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Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Mylan Laboratories

September 20, 2006


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Denise Cote, District Judge


On March 10, 2006, judgment was entered following a non-jury trial in favor of plaintiff and patentee Takeda Pharmaceutical Company, Ltd. (formerly Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.), and its affiliate Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc. (collectively, "Takeda") and against two generic drug companies, Alphapharm Pty. Ltd. and Genpharm, Inc. (collectively, "Alphapharm") and Mylan Laboratories, Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and UDL Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, "Mylan"), in connection with the latters' challenges brought under the Hatch-Waxman Act to Takeda's U.S. Patent No. 4,687,777 ("'777 Patent"), which protects the invention of the chemical compound known as pioglitazone. Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Opinion"). Pioglitazone is a highly successful drug used in the treatment of diabetes.

Takeda has now moved for an award of attorneys' fees against both defendants, arguing that this is an exceptional case. Takeda contends that each of the defendants lacked a good faith basis for its Hatch-Waxman Act Paragraph IV certification and engaged in litigation misconduct. Takeda's motion is granted.*fn1

An award of attorneys' fees should not be made without a careful consideration of the litigation as a whole and the parties' arguments. The framework established by Congress for accelerating the approval process for generic versions of established drugs, however, is not an invitation to frivolous, bad faith attacks on patents.

As described in considerable detail below, Takeda has shown by clear and convincing evidence that Alphapharm and Mylan each filed baseless Paragraph IV certifications attacking the validity of the '777 Patent. Alphapharm's certification, which asserted invalidity due to obviousness, was deeply flawed and Alphapharm revised its theory again and again in a futile effort to state a prima facie case of obviousness. Mylan completely abandoned its Paragraph IV theory of invalidity and proceeded to trial on a contorted claim that Takeda had engaged in inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). Beyond their baseless certifications, Alphapharm and Mylan each engaged in other litigation misconduct. Their misconduct was exceptional and fully justifies the award of attorneys' fees.

Legal Standard

By operation of law, Alphapharm and Mylan each infringed Takeda's patent by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") to make a generic form of pioglitazone before the expiration of Takeda's '777 Patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). An ANDA announces the intention of the filer to produce a bioequivalent form of a drug already approved by the FDA. When filing the ANDA the applicant must make a certification regarding any patent protecting the drug that will be copied. Both Alphapharm and Mylan chose to make a certification pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) ("Paragraph IV"), certifying that the patent protecting pioglitazone was invalid. In making the certification, Alphapharm and Mylan were required to give Takeda notice of the "'factual and legal basis' of invalidity." Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing to 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(B) (ii)).

An ANDA filer must "display care and regard for the strict standards of the Hatch-Waxman Act when challenging patent validity." Id. Such challenges are only authorized under the Hatch-Waxman Act "in accordance with strict statutory requirements" and require the challenger to state in the Paragraph IV certification that "in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his knowledge, that each patent for which the applicant is seeking approval is invalid." Id. (citation omitted). ANDA filers are thus held to a "duty of due care" under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id.

Among the remedies that are available when a patent is infringed by the filing of an ANDA is an award of attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 ("Section 285"), which allows the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in "exceptional cases." Id. at § 271(e)(4). The determination of whether a case is exceptional is made by looking at the "totality of the circumstances." Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1347 (citation omitted). In order to justify an attorneys' fees award the evidence that the case is exceptional must be "clear and convincing." Interspiro USA, Inc. v. Figgie Intern. Inc., 18 F.3d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If a case is determined to be exceptional, the decision to grant attorneys' fees is not automatic; an award should only be made when it is separately determined that it is warranted. Id.

Litigation misconduct that may support an "exceptional case" finding under Section 285 includes "vexatious or unjustified litigation or frivolous filings." Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For example, cases that arise from the filing of an ANDA may become exceptional for purposes of Section 285 "if the ANDA filer makes baseless certifications." Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1347; see also Glaxo Group, 376 F.3d at 1351 (noting that "baseless accusations of invalidity" permit an award of attorneys' fees against ANDA filers). A baseless certification includes the failure "to present even a prima facie case of invalidity in filing [the] paragraph IV certification." Glaxo Group, 376 F.3d at 1350. The Federal Circuit has cautioned, however, that "the mere fact that a company has filed an ANDA application or certification cannot support a finding of willful infringement for purposes of awarding attorney's fees." Id. at 1350-51 (emphasis supplied). Filing a baseless Paragraph IV certification and proceeding to challenge a patent's validity despite glaring weaknesses in the theory of invalidity constitute litigation misconduct. Id. at 1350. Where a non-prevailing party has pursued litigation in good faith, an award of attorneys' fees is only warranted where that party has engaged in misconduct in the litigation. See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Intern. Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Takeda's motion for an award of attorneys' fees from Alphapharm will be addressed first. This ruling presumes familiarity with the Opinion, which contains the findings of fact and conclusions of law following trial and which is incorporated by reference. Nonetheless, various terms, references and findings which are set out in detail in the Opinion are on occasion also briefly described here.


I. Alphapharm

A. Reliance on Advice of Counsel

Before discussing the merits of the motion addressed to Alphapharm, it is necessary to determine whether Alphapharm may oppose this motion by relying on two opinions of counsel that it first produced to Takeda on April 28, 2006, with its opposition to this motion. For several reasons, it may not.

One of the opinions Alphapharm produced is a letter/memorandum dated July 12, 2003, and signed by Allen Kipnes ("Kipnes"), an attorney with the law firm Watov and Kipnes. Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP ("Frommer"), Alphapharm's outside counsel, retained Kipnes at the request of Generics [UK], an Alphapharm affiliate, to prepare a legal opinion regarding the validity of the '777 Patent. Kipnes reported that he and medicinal chemist Dr. Edward Glamkowski, with whom Kipnes consulted in preparing his opinion, had concluded that Takeda's previous disclosure of the six-methyl compound, which is referred to as compound (b) in the Opinion and here, in both an earlier patent issued to Takeda and in an article in a scientific journal, rendered pioglitazone obvious. The prior art patent discussed by Kipnes is U.S. Patent No. 4,287,200 ("'200 Patent") and the scientific article is T. Sohda et al., Studies on Antidiabetic Agents. II. Synthesis of 5-[4-(1-Methylcyclohexylmethoxy)-benzyl]) thiazolidine-2,4-dione (ADD-3878) and its Derivatives, Chem. Pharm. Bull., 30:3580-3600 (1982) ("Sohda II"). Kipnes noted that the '200 Patent was a "broad disclosure of the claims compounds" and that Sohda II was a more specific disclosure in which compound (b) was shown to be "among a group that showed potent activity but considerable increases in body weight and fat." Kipnes took the view that based on the two disclosures, the patent examiner "should have rejected the claims of the application on prior art grounds." At trial, Alphapharm argued that the disclosure of compound (b) in these two pieces of prior art rendered pioglitazone obvious. Specifically, it asserted that the prior art identified compound (b) as a "lead" compound whose investigation would have led to the discovery of pioglitazone.

Kipnes also opined that the differences in toxicity to the liver and heart reported in Table 1 of the '777 Patent between pioglitazone and compound (b) were not surprising, and therefore were insufficient to overcome pioglitazone's prima facie obviousness. See Opinion at 360-62 (describing Table 1). Primarily, Kipnes questioned whether the differences between pioglitazone and the other compounds reported in Table 1 were "material" and also suggested that those reported results contradicted statements made in the '200 Patent and Sohda II.

The second opinion Alphapharm recently produced came from Frommer attorney Jeffrey Hovden ("Hovden"). Hovden indicated that, following receipt of the Kipnes opinion, a synthetic organic chemist Dr. Ali Berkin ("Berkin"), employed by Frommer, prepared Alphapharm's Section 355 Statement under Hovden's supervision. See Opinion at 366-67(describing Alphapharm's Section 355 Statement). Alphapharm was required to disclose any reliance it wished to assert in this lawsuit on advice of counsel by July 30, 2004. Because it did not disclose at that time its intent to rely on an advice of counsel defense in opposing an award of attorneys' fees to Takeda, it may not do so now.

Takeda made no secret that it would move for an award of attorneys' fees in this case. Takeda's complaint explicitly sought an award of attorneys' fees based on a finding that this case is exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285. On February 11, 2004, Takeda wrote to warn Alphapharm that its Paragraph IV certification, which had been filed just two weeks earlier, on January 29, 2004, appeared to have "serious omissions and errors." As explained at a conference of July 16, 2004, and as reflected in a Scheduling Order of July 20, 2004 ("July 20 Order"), the defendants' motions to bifurcate discovery and postpone their identification of and discovery concerning any advice of counsel defense were denied due to concerns regarding efficiency, expense, and prejudice.*fn2 Because the defendants had not yet identified with any clarity the issues as to which they might interpose such a defense, they were required to identify the issues on which they intended to assert an advice of counsel defense by July 30. Following such a disclosure, Takeda could demand production of documents withheld because of an assertion of privilege and take appropriate discovery. On July 30, Alphapharm notified Takeda that it would rely on advice of counsel as to the combination use patent issues only.*fn3

Alphapharm also forfeited any right to rely on the Kipnes opinion when it did not identify the document on a privilege log or otherwise in response to Takeda's June 2, 2004 request for production of documents. The request included a demand for all documents concerning any opinion or advice of counsel sought or obtained by the defendants concerning the validity of the '777 Patent. Alphapharm has not given any excuse for this omission. Such an omission is wrongful, and provides an independent basis for the suppression of the Kipnes opinion.

Essentially, Alphapharm made a unilateral decision to disregard the July 20 Order and its discovery obligations, and to grant itself a bifurcation of discovery. Alphapharm's conduct is vexatious and constitutes litigation misconduct.

Of course, the very concerns about delay, expense and prejudice which underlay the decision to deny the motions for bifurcation are resurrected by Alphapharm's attempt at this late date to reopen discovery. Even now, Alphapharm has made only the most limited and piecemeal disclosure of its privileged documents. Takeda would not be required to take this limited production at face value, but would be entitled to disclosure of all relevant documents and an opportunity to depose witnesses to test the bona fides of this reliance defense.*fn4

Alphapharm asserts that the Court's decision in January of this year, on the eve of trial summations, to take separate briefing on the issue of attorneys' fees following a ruling on the merits of the challenges to the '777 Patent was a decision to bifurcate discovery on the attorneys' fees issue. This argument is frivolous.*fn5 The briefing schedule for the attorneys' fees motion in 2006 did not vacate the July 2004 Order that discovery would not be bifurcated, and Alphapharm has pointed to nothing that was said during the trial that could lead to a good faith belief that discovery would be reopened. Indeed, the motion papers filed by Alphapharm's co-defendant Mylan in opposition to this motion for an award of attorneys' fees recognizes, as they must, that Mylan cannot rely on any advice of counsel it previously received but did not disclose in 2004.

The Kipnes opinion has, in any event, very little relevance to either prong of Takeda's motion. It was obtained at least nineteen months after Alphapharm made its decision to file its Paragraph IV certification. As reported by Alphapharm, that decision had been made by November 2, 2001, at the latest; it did not obtain the Kipnes opinion until July 2003.

Similarly, Alphapharm is not in a position to rely on any work done by Berkin. Berkin is a synthetic organic chemist, and Alphapharm moved at trial, successfully, to strike the testimony of Takeda expert Dr. James Hendrickson on the ground that a synthetic organic chemist is not qualified to opine on the selection of a lead compound for further pharmacological development. Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 03 Civ. 8253 (DLC), 2006 WL 83366 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006). As described in the Opinion, demonstrating that it would be obvious to select compound (b) as a lead compound was critical to Alphapharm's argument that the '777 Patent was invalid.*fn6 See Opinion at 375-80.

In sum, Alphapharm may not interpose an advice of counsel defense on the motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Indeed, its contention that it is entitled to do so is frivolous and vexatious.

B. Alphapharm's Paragraph IV Certification

Takeda contends that Alphapharm's January 29, 2004 Section 355 Statement was devoid of merit. Even as described in the Opinion, the Statement contained clear errors as well as arguments that Alphapharm abandoned by the time of trial. Opinion at 366-67. Viewed in its totality, Alphapharm's Section 355 Statement is so devoid of merit and so completely fails to establish a prima facie case of invalidity that it must be described as "baseless." When viewed in the context of the totality of this litigation, the filing strongly supports an award of attorneys' fees.

Despite the obvious deficiencies of its Section 355 Statement, Alphapharm points out that its Statement satisfied all of the "technical" requirements of the Hatch-Waxman Act and that it was supported by both an outside opinion of counsel and the work of three medicinal chemists and one synthetic organic chemist, and that it allowed Takeda to investigate Alphapharm's claims fully. Alphapharm misses the point. The question is not whether the Statement complied with the technical requirements of the Hatch-Waxman Act, but whether the Statement breached the duty of due care that is imposed on ANDA filers by the Hatch-Waxman Act and is so devoid of merit as to be baseless.

This prong of Takeda's motion rests principally on four contentions regarding the Statement. They will be addressed in turn.

1. Selection of Compound (b) as a Lead Compound and Motivation To Optimize It Through Modifications

Takeda contends that Alphapharm's Section 355 Statement does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would identify a compound, identified in the Opinion as compound (b), from Sohda II (one of the two writings the Statement identified as prior art) as a lead compound worthy of further investigation.*fn7 This contention requires some background.

Although Alphapharm's trial presentation was characterized by a constantly shifting set of arguments, Opinion at 372 n.37, the heart of its attack on the '777 Patent relied on the single contention that prior art compound (b) was a lead compound warranting further investigation or optimization, and that the application of two, obvious chemical processes (homologation and "walking the ring") to that compound would have led to the discovery of pioglitazone. Id. at 372. Thus, it was incumbent upon Alphapharm to explain in its Statement what in the prior art would have led one skilled in the art to identify compound (b) as a lead compound. For the reasons explained in detail in the Opinion, the evidence at trial showed that one skilled in the art would certainly not have concluded that compound (b) should be chosen as a lead compound over the many other more obvious or at the very least similarly interesting choices presented by that prior art. Indeed, Sohda II teaches away from compound (b) when it specifically comments on its negative effects on body weight and brown fat.

Opinion at 377.

Despite the centrality of compound (b) to Alphapharm's trial strategy, and the herculean efforts that its trial expert made to explain despite all the evidence to the contrary why Sohda II would lead one skilled in the art to identify compound (b) as a lead compound, see id. at 377-78, the Statement did not even make that argument.*fn8 The Statement focused instead on two other compounds described in Sohda II, which the Statement then misidentified, see id. at 36-67, as described below. As a consequence, Alphapharm's Statement did not grapple with the many impediments evident in Sohda II for choosing compound (b) as a lead compound. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Dr. Howard Rosenberg ("Rosenberg"), the head of Alphapharm's intellectual property department, a medicinal chemist, and an Alphapharm officer who assisted in formulating the Statement, admitted in his deposition that there was "nothing" to recommend compound (b) over several other compounds, and he only chose it as a lead compound "because it was similar to pioglitazone." Id. at 377. This is a stunning admission that Alphapharm worked backwards from pioglitazone's success to identify what it would contend was a "lead" compound, and relied exclusively on hindsight.*fn9

Alphapharm contends in opposition to this motion that Rosenberg did not impermissibly rely on hindsight, but explained in his deposition that compound (b) was identified by Alphapharm as a lead compound because the data presented in Sohda II showed that it was one of seven active compounds. It also asserts that Rosenberg only received the Statement in its final form after it had been filed. But, this analysis of the compound's activity did not appear in the Statement either. In any event, this iteration of Alphapharm's argument is also scientifically worthless.

Sohda II identified three compounds, and not compound (b), as having the most favorable performance. As for the seven compounds with the highest efficacy scores, six of the seven, including compound (b), were identified as having problems with either toxicity or side effects. See Opinion at 376. Sohda II simply does not support the selection of compound (b) as a lead compound. Moreover, whether Rosenberg saw the finalized Statement before its filing is quite beside the point since, as he admitted in his deposition, he "formulated" the opinion of invalidity on which Alphapharm's Statement was premised.

Alphapharm's Statement is similarly deficient in its explanation of why one skilled in the art would be motivated to modify compound (b) in a way that would lead to the discovery of pioglitazone. In making the argument that one skilled in the art would have learned from Sohda II that an ethyl and methyl are "equivalent with respect to biological activity on a closely related analog of pioglitazone," the Statement misidentified the compounds as having pyridyl rings at their left moeity, while they in fact had benzene rings.*fn10 Id. at 366-67. While Alphapharm in opposition to this motion asks this Court to find that this error was ...

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