United States District Court, S.D. New York
December 12, 2005.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BOANERGES SANTOS, Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT SWEET, District Judge
Defendant Boanerges Santos, a/k/a "Alexis Diaz," a/k/a "Boanel
Renito," a/k/a "Boanerges Santo," a/k/a "Boarel Renito,"
("Santos") has pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after
deportation subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction in
violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 (a) and (b) (2), a Class C Felony.
Santos will be sentenced to twenty-four months incarceration and
to three years supervised release.
Santos was arrested by New York Police Department officers on
December 15, 2004, and remained in New York City custody until
May 3, 2005, when he was transferred into federal custody for an
alleged violation of federal immigration laws. On May 12, 2005,
an indictment was filed charging Santos with unlawfully entering
the United States after having been deported from the United States subsequent to convictions on April 10,
1998, in New York County Supreme Court, for criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the second degree. On May 27, 2005,
Santos appeared before the Honorable Henry B. Pitman in the
Southern District of New York and allocuted to the criminal
conduct charged in the indictment without the benefit of a plea
agreement. This Court accepted Santos's plea on June 29, 2005.
Santos is scheduled to be sentenced on December 12, 2005.
The Sentencing Framework
In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) and the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.
2005), the sentence to be imposed was reached through
consideration of all of the factors identified in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory Sentencing Guidelines (the
"Guidelines") establishing by the United States Sentencing
Commission. Thus, the sentence to be imposed here is the result
of a consideration of:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by
the applicable category of defendant as set forth in
the guidelines . . .;
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . [issued by
the Sentencing Commission];
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentencing judge is permitted to find all
the facts appropriate for determining a sentence, whether that
sentence is a so-called Guidelines sentence or not. See
Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111.
Boanerges Santos was born on April 28, 1975, in San Francisco
de Macoris, Dominican Republic, to the marital union of Juan
Santos Burgos and Dulce Maria Castro. His father resides in New York and works in a bakery. His mother resides in Santo
Domingo and owns a small clothing store in the Dominican Republic
but lives with her husband, Santos's father, when visiting New
York. Santos has one sibling, who lives and works in New York.
Santos was raised by both of his parents and shares close
relationships with his mother, father, and sister. According to
the defendant, his parents are Jehovah's Witnesses, and as such,
always provided basic necessities for him and his sister while he
was growing up and continue to provide him with advisement on a
Santos reported moving from the Dominican Republic to Puerto
Rico during 1996. He subsequently moved to New York in 1997,
where he remained until he was deported to the Dominican Republic
He has shared a four-year relationship with his girlfriend, who
currently lives in Santo Domingo with the defendant's mother and
is not currently employed due to a financial crisis in the
Dominican Republic. Santos has one child with his long-time
girlfriend, a son aged three. His son resides with his mother and
paternal grandmother in the Dominican Republic. According to
Santos, his son was recently diagnosed with the beginning stages
of asthma and now is taking medication to prevent a full-blown
case of asthma from developing. The defendant reportedly attended Liceo Bonilla, located in San
Franciso de Macoris, for approximately five years. Santos
reported completing his third year of the four-year high school
program at Liceo Bonilla and has not obtained his high school
degree to date.
According to the defendant, he was licensed as an electrician
in 2001 in Santo Domingo, after completing a one-month electrical
course. Santos completed two courses in custodial maintenance and
grounds keeping while incarcerated in 1998 and 2000.
Santos has reported a history of alcohol use, although he
successfully completed a two-month alcohol treatment program in
2000. It is uncertain whether Santos is a risk for future drug
Although Santos has held jobs intermittently over the past four
years, since his deportation to the Dominican Republic, Santos
was not working immediately prior to his instant arrest and
incarceration. Santos also reported that he has no assets and no
liabilities. The Offense Conduct
Santos is a citizen and national of the Dominican Republic, and
is not and has never been a citizen of the United States.
On August 18, 1997, Santos was arrested by the New York City
Police Department. In connection with that arrest, he was
fingerprinted. On April 10, 1998, he pled guilty to criminal sale
of a controlled substance in the third degree in New York Supreme
On January 13, 1998, he was arrested again by the New York City
Police Department. In connection with that arrest, he was
fingerprinted once more. On April 10, 1998, in conjunction with
the aforementioned charge, he pled guilty to criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the second degree in New York Supreme
On June 9, 2001, Santos was removed from the United States
pursuant to an order of removal dated May 24, 2001. In connection
with the deportation, a fingerprint was taken from him.
On December 15, 2004, Santos was arrested by the New York City
Police Department in Manhattan for criminal sale of a controlled substance on school grounds. Shortly after his arrest,
these charges were dropped. However, as he had been placed on
lifetime parole subsequent to his release and prior to his
deportation in 2001, the instant arrest triggered a state parole
violation, for which he was sentenced to a term of four months
While he was incarcerated pursuant to his parole violation,
federal authorities began investigating Santos's immigration
status. An FBI agent assigned to Santos's case compared the
fingerprints from the August 18, 1997 and January 13, 1998
arrests with those taken for the June 9, 2001 deportation, the
December 15, 2004 arrest, and the May 3, 2005 federal arrest. The
FBI agent concluded that all five fingerprints belonged to
The investigating agent conducted a search of Government
records and found that as of May 3, 2005, Santos had not sought
or received permission to reapply for admission from the Attorney
General or Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security to
re-enter the United States following his deportation.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed under the
sole count against Santos is 20 years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b) (2). If a term of imprisonment is imposed, the
Court may impose a term of supervised release of not more than
three years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).
The defendant is eligible for not less than one nor more than
five years probation per count. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (c) (1).
Because the offense is a felony, one of the following must be
imposed as a condition of probation unless extraordinary
circumstances exist: a fine, restitution, or community service.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (2).
The maximum statutory fine is $250,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571
(b) (3). A special assessment of $100 is mandatory. See
18 U.S.C. § 3013.
The November 1, 2004 edition of the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual ("the Guidelines") has been used in
this case for calculation purposes, in accordance with Guidelines
§ 1B1.11 (b) (1).
The guideline for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is found in §
2L1.2 (a), which provides for a base offense level of eight.
Pursuant to § 2L1.2 (b) (1) (A) (i), there is a sixteen-level
increase because the defendant previously was deported and unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction for
a felony that is a drug trafficking offense for which the
sentence imposed exceeded 13 months. This results in a criminal
offense level of twenty-four.
Santos has shown recognition of responsibility for his offense.
Therefore his offense level is reduced two levels. See § 3E1.1
(a). Furthermore, a one-level reduction is warranted, because
Santos gave timely notice of his intention to plead guilty. See
§ 3E1.1 (b). The resulting adjusted offense level is twenty-one.
Santos was convicted on or about April 10, 1998 for criminal
sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal
sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, for which he
was sentenced to a concurrent term of 1 to 3 years and 3 years to
life, respectively. Under § 4A1.1 (a), each sentence, despite
running concurrently, triggers three criminal history points,
resulting in a total of six criminal history points.
According to Santos's New York State arrest record, he was
paroled to United States Immigration on May 24, 2001, soon after
which he was deported to the Dominican Republic, and assigned to
lifetime parole. At the time of the instant offense, Santos was on still on
lifetime parole, despite having been deported. Pursuant to §
4A1.1(d), two criminal history points are added.
Given the foregoing discussion, Santos has a total of eight
criminal history points, which places him in Criminal History
Based on a total offense level of twenty-one and a Criminal
History Category of IV, the Guidelines range of imprisonment is
fifty-seven to seventy-one months.
The guideline range for a term of supervised release is at
least two years but not more than three years. See § 5D1.2(a)
(2). If a sentence of imprisonment of one year or less is
imposed, a term of supervised release is not required, but is
optional. See § 5D1.1(b). Supervised release is required if the
Court imposes a term of imprisonment of more than one year or
when required by statute. See § 5D1.1(a).
Because the applicable guideline range is in Zone D of the
Sentencing Table, Santos is not eligible for probation pursuant
to § 5B1.1, application note #2. The fine range for the instant offense is from $7500 to
$75,000. See § 5E1.2 (c) (3) (A).
The Remaining Factors of Section 3553(a)
Having considered the Guidelines calculations, as set forth
above, this Court also gives due consideration to the remaining
factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Pursuant to all of the
factors, and in particular 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a) (5) and (6),
imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence is warranted here.
Specifically, it is determined that the sentencing disparity
created here, taken together with the double-counting of criminal
history under the Guidelines for illegal reentry and the extended
delay in transferring Santos into federal custody, warrants the
imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence.
The Fast Track Disparity
Section 3553 (a) (6) instructs the Court to consider "the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." §
3553 (a) (6). A number of courts, including some courts in this
district, have recognized the unwarranted sentencing disparities
that result from so-called "fast track" programs for dealing with illegal reentry cases. See United States v. Krukowski, 04 Cr.
1309 (LAK); United States v. Vernal Mark Deans, 03 Cr. 387
As way of background, in response to the increasing number of
illegal reentry arrests in certain geographical areas, a number
of judicial districts began utilizing fast-track programs to
manage charges brought under § 1326 more efficiently. The
programs work as follows:
Through charge bargaining or stipulated departures,
these programs allow a § 1326 offender who agrees to
a quick guilty plea and uncontested removal to
receive a reduced sentence . . . In the Southern
District of California, for example, defendants
subject to 20 year statutory maximums and guideline
ranges of 70-87 months were allowed to plead guilty
to an offense carrying a two year statutory maximum
penalty. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez,
215 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2000). In other border
districts, defendants received downward departures to
induce fast pleas. See [Erin T. Middleton,
Fast-Track to Disparity: How Federal Sentencing
Policies Along the Southwest Border Are Undermining
the Sentencing Guidelines and Violating Equal
Protection, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 827] at 829-30.
Recently, in the PROTECT Act, Congress made
fast-track programs official, see Middleton, at
838-40, and the Commission then enacted a guideline,
§ 5K3.1, providing for a 4 level departure on the
government's motion pursuant to an early disposition
United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958
, 963 (E.D.
Wis. 2005). In other words, in districts utilizing fast-track
programs, offenders agree to a quick removal, saving the
Government resources, and in return they receive reduced
sentences. Because offenders pleading guilty to illegal reentry in border
districts with fast-track programs receive substantially lower
sentences than those pleading guilty in other jurisdictions (such
as the Southern District of New York), the defendant argues that
the imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines range would
create an unwarranted sentencing disparity between his sentence
and the sentences imposed on defendants in fast-track
The Government contends that Congress' enactment of the Protect
Act in 2003 reflects a legislative determination that any
disparities created as a result of the use of fast-track programs
are warranted, that the charging decisions made within fast-track
programs amount to exercises of prosecutorial discretion, and
therefore result in warranted disparities, and that the disparity
caused by fast-track programs is warranted in light of the
absence of resources necessary to deal with the "explosion of
illegal reentry cases in the Southwest without fast-track."
Finally, it contends that the imposition of non-guideline
sentences in cases like this would create greater disparities in
Confronted with these contentions from the Government, the
Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan recently rejected the Government's
position that the sentencing disparities that arise from
fast-track programs are not unwarranted within the meaning of
Section 3553 (a) (6). See United States v. Krukowski, 04 Cr.
1309 (LWK). After ordering the Government to submit a comprehensive listing
of the DOJ-approved fast-track disposition Guidelines for the 13
participating districts, Judge Kaplan explained:
The question is when Section 3553 (a) (6) speaks of
"unwarranted sentencing disparities" what are the
criteria against which one is to determine whether
any given disparity is unwarranted? Inasmuch as the
statute speaks of imposing a sentence that considers
"the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct," the text of the
Sentencing Reform Act strongly suggests that the
measure of whether a disparity is warranted depends
upon the characteristics of the defendants and their
conduct, not overall considerations of law
enforcement efficiency or administrative convenience.
United States v. Krukowski, 04 Cr. 1309 (LAK), Sent. Tr. at 5.
Although Judge Kaplan ultimately declined to impose a
non-Guidelines sentence based upon consideration of all of the
3553 (a) factors, his determination of the meaning of
"unwarranted disparities" is persuasive.
Also in this district, on October 28, 2005, the Honorable Kimba
M. Wood imposed a non-Guidelines sentence based upon the
unwarranted sentencing disparity in illegal reentry cases. See
United States v. Vernal Mark Deans, 03 Cr. 387 (KMW). Judge
Wood found that most fast-track illegal reentry jurisdictions on
average reduce a sentence by four offense levels, and accordingly
rejected the Guidelines range of seventy-seven to ninety-six
months and imposed a sentence of fifty-one months. While fast-track programs may create an efficient solution to
an explosion of illegal reentry cases in border districts, they
nevertheless result in the type of sentencing disparity cautioned
against in section 3553 (a) (6). As the Court in
Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 963, explained: "Because
they operate only in certain districts (typically in southwestern
states), an illegal alien stopped in California or Arizona will
receive a lighter sentence than an alien convicted of the same
offense and with the same record who is found in Wisconsin."
Courts confronted with this issue have also noted that the
amount of the reduction one receives in a fast-track sentence is
substantial. As Judge Kaplan noted, "it is difficult to imagine a
sentencing disparity less warranted than one which depends upon
the accident of the judicial district in which the defendant
happens to be arrested." United States v. Bonnet-Grullon,
53 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 212 F.3d 692 (2d Cir.
2000). Because the disparity created is of the type envisioned by
§ 3553 (a) (6), under Crosby, it is appropriate for the Court
to exercise discretion to minimize the sentencing disparity that
fast-track programs create.
Section 3553 (a) (5) also instructs this Court to consider
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission in
determining whether a non-guideline sentence should be imposed.
The Sentencing Commission itself has expressed serious concern about the unwarranted disparities that result from fast-track
programs. As the Commission explained:
The statutory requirement that the Attorney General
approve all early disposition programs hopefully will
bring about greater uniformity and transparency among
those districts that implement authorized programs.
Defendants sentenced in districts without authorized
early disposition programs, however, can be expected
to receive longer sentences than similarly-situated
defendants in districts with such programs. This type
of geographical disparity appears to be at odds with
the overall Sentencing Reform Act goal of reducing
unwarranted disparity among similarly-situated
Report to Congress: Downward Departures from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines at 66-67 (emphasis added). In identifying
the disparities that result from early disposition programs, like
fast-track programs, the Sentencing Commission invoked the
specific language of § 3553 (a) (6), "unwarranted disparity," and
highlighted the type of geographical disparity present here.
Accordingly, the policy statement of the Sentencing Commission
also militates in favor of imposing a non-Guidelines sentence
based on its judgment that geographical disparities, like those
resulting from fast-track programs, result in unwarranted
disparities in sentencing.
Double-Counting of Criminal History
Santos argues that the advisory Guideline range of 57 to 71
months incarceration is unreasonable because it double counts
Santos's criminal history, using his prior convictions to enhance not only his criminal history category but also to raise
his offense level by 16.
As one court, considering this very issue, has noted recently,
"although it is sound policy to increase a defendant's sentence
based on his prior record, it is questionable whether a sentence
should be increased twice on that basis." Galvez-Barrios,
355 F. Supp. 2d at 958. Judge Rakoff echoed this sentiment, citing
this arbitrary aspect of the Guidelines, in justifying a
below-Guidelines sentence for a defendant charged with conduct
similar to that of Santos. See United States v. Ramon
Ramirez, 04 Cr. 1021 (JSR).
In this case, double-counting is particularly inappropriate
given the nature and circumstances surrounding Santos's prior
offenses. Under the Guidelines, his offense level is increased 16
levels, from 8 to 24, based entirely on drug convictions received
in 1998 when he was 22 years old. The result of this
double-counting produces a Guideline range that is particularly
unreasonable, given the non-violent nature of the offense.
Without the 16 level enhancement, Santos's Guideline range would
be 6 to 12 months incarceration.
These very same drug convictions are the sole basis for all
eight of Santos's criminal history points. Despite receiving
concurrent sentences for his two convictions, and despite being
paroled after serving just three years, Santos's two drug convictions are treated as unrelated cases under the Guidelines
and thus each triggers three criminal history points.
Furthermore, Santos continued to be on lifetime parole, despite
being deported to the Dominican Republic, and, as such, was still
on parole when he committed the instant offense. Thus, his two
drug convictions in 1998, which landed him on lifetime parole,
produced another two criminal history points, raising his total
Under § 4A1.3 of the Guidelines, a sentencing court can grant
an upward or downward departure if a defendant's criminal history
category does not adequately represent his criminal conduct.
See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. In particular, section 4A1.3 instructs
that "[t]here may be cases where the court concludes that a
defendant's criminal history category significantly
over-represents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history
or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes."
Although Santos was convicted of two separate instances of
criminal sale of a controlled substance in 1998, he has not
committed any additional narcotics crimes. Once he was paroled,
he was deported, and once back in the Dominican Republic, Santos
began to reassemble his life. He returned to the United States
illegally to find work and send money home to support his family
and his son, who needed, and continues to need, special medical
attention to treat his asthma. Although Santos was arrested in the instant offense on suspicion of criminal drug activity, those
charges were unsubstantiated and quickly dropped. Thus, while
illegal reentry is a serious offense and warrants considerable
punishment, it is important to note that Santos was not involved
in criminal conduct when arrested on December 15, 2004.
Given Santos's characteristics, as well as the nature of his
prior and instant offenses, the sentence recommended under the
advisory Guidelines is unreasonably harsh. See United States
v. Perez, 04 Cr. 376 (RJH) (April 14, 2005) (imposing a
non-Guideline sentence in an illegal reentry case because the
nature and age of the defendant's prior conviction made a
guideline sentence unreasonably harsh).
To discount adequately the 16 level enhancement created by the
double-counting of prior criminal conduct, a three level
reduction will be imposed. See Galvez-Barrios,
355 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (stating a three level downward departure was
reasonable based on defendant's motives to re-enter the country
and to offset properly the double-counting of criminal history
under the Guidelines).
The Undue Delay in Transferring Santos into Federal Custody
Prior to Booker, the Second Circuit had recognized that a
departure from the Guidelines may have been warranted where there had been a delay in prosecuting a defendant charged with
illegal re-entry, who had been held in state custody, from the
time that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), now
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Service ("BICE"),
discovered the defendant's presence to the time of indictment.
See United States v. Los Santos, 283 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding that a four month delay was not unreasonable but that a
longer delay could be).
The court in Los Santos held that two criteria must be met in
order for the "missed opportunity for concurrent sentencing"
departure to be applicable. First, the defendant must have been
found in the United States early enough so that a timely
prosecution could have resulted in concurrent sentences. Id. at
427. Second, the delay in prosecuting the defendant for illegal
reentry once he has been found must either "have been longer than
a reasonable amount of time for the government to have diligently
investigated the crime involved such that the delay takes the
case out of the heartland" or due to "bad faith." Id. at 428. A
person who is "found" to be present illegally in the United
States when his physical presence is discovered and noted by the
immigration authorities, and the knowledge of the illegality of
his presence, through the exercise of diligence typical of law
enforcement authorities, can reasonably be attributed to them."
Id. (quoting United States v. Santana-Castellano,
74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996). The rationale underlying the court's decision in Los Santos
is that it is unfair to prejudice a defendant, who otherwise
would have had the opportunity to have his sentence for the
immigration charge run concurrently with his state sentence,
merely because of the "fortuity of delay" on the government's
part. Id. at 428 (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez,
161 F.3d 556, 564 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (finding 10 month
In this case, the Division of Parole notified immigration
officials that Santos was in state custody on December 17, 2004,
two days after he was arrested. Despite being notified in such a
timely fashion, immigration officers did not bring Santos into
federal custody until May 3, 2005, after his sentence for
violation of parole had been fully discharged, denying him the
opportunity to serve any of his federal sentence concurrently to
his state sentence. Under the standard set forth in Los Santos,
the five and one-half month delay is unreasonable for the
purposes of considering a downward departure. See United
States v. Garcia, 165 F. Supp. 2d 496, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Based upon the foregoing, and consideration of, among other
things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history
and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the
sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to afford
adequate deterrence, and to protect the public from future
crimes, it is determined that a non-Guidelines sentence which addresses the unreasonable sentencing disparities resulting from
fast-track programs, as well as the double-counting of criminal
history under the Guidelines and the extended delay in
transferring Santos into federal custody, is sufficient "but not
greater than necessary" to punish Santos for the instant offense.
It is determined that based upon Judge Wood's estimate that the
average fast-track sentence is reduced by four-levels, see
Vernal Mark Deans, 03 Cr. 387 (KMW), Santos's offense level is
decreased from twenty-one to seventeen. Furthermore, based on the
three level reduction granted in Galvez-Barrios for the
double-counting of criminal history, Santos is more appropriately
sentenced at an offense level of fourteen than at seventeen. An
offense level of fourteen and a Criminal History Category of IV
results in a Guidelines range of twenty-seven to thirty-three
months. Finally, given the undue delay in having the defendant
transferred into federal custody from state custody under the
standard set forth in Los Santos, the defendant is hereby
sentenced to twenty-four months incarceration.
Santos is also hereby sentenced to three years supervised
release. Santos shall report to the nearest Probation Office
within 72 hours of release from custody, and supervision will be
in the district of his residence. As mandatory conditions of supervised release, Santos shall (1)
not commit another federal, state, or local crime; (2) not
illegally possess a controlled substance; (3) not possess a
firearm or destructive device; (4) refrain from any unlawful use
of a controlled substance; (5) submit to one drug testing within
fifteen days of placement on supervised release and at least two
unscheduled drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation
officer; and (6) cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed
by the probation officer.
Santos shall comply with the standard conditions of supervision
and shall also comply with the following special condition: he
shall obey the immigration laws and comply with the directives of
immigration authorities; he shall participate in an alcohol
aftercare treatment program under a co-payment plan, which may
include urine testing at the direction and discretion of his
probation officer. Santos shall also pay to the United States a special assessment
in the amount of $100, which shall be due immediately. Given
Santos's inability to pay a fine, the fine in this case is
It is so ordered.
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