The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hurley, District Judge
Plaintiff Amy Grobert ("Plaintiff") filed the present action against defendants Career Education Corporation d/b/a Katherine Gibbs School, David Schuchman, and Matthew Brellis (collectively, "Defendants") alleging violations of Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") based on both gender discrimination and sexual harassment. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted and this case is dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by the Katherine Gibbs School from March 1, 1997 through October 1, 1999 as a High School Admissions Representative and then again from May 1, 2000 through October 31, 2002 as Director of Student Management. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff claims that during the course of her employment, she was subjected to various gender-related comments and alleged sexual harassment. She was terminated on October 31, 2002, allegedly because of her gender. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 28.)
On October 22, 2003, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the New York State Division of Human Rights (the "Division"). (Id. ¶ 9.) In her charge, Plaintiff alleges that the Katherine Gibbs School discriminated against her on the basis of her age (30), marital status (married), and gender (female) in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL. Plaintiff further alleges that the "most recent or continuing discrimination took place on 01/01/03." (Defs.' Not. of Mot., Ex. B.) In support of this claim, she alleges:
On October 31, 2002, I was informed by Mr. S[c]huchman, School President, married, who is in his fifties, that he had to let a Manager go due to budget reasons and my position was being eliminated. It should be noted that I was not the least senior Manager. Mr. S[c]huchman informed me that he would call me in January regarding whether the money had been restored to the budget to fund my position. Mr. S[c]huchman never called me. (Id. ¶ 3.)
On August 27, 2004, the Division issued a no probable cause finding and dismissed Plaintiff's charge. (Id. Ex. C.) On September 22, 2004, the EEOC issued a notice of dismissal adopting the Division's no probable cause finding. (Id. Ex. D.)
On December 16, 2004, Plaintiff initiated the instant action. The Complaint asserts three causes of action, to wit: (1) a violation of Title VII "on the basis of sex"; (2) a violation of the NYSHRL based on gender discrimination; and (3) failure of Defendants to exercise reasonable care to protect their employees. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claims on the ground that they are time-barred and Plaintiff's state law claims on the grounds that they are barred by the election of remedies doctrine and that they fail to state a claim. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-barred, they are dismissed. And the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.
I. Motion to Dismiss: Legal Standards
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must limit itself to the facts stated in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999). The court must accept the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true, and view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief in support of her claim. Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2003).
II. Plaintiff's Claims Under Title VII are Time-Barred
In order to file an action in federal court alleging discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory act occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); see also Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2003). A claim accrues when the employee is given notice of the employer's termination decision, ...