The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garaufis, United States District Judge.
Presently before the court is pro se Petitioner Edgar Moreno-Ortiz's "Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter and Amend the Court's August 9, 2005 Order Transferring Detention Claim to Northern District of Alabama" dated August 17, 2005.*fn1 Moreno-Ortiz ("Petitioner"), who is currently confined in the Etowah County Detention Center in Gladsden, Alabama, seeks reconsideration of this court's transfer of his habeas corpus petition out of the Eastern District of New York.
Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 10, 2004 challenging the validity of a final order of removal issued against him by the Board of Immigration Appeals. In an amended petition dated May 10, 2005, the Petitioner additionally challenged the lawfulness of his detention by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. By Memorandum & Order ("M&O) dated August 9, 2005, I determined that this court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner's dual habeas claims. I held that the Real ID Act of 2005 ("RIDA"), Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, deprived this court of jurisdiction to review Petitioner's challenge to his removal order. In accordance with RIDA, I transferred that portion of his claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Petitioner does not challenge this portion of my decision. With respect to Petitioner's challenge of his confinement, I held that the Supreme Court's decision in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004), established that jurisdiction to hear the confinement claim rests exclusively with the district court in the district where Petitioner is being detained. Accordingly, I transferred this portion of Petitioner's habeas claim to the Northern District of Alabama. The Petitioner now moves for reconsideration of the order transferring his detention claim to the Northern District of Alabama.
II. Standard to be Applied
As a preliminary matter, although the Petitioner did not specify the rule pursuant to which he moves for reconsideration, I will treat the motion as one made pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it was filed within ten days of the decision for which reconsideration is sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 223 F.3d 130, 136-7 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We have long held that a postjudgment motion made within 10 days after entry of judgment, if it involves reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits, is to be deemed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) . . . ."); Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 2000) ("A postjudgment motion requesting alteration or amendment of the judgment but denominated a motion under a Rule other than Civil Rule 59(e) is generally treated as having been made under Rule 59(e) . . . if the motion was filed within the 10-day period allowed for a Rule 59(e) motion."); see also United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We conclude that a motion to reconsider a section 2255 [habeas] ruling is available, that it is to be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if filed within 10 days of entry of the challenged order and as a Rule 60(b) motion if filed thereafter . . . .").
A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) may be granted only on the grounds that the court overlooked (1) factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion or (2) controlling legal authority. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A motion for reconsideration "is not simply a second opportunity for the movant to advance arguments already rejected." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Rather, such a motion may be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances," United States v. Bank of New York, 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1994), such as to "correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983).
As is set out in more detail below, Petitioner's Rule 59(e) motion is denied because he has not identified any issues of law or fact that require a different outcome in this matter.
The Petitioner raises five arguments in support of reconsideration. Each will be considered in turn.
A. The Real ID Act of 2005
The Petitioner argues that passage of RIDA has affected habeas corpus petitions brought by immigrants challenging their detention. He takes issue, in light of RIDA, with this court's reliance on the case of Deng v. Garcia, 352 F.Supp.2d 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), in which I held -- before the passage of RIDA -- that a habeas petitioner's attack of the validity of his confinement during pendency of his challenge to a deportation order constituted a "core" habeas claim. In Deng, I transferred the petitioner's core habeas claim to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the place of the petitioner's confinement, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla. Deng, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 375-6.
The Petitioner makes the following argument in his motion papers: Petitioner avers that in light of the REAL ID Act, divesting the District Court of jurisdiction over immigrant's Habeas petition, there is no longer a need to distinguish between a 'core' and 'no-core' habeas petition in immigration context. Therefore, to the extent the court relied on its decision in Deng v. Garcia, 352 F. Supp. 2d 373 (EDNY 2005). [sic] This decision no longer remains good law, because, in the aftermath of RIDA, Deng will only have challenges to his detention available on habeas petition. (Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration ("Pet.'s Mot.") at 2). The Petitioner's argument, that RIDA has somehow abrogated the "core" habeas petition distinction expressed in Deng, is without merit.
RIDA amended the judicial review provisions of section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1252, by adding, inter alia, ...