The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge
Plaintiff, William Carmody, filed a complaint against the above-named seventeen defendants alleging that they engaged in several incidents of harassment, retaliation, and conspiracy against him in violation of federal and state civil rights laws while he was a police officer with the New York City Police Department ("NYPD").*fn1 Defendants moved to partially dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to seven of the individually-named defendants, Joseph Esposito, "Murphy", Rafael Pineiro, Charles V. Campisi, "Pignataro", Matthew Gracen, and "Riveria." Additionally, Defendants NYPD (sometimes "Department") and the Civilian Complain Review Board ("CCRB") moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that they are not suable entities under the New York City Charter. This motion was GRANTED as to these nine defendants.
This Amended Order addresses whether the conspiracy and state law tort claims should be dismissed as to the remaining eight defendants. For the reasons stated below, this motion to dismiss with regard to these eight defendants is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are taken as true. See Bolt Elec., Inc. v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff recounts the following. He was hired as a NYPD officer around July 2002. Plaintiff's harassment and retaliation by the above-named defendants began when he was transferred to the 43rd Precinct in January 2003. At the 43rd Precinct, Plaintiff, a white male, was assigned to Operation Impact and partnered with Police Officer Manuel Gomez, a Hispanic officer. During their partnership, Gomez filed a discrimination lawsuit against the NYPD. As a result of this lawsuit and Plaintiff's close association with Gomez, Plaintiff alleges that certain police officers discriminated against and harassed him. Plaintiff alleges that the harassment and retaliation increased after he, along with four other officers, exposed misconduct in the 43rd Precinct and reported such misconduct to the Internal Affairs Bureau ("IAB"). Around February 5, 2004, plaintiff was notified by defendant, Florence Finkle, that certain allegations of misconduct had been found to be substantiated as against him by defendant Vanessa Rosen, CCRB Investigator.
In March 2004, Plaintiff filed an official complaint with the Department Advocate's Office, Patrolman's Benevolent Association ("PBA") as well as defendant, Finkle, with regard to defendant Rosen's actions during the misconduct investigation. Plaintiff claims that Rosen intentionally omitted crucial information that would have cleared him of all misconduct charges. On approximately December 14, 2004, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").*fn2 Plaintiff was terminated by the Department on February 22, 2005 for misconduct as well as residency fraud. As a result of the actions above, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages from the above-named defendants.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the movant must establish that the plaintiff failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule12(b)(6) motion, this Court must construe all factual allegations in the complaint in favor of the non-moving party. See Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 47 - 48 (2d Cir. 2002). A motion to dismiss should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Plaintiff brings retaliation and hostile work environment claims against defendants pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, New York State Executive Law § 296, and New York City Administrative Code § 8-502. He brings a conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) as well as an intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with an employment contract claim pursuant to the New York State common law. For the most part, plaintiff's claims charge that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights as well as harassed and retaliated against him while he served as a NYPD officer.
To begin with, Defense counsel contends that the NYPD and the CCRB are not suable entities in their independent capacities, thus, all claims against these parties should be dismissed. I agree.
NYPD and CCRB are agencies of the City of New York. Pursuant to the explicit terms of the New York City Charter, all actions that allege violations of law against a Department of the City must be brought in the name of the City of New York, and not the Department. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 396 ("All actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law."); See also Montes v. King, 2002 WL 424318, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2002) (providing that the New York City Police Department is not a suable entity). Consequently, all claims against the NYPD and the CCRB are dismissed.
B. Individually Named Defendants
Joseph Esposito, "Murphy", Rafael Pineiro, Charles V. Campisi, "Pignataro", Matthew Gracen, and "Riveria" move to dismiss the claims filed against them based on the failure of the plaintiff to allege any personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.*fn3 Since this is my reading of the complaint as well, the motion to dismiss is granted. An analysis as to these claims follows.
1. Title VII Claims Against the Seven Movants
This section will discuss the retaliation and hostile work environment claims plaintiff alleges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff also alleges retaliation and hostile work environment pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The § 1981 claim is discussed in Part Two below.
Plaintiff contends that defendants retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.*fn4
To establish a claim here, the plaintiff must allege the prongs necessary to prove a prima facie case. They include: 1) that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity known to the defendant, 2) suffered an adverse employment action, and 3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, the Amended Complaint clearly alleges the second element, namely, that he suffered an adverse employment action. See Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (providing that an adverse ...