Id. That music
included women singing, which "Hasidic Jewish men are forbidden
from listening to . . . because it might give them improper thoughts about women other
than their wives." Id. Shain alleges that Wilner made the
suggestion to upset him. Id. After the meeting, Berkowitz,
Burke and Wilner started taking food without paying. Otero
Affidavit ¶ 27. Plaut also had the Café provide platters of food
and charge it to the Center's account, and Burke told Otero that
that food did not count toward the Café's profits. Otero
Affidavit ¶ 28-29.
On April 2, 2003, the Center's Board of Directors had a meeting
and voted to have RAM caterers take over the Café. Biguenet
Declaration, Ex. Q. The minutes of the meeting noted that the
Café was losing $65,000 to $70,000 per year. Id. On the same
day, Shain closed the Café in anticipation of slow business
preceding the Passover holiday. Three weeks later, around April
22, 2003, Shain came in to the Center during Chol Hammoed (the
middle days of the eight-day holiday of Passover during which
work is permitted) to unlock the Café for painters who were
going to repaint it. Shain Affirmation ¶ 19. As the Mashgiach,
charged with ensuring that no unkosher food contaminated the
Café, Shain apparently had the only key. Wilner demanded the
key, but Shain explained that as Mashgiach, he could not
relinquish it. Id. at ¶ 20-21; Am. Compl. ¶ 25.*fn3
On April 29, 2003, the Tuesday after Passover ended, Berkowitz
called Shain into his office, told him that the Center had a
problem with the Café losing money and that they had to let him
go, and took back the key to the Café. Id. at ¶ 23. Shain later learned
that the Center brought in RAM Caterers to run the Café, and
that their Mashgiach did not wear a beard. Id. at ¶ 24.
B. Plaintiff Parnes
Bella Parnes is an Orthodox Jew, and accordingly dresses
modestly, has covered her hair in public since she was first
married, and keeps kosher. She also observes Shabbat, or
Sabbath, which starts before sundown on Fridays. Keeping
Shabbat means Parnes may not cook, use money, or do other kinds
of work after Shabbat has begun. This entails leaving work
early on Fridays, especially during the shorter days in the
In December 2000, Parnes was hired as a Public Relations
Associate by Barbara Goldberg, then the Director of Public
Relations for the Center. In September 2002, Rabbi Plaut was
appointed Executive Director of the Center, and Parnes alleges
that Slovin became much more involved in the day-to-day
operations of the Center. Parnes Affirmation ¶¶ 24-25. Later that
month, Barbara Goldberg, an Orthodox Jew, was fired from her
position as Director of Public Relations and replaced by Steven
Greene, who is not Orthodox. Parnes Affirmation ¶ 31.
Sometime in December 2002, Max Gershenoff was hired as an
assistant to Rabbi Plaut. When he met Parnes, he shook her hand
and said sarcastically "I didn't know if you were a Shomer
Negiah" (a person who observes the Orthodox rule that men and women may not
touch members of the opposite sex except for their spouses).
Parnes Affirmation ¶ 33. One afternoon soon after Gershenoff was
hired, Slovin spoke "so loudly that the entire office could hear
him," asking Gershenoff to pick him up a bacon, lettuce, and
tomato sandwich "with extra bacon." Am. Compl. ¶ 40; Parnes
Affirmation ¶ 35. Gershenoff then approached Parnes, and, "in a
snide and nasty tone," asked, "Did you hear that, extra bacon,"
and laughed sarcastically. Id. Bacon and other forms of pork
are not kosher.
On Friday, January 3, 2003, Greene e-mailed Parnes around noon
to ask her to do a project. Feinberg Affirmation, Ex. EE. Parnes
responded by explaining that she had to leave by one o'clock to
prepare for the Sabbath. Greene responded in turn that he
understood that Parnes was observed the Sabbath but that her
responsibilities would have to change. When Parnes asked what
Greene meant, he wrote that they would discuss the subject the
following week. Parnes Affirmation ¶ 36. On January 8, 2003,
Greene asked Rabbi Plaut to remove Parnes from his department
because he felt she lacked the required professional skills.
Parnes Affirmation ¶ 37; Feinberg Affirmation, Ex. FF. Two days
later, Plaut held a meeting with Parnes, Berkowitz and
Gershenoff, where he removed Parnes from Greene's department, and
told her that her salary would be reduced. Parnes Affirmation ¶
38.*fn4 Parnes started working in the Center library with Rachel Cohen,
an Orthodox Jewish woman. Cohen told Parnes that Slovin had told
her not to cover her hair. Parnes Affirmation ¶ 39. A few weeks
after Parnes started at the library, she was reassigned to the
Development Department, under Suzanne Maltz. Parnes Affirmation ¶
40. A month later, Maltz was replaced by Sandi Rubin. Parnes
Affirmation ¶ 41. On March 26, 2003, Rubin sent an e-mail to
Rabbi Plaut criticizing Parnes's work performance and
qualifications. Feinberg Affirmation Ex. XX. Parnes alleged that,
in private, Rubin told her it was Slovin's idea to fire her, not
her own. Parnes Affirmation ¶ 41.
On April 4, 2003, Rabbi Plaut sent a memo to Slovin explaining
that he planned to terminate Parnes in light of the "upgrading of
the Development Department's secretary position to development
assistant," and "pursuant to [Slovin's] direction" on March 31,
2003 and his earlier requests in December 2002 and again before
he left for a vacation in March 2003. Feinberg Affirmation, Ex.
RR. The Center terminated Parnes on April 7, 2003 and replaced
her with Margery Gerstein, a non-Orthodox woman. Parnes
Affirmation ¶¶ 42-43.
I. Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence submitted
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). While credibility determinations, weighing evidence and
drawing legitimate inferences from facts are functions that the
Court must leave to the jury, if the nonmoving party does not
present evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a
favorable verdict, then summary judgment is appropriate. See,
e.g., Golden Pacific Bancorp. v. F.D.I.C., 375 F.3d 196, 200
(2d Cir. 2004).
II. Employment Discrimination
Although plaintiffs assert claims under Title VII, the New York
State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law,
employment discrimination claims under all these statutes are
analyzed under the three step burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See
Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Assoc., Inc., 192 F.3d 310,
316-17 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1999); Curley v. St. John's Univ.,
19 F.Supp.2d 181, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In the first step, we inquire
"whether the plaintiff has successfully asserted a prima facie
case of . . . discrimination against . . . defendants. A
plaintiff may rely on direct evidence of what the defendant did
and said in satisfying her initial burden under McDonnell
Douglas." Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Holtz
v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 77 (2d Cir. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge, the plaintiff must establish that "(1) he is a member
of a protected class; (2) he is competent to perform the job or
is performing his duties satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an
adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discrimination based on his membership in the protected
class." Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.
2005) (citing Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91,
98 (2d Cir. 2001)).
In assessing the circumstances surrounding a termination of
employment, we must "be alert to the fact that employers are
rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel
file that their actions are motivated by factors expressly
forbidden by law" and so employees are "usually constrained to
rely on circumstantial evidence." Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers
Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). "Circumstances contributing to a permissible
inference of discriminatory intent may include . . . the
employer's criticism of the plaintiff's performance in ethnically
degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the
employee's protected group; . . . or the sequence of events
leading to the plaintiff's discharge." Id. (citations omitted).
The burden of proof an employment discrimination plaintiff must meet
to survive a summary judgment motion at the prima facie stage is
de minimis. Id. (citations omitted).
Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination, we proceed to the second step of the
burden-shifting framework, in which the defendants "have the
burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
their actions. In order to prevent summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff at this stage, that explanation must, if taken as
true, `permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action.'" Back, 365 F.3d at 123 (quoting
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 (1993)).
Finally, we continue to the third step of the burden-shifting
framework, in which plaintiff "has the opportunity to prove `by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). In order to
defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff "is not required to show
that the employer's proffered reasons were false or played no
role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the
only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of
the `motivating' factors." Id. (quoting Holtz,
258 F.3d at 78). In Back, the Second Circuit elaborated on plaintiff's
ultimate burden of persuasion:
Regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove
pretext, she or he bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion, and must adduce enough evidence of
discrimination so that a rational fact finder can
conclude that the adverse job action was more
probably than not caused by discrimination. See
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511 (holding
that "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons
[for the adverse action] will permit the trier of
fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination" but does not "compel?" this
inference); Fisher v. Vassar College,
114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997) (in banc) (stating that,
after the defendant proffers a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the action, "[t]he
question becomes the same question asked in any other
civil case: Has the plaintiff shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is
liable for the alleged conduct?").
To meet his or her ultimate burden, the plaintiff
may, depending on how strong it is, rely upon the
same evidence that comprised her prima facie case,
without more. See Holtz, 258 F.3d at 79 (citing
Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d
Cir. 1995)). And as with the first stage of
McDonnell Douglas, [plaintiff] is not required to
provide evidence that similarly situated [individuals
who are not members of her protected class] were
treated differently. Holtz, 258 F.3d at 78 ("[J]ust
as evidence of disparate treatment is not an
essential element of a prima facie case of
discrimination, such evidence is also not always
necessary at the final stage of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis." (citation omitted)). And unless
the defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reason is
"dispositive and forecloses any issue of material
fact," summary judgment is inappropriate. Carlton v.
Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F. 3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.
2000); see also Holtz, 258 F.3d at 79 (noting
that the issue of pretext "is ordinarily for the jury
to decide at trial rather than for the court to
determine on a motion for summary judgment").
Back, 365 F.3d at 23-24.
III. Religious Discrimination
We find that both plaintiffs have established prima facie cases
of religious discrimination. Both Shain and Parnes (1) are
Orthodox Jews, a protected class; (2) have offered sufficient
evidence to permit a jury finding that they were performing their
duties satisfactorily; (3) were terminated, an adverse employment
action; and (4) presented evidence both that the decision to
terminate them was influenced by Mr. Slovin and that he had
expressed hostility toward Orthodox Jews, giving rise to an
inference of discrimination.
Defendant offers several arguments in support of a contrary
conclusion, which we now address. First, defendant argues that
plaintiffs "have no evidence that the alleged discriminatory acts
were in any way connected with their dismissals (the adverse
employment action), a showing that is required to establish a
prima facie case." Support Mem. at 9 (citing Lynch v. Pathmark
Supermarkets, 987 F. Supp. 236, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Rivera v.
Potter, No. 03 Civ. 1991, 2005 WL 236490, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
31, 2005)). Although defendant would rely on Lynch and
Rivera, the plaintiffs in those cases did not proffer any
evidence that showed the harassment they described played any
part in their dismissals. Lynch, 987 F. Supp. at 243; Rivera, 2005 WL 236490, at *5.
Here, however, plaintiffs have offered ample evidence connecting
Slovin's alleged hostility toward Orthodox Jews to their
termination. Without drawing any conclusions about the truth of
plaintiffs' allegations, we note that they have produced evidence
that Slovin expressed hostility towards plaintiffs' religious
practices, stated that he did not want Orthodox Jews working in
the Center, and exerted his power to have plaintiffs terminated.
We further note that discovery is not yet completed, and that
"caution should be exercised in granting summary judgment where
state of mind is in issue or when the party opposing the motion
has been denied relevant discovery." Flaherty v. Coughlin,
713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Landmark Land Company v.
Sprague, et al., 701 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1983); Quinn v.
Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir.
Defendant also asserts that Parnes's prima facie case relies
entirely on five distinct incidents, and attempts to demonstrate
that Parnes has failed to state a prima facie case by rebutting
each of those incidents.*fn5 We agree with defendant that
Mr. Gershenoff's comment about Parnes being Shomer Negiah is
not attributable to the Center or connected to her termination.
We also agree that Rabbi Plaut's warning Parnes not to eat a
non-kosher cake does not reflect discriminatory behavior. However, we cannot categorically
conclude that the same is true of the other alleged incidents.
Slovin's alleged yelling about "extra bacon" within earshot of
Parnes is similar to his alleged shouting that he is opposed to
organized religion near Slovin, and arguably suggests
anti-Orthodox prejudice. Greene's alleged reaction to Parnes's
refusal to work on Friday afternoon recommending that she be
removed from his department is arguably evidence of
anti-Orthodox discrimination that led to Parnes's termination.
The same may be true, although not necessarily, of Rabbi Plaut's
considering a policy of making employees who observe Shabbat
make up the time they miss, along with Slovin's alleged comments
about observant Jews. In sum, we conclude that both Shain and
Parnes have made the de minimis showing necessary to establish
prima facie cases of religious discrimination in connection with
Defendant also argues that it has articulated legitimate
business reasons for terminating plaintiffs' employment and that
plaintiffs cannot prove that those reasons were pretexts for
discrimination. Support Mem. at 15. With respect to Shain,
defendant asserts that there is "incontrovertible documentary
evidence that the Center decided to hire an outside caterer to
run the Café because it believed it was losing money running it
itself." Support Mem. at 17. Those documents are, however,
controverted by evidence that the Center did not feel the Café
needed to be profitable, that it would have to pay a caterer a fee equivalent
to its annual losses to compensate for the unprofitability of
running the Café, and by evidence that the Café was, in fact,
profitable. Shain Affirmation ¶¶ 25-30. This evidence would
support Shain's contention that the alleged unprofitability of
the Café was, in fact, a pretext for dismissing him.
As for Parnes, defendant explains that Parnes lacked the
necessary qualifications for her job in the Public Relations
department, and that she admitted as much in her deposition.
Parnes Tr. 45, 51. Defendant further urges that we reject
evidence presented in Parnes's affidavit supporting a contention
that she was qualified as inconsistent with her deposition
testimony. Reply Mem. at 7 (citing Raskin v. Wyatt Co.,
125 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997); Macaluso v. Herman Miller, Inc.,
No. 01 Civ. 11496, 2005 WL 563159, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. March 10,
2005)). In fact, Parnes did not testify that she was unqualified
for her position. Rather, she admitted that Greene had asked her
to do certain tasks which she was unqualified to do because they
had previously been the responsibility of her supervisor, Barbara
Goldberg. Defendant also argues that Parnes cannot show that
Sandi Rubin's rationale for terminating Parnes's employment in
the Development Department was pretext. Opp. Mem. at 16. But
Parnes alleges that Rubin told her the termination was Slovin's
idea, and Rabbi Plaut's April 4, 2003 e-mail to Slovin
corroborates that allegation, referring to a request by Slovin to terminate Parnes in December 2002, around the time of his "extra
bacon" comment and before the Center began transferring Parnes
In sum, there are material issues of fact as to whether the
Center's reasons for terminating Shain and Parnes were
pretextual. We therefore cannot grant summary judgment in favor
of defendant on plaintiffs' claims that their terminations were
motivated by religious discrimination.
IV. Age and Sex Discrimination
We also find that Parnes has failed to state a prima facie case
of age or sex discrimination. Parnes simply adduces no evidence
that could give rise to an inference of age or sex
discrimination. Her allegations that Rabbi Plaut hired young men
Gershenoff, Greene, and Eric Katzman, her replacement in the
Public Relations department and that Rabbi Plaut, Greene, and
Gershenoff had a camaraderie that did not include Parnes, are
insufficient to give rise to such an inference. Parnes Tr. At
Furthermore, we hold that plaintiffs cannot survive summary
judgment on their hostile work environment claims because they
have failed to "adduce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable
jury to conclude that [their] workplace was permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . .
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions" of
their employment. Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 223
(2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Title VII "does not
establish a `general civility code' for the American workplace.
Simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents of
offensive conduct (unless extremely serious) will not support a
claim of discriminatory harassment." Id. (citing Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998);
Holtz, 258 F.3d at 75). The sporadic inappropriate comments
aimed at plaintiffs fall far short of the standard for a hostile
For the foregoing reasons, we grant defendant's motion for
summary judgment against plaintiffs' hostile work environment
claim and against Parnes's claims for age and sex discrimination.
We deny defendant's motion for summary judgment against
plaintiffs' wrongful termination claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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