The opinion of the court was delivered by: GEORGE DANIELS, District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
On August 9, 2005 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision and
Order after holding a Markman hearing to address the
construction of the patent claims in the above caption case.
Defendants' Compaq Computer Corporation ("Compaq") and Seagate
Technology LLC ("Seagate") (collectively, "defendants") moved for
reconsideration and reargument of this Court's August 9, 2005
Decision and Order ("Order") pursuant to Civil Rule 6.3 of the
Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York ("Local Rule 6.3") on the grounds
that this Court failed to consider the Federal Circuit's en banc
decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
July 12, 2005, revised July 14, 2005) (en banc).
Specifically, defendant Compaq seeks reconsideration of the
construction of two terms in the '473 Patent: (1) "user
interface;" and (2) "shaping input signals" by reducing "selected
unwanted frequencies." Compaq argues that the Court, at
plaintiffs' urging, relied too heavily on dictionary definitions
when constructing these claims and therefore ran afoul of the
holding in Phillips. Defendant Seagate advances a similar
argument in its motion which asks the court to reconsider its claim construction with respect to six different
terms: (1) "expressions;" (2) "second constraints;" (3)
"minimizes;" (4) "user interface;" (5) "data storage device;" and
(6) "outputting commands." Defendants have offered no new
arguments nor have they articulated in what manner the Court's
claim construction is erroneous.
Contrary to defendants' assertions, this Court considered
Phillips which was decided four weeks prior to the issuance of
this Court's Order and which was specifically raised in briefing
by defendant Compaq by letter dated July 29, 2005 and by
defendant Seagate by letter dated August 1, 2005. Consistent with
Phillips, this Court stated at the outset that: "[p]roper
interpretation looks first to intrinsic evidence: the language of
the claims themselves, the patent specification, and the
prosecution history . . . [t]he claims are at the center of the
analysis" (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, in
construing each term or phrase at issue, this Court first focused
on intrinsic evidence in reaching each of its conclusions.
Defendants' also incorrectly assert that this Court's use of
dictionary definitions during claim construction led it to rely
"too heavily" on such extrinsic evidence in violation of
Phillips' holding. Phillips expressly states that: ". . . we
do not intend to preclude the appropriate use of dictionaries. . . .
[which] are often useful to assist in understanding the
commonly understood meanings of words and have been used by both
our court and the Supreme Court in claim interpretation."
415 F.3d at 1322 (internal citations omitted). In keeping with
Phillips' holding, this Court's Order did not utilize
dictionary definitions and extrinsic evidence in a vacuum;
rather, this Court considered dictionary definitions when offered
by the parties' themselves as correct definitions, as well as, to
help it understand the commonly understood meaning of certain
words used in the patents' themselves. See 415 F.3d at 1319
(stating that extrinsic evidence, though useful, should be
"considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence"). Because the Court considered the Phillips decision,
defendants' motions have failed to meet their burden under Local
Rule 6.3. See In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Secs. Litig.,
113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal citation omitted)
(stating "reconsideration . . . is an extraordinary remedy to be
employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation
of scarce judicial resources); see also Shrader v. CSX
Transp., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[t]he standard for
granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked
matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to
alter the conclusion reached by the court"). Moreover, Rule 6.3
is not a vehicle for "reargu[ing] those issues already considered
when a party does not like the way the original motion was
resolved," In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), nor "does it mean the parties get a `do over.'"
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17093, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004).
Nothing in this Court's Order is inconsistent with Phillips;
nor would reconsideration of anything in Phillips lead this
Court to reach a different result. Accordingly, defendants'
motions for reconsideration and reargument of this Court's August
9, 2005 Memorandum Decision and Order are denied.
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