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Bar-Ayal v. Time Warner Cable Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


October 16, 2006

SHLOMO BAR-AYAL, PLAINTIFF,
v.
TIME WARNER CABLE INC., DEFENDANT.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wood, U.S.D.J.

ORDER

I. Overview

Plaintiff Shlomo Bar-Ayal, individually and on behalf of a putative class, brings this action against defendant Time Warner Cable, Inc., to recover damages Plaintiff alleges he (and other class members) suffered as a result of what he claims to be Defendant's "unlawful practice of levying certain customers with additional charges above its itemized rate for cable television and Internet access services, and failing or refusing to refund those charges." Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant unlawfully collected from him and other similarly situated consumers "franchise fees" that amounted to five percent of all billed services provided by Defendant, including cable television services and Internet access, when Internet access services should not have been included in the calculation of the franchise fee. Defendant has moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, and has also moved, in the alternative, to dismiss to action. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration is granted.

II. Background

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Amended Class Action Complaint. Plaintiff, a resident of the State of New York and the County of New York, was and continues to be, from July 2001 through the present, a subscriber to Time Warner Cable*fn1 's cable television service as well as its Internet access service marketed under the "Road Runner" brand (hereinafter the "Road Runner Internet service"). For the period from July 2001 through March 2002, in its monthly billing, Defendant billed Plaintiff for cable television services and Internet access services, and added "franchise fees" amounting to five percent of all of those billed services.*fn2 In March 2002, the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") issued a declaratory ruling, holding that, for the purpose of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), a high-speed Internet access service offered through a cable system - i.e., a cable-modem service - is "properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service," and concluding that "revenue from cable modem service would not be included in the calculation of gross revenues from which the franchise fee ceiling is determined." In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, ¶ 7, ¶ 105 (2002) ("FCC 2002 Order").

Between March 2002 and June 2002, Defendant continued to collect from Plaintiff franchise fees equivalent to five percent of all billed services, including Internet access services. In June 2002, Defendant decreased the franchise fee charged to Plaintiff to an amount equivalent to five percent of billed cable television services. Defendant did not refund to Plaintiff the franchise fees in excess of five percent of billed cable television services that Defendant collected from Plaintiff until June 2002. Plaintiff alleges that, upon information and belief, Defendant similarly collected and did not refund such excess franchise fees to other subscribers in New York City and throughout the United States.

The class on whose behalf Plaintiff seeks to bring this action is comprised of "all persons who (i) subscribed to the Road Runner Service or any other Internet access service provided by Time Warner Cable and (ii) were assessed 'franchise fees' or other surcharges or taxes on total amounts billed for cable television services and Internet access services combined." Am. Compl. ¶ 8.*fn3

Based on the allegations described above, in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant for: violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 542; violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206; violation of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, reproduced at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note § 1101, and the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206; breach of contract; restitution; and deceptive practices in violation of New York's General Business Law § 349. Plaintiff asks that this action be certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and seeks, on behalf of himself and the class, damages on each of the counts alleged (as well as a declaration that Defendant has committed violations of the federal and state statutes as alleged), pre-judgment interest, and costs and expenses including attorneys' fees.

Defendant moves to stay proceedings and compel arbitration (and also moves, in the alternative, to dismiss the action).

III. Discussion

A. Issues as to Arbitrability -- Generally

"[T]he Federal Arbitration Act (the 'FAA') creates a 'body of federal substantive law of arbitrability' applicable to arbitration agreements . . . affecting interstate commerce." Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., Inc. v. Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).*fn4 Under Section 2 of the FAA, "[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract [or] transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. "Section 2 is 'a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements[.]'" Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24). The FAA "leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (emphasis in original).

However, "arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes -- but only those disputes - that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Thus, before compelling arbitration on the merits of a dispute, questions regarding whether a dispute is arbitrable must be addressed.

Problems of arbitrability usually arise in two contexts. First, and most commonly, this question arises when the issue is whether an arbitration clause in an existing . . . agreement covers a particular dispute between the parties. . . . The second type of arbitrability question deals, not with the scope of the arbitration clause, but with whether there is even a valid agreement to arbitrate in effect at a particular time. This question usually arises in one of two factual scenarios: (1) whether the parties ever entered into an arbitration agreement at all, and (2) whether an arbitration agreement has expired or been terminated.

Abram Landau Real Estate v. Bevona, 123 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). As to the question of whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate, a party may challenge either the entire contract in which the arbitration provision is included, or the arbitration provision -- or separate arbitration agreement -- itself. Moreover, as further discussed infra, in challenging a contract as a whole or the arbitration provision specifically, a party may argue that the contract or provision does not exist, or is otherwise not valid. "[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA]." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). See also Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 2003) ("It is clear that questions of contractual validity relating to the unconscionability of the underlying arbitration agreement must be resolved first, as a matter of state law, before compelling arbitration pursuant to the FAA.").

B. Parties' Claims as to Arbitrability

The parties primarily dispute two issues of arbitrability:

1) whether Plaintiff is bound by an arbitration provision included in a contract that Defendant claims Plaintiff accepted; and 2) whether, if Plaintiff is so bound, Plaintiff's claims in this action fall within the scope of that arbitration provision. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that, even if an agreement to arbitrate exists and it covers his claims in this action, the arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is unconscionable.

1. Claims Regarding Whether Plaintiff is Bound by Arbitration Provision

As to the first issue, Defendant argues that Plaintiff accepted and is bound by the arbitration provision of the subscription agreement for Defendant's cable-modem service (in effect in July 2001) (the "Customer Agreement"); the provision, at Section 13 of the Customer Agreement, states that, with some limited exceptions not relevant here,*fn5 "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or related to this agreement . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration commenced with one year[.]" Declaration of James An (in support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration), Director of Business Operations, High Speed Online Services, for Time Warner NY Cable Inc., dated March 23, 2004 ("First An Decl."), ¶ 10, and Exhibit 2 attached to First An Decl.*fn6 Defendant's argument that Plaintiff accepted and is bound by the Customer Agreement, including its arbitration provision, is based on the following claims: 1) Plaintiff installed Defendant's "Road Runner" Internet access service using a self-installation kit, which included a) a CD-ROM containing software that could be installed only if the subscriber clicked a button accepting the terms of the Customer Agreement (which was itself provided, in an electronic version, in the CD-ROM), and b) written materials including a "Getting Started Guide" with installation instructions, and a "Road Runner User Guide," which referred, respectively, to viewing, on screen, the "License Agreement" and "Software License Agreement" (which Defendant states are the same and included the Customer Agreement), Def. Mem. Compel 4, First An. Decl. ¶¶ 2-7; 2) Plaintiff affirmatively relied on the Customer Agreement in his original Complaint, by claiming a breach of contract, Def. Mem. Compel 4 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 1, 17); and 3) after Defendant's personnel made a service call at Plaintiff's home, Plaintiff signed a work order, dated November 12, 2003, which states, above the signature line, that the signature on the order indicates that the signatory has received and agreed to the terms of the Cable Modem Service Subscription Agreement, including Section 13 of the agreement providing for arbitration, Def. Mem. Compel 4, First An. Decl. ¶ 8.*fn7

Plaintiff claims, however, that he (and other class members) "did not knowingly assent to binding arbitration," Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel") 8. He argues that he is not bound by the arbitration agreement because he was not put on "clear notice" of it. Pl. Memo. Opp. To Motion to Compel 6. In particular, as to Defendant's argument regarding the loading of the CD-ROM, Plaintiff recognizes that, in 2001, he initiated his Road Runner Internet service by loading a "Road Runner High Speed Internet software kit," but declares that: he has "no recollection . . . of having seen, either in hard copy form or electronically, any 'subscription' or 'customer' agreement of the kind attached to [First An Decl. in Exhibits 2 and 6, discussed above]"; he "do[es] not recall in [his] review of the Road Runner guides that accompanied the kit any reference to a licensing agreement, which [he] allegedly had to accept as a precondition to executing the software"; and "had no idea that [his] rights vis a vis Time Warner were to be governed by an arbitration clause" and does "not recall ever having seen any notice advising [him] that [he] was compelled to arbitrate." Declaration of Shlomo Bar-Ayal, dated April 21, 2004, in further support of his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Pl. Decl.") ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 5.*fn8

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim of not having seen any "subscription" or "customer" agreement when loading the Road Runner software is "not credible." Def. Reply Mem. To Compel 2. Defendant states that, when an individual installs the Road Runner software with the CD-ROM provided to new cable-modem-service subscribers in July 2001, the individual is clearly notified of certain agreements, including the Customer Agreement, is repeatedly asked to indicate whether he or she accepts them, and is told that he or she cannot install the software if he or she does not accept the agreements. Def. Reply Mem. To Compel 2-3; Second Declaration of James An (in support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration), Director of Business Operations, High Speed Online Services, for Time Warner NY Cable Inc., dated April 23, 2004 ("Second An Decl.").*fn9 The process as described by Defendant will be further discussed infra. Plaintiff's counsel submitted, as a sur-reply in further opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration, a Declaration by co-counsel Harley J. Schnall, Esq., dated May 6, 2004 ("Schnall Decl.")*fn10 reporting on co-counsel's own experience when loading a copy of the Road Runner installation CD-ROM described in the Second An Declaration. The Schnall Declaration, which will be further discussed infra, points to issues regarding whether or not it would be clear to an individual loading the CD-ROM that he or she was accepting certain agreements, including an arbitration provision; ultimately, Plaintiff's counsel claims that, "[b]ased on [counsel's] own experience in loading the software package, assuming that it is the same package that the plaintiff allegedly loaded in 2001, it is apparent that plaintiff and members of his class were not on fair notice of the existence of an arbitration clause." Schnall Decl. ¶ 30.

Plaintiff's arguments as to whether he is bound by the arbitration provision in the Customer Agreement can be understood as a challenge either to the existence of the arbitration provision specifically, or to the existence of the overall Customer Agreement containing the arbitration provision at issue. Indeed, although Plaintiff's focus is on the arbitration provision, he also appears to be arguing, more generally, that he did not see, was not on clear notice of, and did not knowingly accept the Customer Agreement overall.

2. Scope of Arbitration Provision Plaintiff claims that, even if the agreement to arbitrate exists, it does not cover this dispute, because the latter involves the imposition of franchise fees.

3. Unconscionability Claims

Plaintiff argues that, even if the arbitration provision at issue is binding on him (and other class members), it should not be enforced because it is unconscionable under New York state law. Plaintiff claims both procedural and substantive unconscionability. As to the procedural element, Plaintiff contends that he lacked meaningful choice in his ability to purchase both cable and Internet services, such that Defendant could "dictate contract terms," and that there was a "significant disparity in bargaining power" between him and Defendant.*fn11 Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 12. Plaintiff also contends that the arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because: 1) it replaces the applicable statute of limitations, of three to six years, with a one-year limit for bringing claims; 2) it eliminates the right to a jury trial; 3) it eliminates pre-hearing discovery; 4) it eliminates the possibility of bringing class actions; and 5) it precludes actions in small-claims court, "mandating a costly arbitration process instead." Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 12.

C. Who Should Decide Arbitrability Issues

The first question that must be addressed is who should decide arbitrability issues -- this Court, or an arbitrator.*fn12

1. Relevant Law

"Under the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the general presumption is that the issue of arbitrability should be resolved by the courts." Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., 445 F.3d 121, 125 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)); accord Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005). Therefore, "the issue of arbitrability may only be referred to the arbitrator if there is clear and unmistakable evidence from the arbitration agreement, as construed by the relevant state law, that the parties intended that the question of arbitrability shall be decided by the arbitrator." Contec, 398 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original). Accord Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., 445 F.3d at 125 ("[T]he issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a matter is to be decided by the courts and not the arbitrators, 'unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.' AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649."); Abram Landau Real Estate, 123 F.3d at 72 ("When parties disagree about whether they ever entered into an arbitration agreement, a court decides that issue, absent a clear and unmistakable delegation of that authority to an arbitrator[;] [u]nder these circumstances, any silence or ambiguity about whether such a question is arbitrable reverses the usual presumption that issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.").

However, where a party challenges the validity of a contract (that includes an arbitration provision) as a whole -- rather than the validity of the arbitrator provision itself, or a separate arbitration agreement - the arbitrator must decide that issue. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (regarding a claim of fraudulent inducement of the entire contract)*fn13 ; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 1209 (2006) (noting that Prima Paint established that "unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance"). Thus, when a party argues that the entire contract (containing an arbitration provision) is unconscionable, the arbitrator must decide that claim. See JLM Indust., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Claims of unconscionability and adhesion contracts are similarly included within the Prima Paint rule.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

But "[t]he issue of the contract's validity is different from the issue of whether any agreement between the [parties] was ever concluded." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1208 n.1. The former question includes, for example, whether the contract was fraudulently induced, or whether the contract was rendered invalid by a usurious finance charge; the latter includes questions as to whether a party actually signed the contract, was authorized to sign it, or had the mental capacity to consent to it. Id. Thus, as suggested by this distinction made by the Buckeye Cashing Court, and as found by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit*fn14 , as well as judges in this district,*fn15 the Prima Paint rule does not apply to claims that a contract that includes an arbitration agreement does not, as a whole, exist.

Thus, absent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended that questions of arbitrability be resolved by arbitration, the court has two initial tasks when it is asked to compel arbitration and stay judicial proceedings pending the arbitration: "first, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate*fn16 ; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement." Genesco, 815 F.2d at 844 (citations omitted); accord Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co. L.P., 205 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2000).*fn17

"When contract formation is at issue in an FAA case, we generally apply state-law principles." Adams v. Suozzi, 433 F.3d 220, 227 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., 445 F.3d at 125 (stating that, where an arbitration agreement is at issue, "courts generally look to state law for guidance as they seek to ascertain the parties' intent"); Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co. L.P., 205 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) ("in deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter, courts should generally apply state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts").

2. Analysis

a. Whether There is "Clear and Unmistakable Evidence" that Arbitrability

Issues Should be Decided by Arbitrator As noted above, this Court should decide any claims challenging the existence (but not the "validity") of the contract containing the arbitration provision at issue, and any issues concerning the existence or validity of the arbitration clause specifically, as well as other issues concerning arbitrability, unless the Court finds that "there is clear and unmistakable evidence from the arbitration agreement, as construed by the relevant state law, that the parties intended that the question of arbitrability shall be decided by the arbitrator," Contec, 398 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).*fn18

In this case, the arbitration clause by which Defendant claims Plaintiff is bound states, in relevant part:

ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT (BUT NOT ANY CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OR THE THEFT OR OTHER UNAUTHORIZED RECEIPT OF ANY TIME WARNER CABLE SERVICE ON THE PART OF CUSTOMER) SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION COMMENCED WITHIN ONE YEAR UNDER THE THEN-CURRENT COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (OR ANY CONSUMER RULES ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION TO WHICH BOTH PARTIES AGREE), EXCEPT THAT EITHER PARTY MAY SEEK EQUITABLE OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ONLY IN AN APPROPRIATE COURT OF LAW OR EQUITY. . . . THE ARBITRABILITY OF DISPUTES SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR.

Section 13 of Customer Agreement, First An. Decl. Exh. 2.

The arbitration provision specifically refers the question of the "arbitrability of disputes" to the arbitrator. The "arbitrability of disputes" includes both questions as to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, and questions as to the scope of the arbitration provision and whether particular issues are covered by it. Moreover, the phrase encompasses questions as to the existence of the underlying contract as a whole, if such questions are raised in connection with the issue of arbitrability -- e.g., by a party claiming that he or she cannot be compelled to arbitrate because he or she did not enter into the Customer Agreement and therefore cannot be bound by its arbitration provision.

Furthermore, the arbitration provision incorporates, by reference, the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which in relevant part provide that "[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement," AAA Rule R-7(a).*fn19 American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (amended and effective September 15, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R7.*fn20 In Contec, the Court of Appeals found "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties intended that the question of arbitrability shall be decided by the arbitrator where the arbitration provision at issue stated that any controversy would be resolved by arbitration "in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association," 398 F.3d at 208; the Contec Court specifically referred to AAA Rule R-7(a). The Court held that when "parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator." Id. Accord Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., 445 F.3d at 126 (quoting Contec). Specifically, the Contec Court found that the incorporation of AAA Rule R-7a evidences an intent for the arbitrator to decide issues as to the existence of the contract (that includes the arbitration provision) as a whole; the issue in that case was whether the party seeking to compel arbitration had any rights under an agreement, signed by the other party, that included an arbitration provision, and the Court concluded that this issue must be decided by an arbitrator. See Contec, 398 F.3d at 211.

The Court concludes that the arbitration provision at issue here, both in its explicit language and its incorporation of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules, constitutes sufficiently clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to have issues of arbitrability decided by the arbitrator.

b. Whether Plaintiff Is Bound by Arbitration Provision of Customer Agreement

Plaintiff, however, contends that he (and other class members) "did not knowingly assent to binding arbitration" as set forth in the Customer Agreement. Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 8. Plaintiff's argument implies, more specifically, that Plaintiff and other class members did not intend to agree to have the issue of arbitrability itself decided by an arbitrator. Thus, this Court must engage in a further inquiry,*fn21 guided by principles of state contracts law. Cf. Contec, 398 F.3d at 209 (stating, as to the further question of whether a non-signatory to the agreement that included the arbitration clause could compel a signatory to arbitrate a dispute, that, "[i]n order to decide whether arbitration of arbitrability is appropriate, a court must first determine whether the parties have a sufficient relationship to each other and to the rights created under the agreement" -- and finding, in the circumstances of that case -- including the fact that the party seeking to avoid arbitration had signed the agreement that included the arbitration provision - that it was appropriate to refer the question of arbitrability to arbitration); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995) (finding, as to the question of whether a signatory to an agreement that included an arbitration provision could compel non-signatories to arbitrate a dispute, that, "[o]n the record before [the Court], [the signatory] cannot show that the [non-signatories] clearly agreed to have the arbitrators decide (i.e., to arbitrate) the question of arbitrability," because the fact that the non-signatories had filed, with the arbitrators, a written memorandum arguing that the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction over the dispute, did not evidence an intent for issues of arbitrability to be resolved by arbitration).

i. Relevant New York law*fn22

"'In determining whether a party entered into a binding contract, courts eschew the subjective and look to objective manifestations of intent as established by words and deeds.'" In re Rose BB, 752 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144, 300 A.D.2d 868, 869-870 (3d Dep't 2002) (quoting Ahlstrom Mach. v. Associated Airfreight, 708 N.Y.S.2d 497, 272 A.D.2d 739, 741 (3d Dep't 2000); further internal quotation marks, citation, and added emphasis omitted). See also Genesco, 815 F.2d at 845, 846 ("Under general contract principles a party is bound by the provisions of a contract that he signs, unless he can show special circumstances that would relieve him of such an obligation" and a court must "focus not on whether there was subjective agreement as to each clause in the contract, but on whether there was an objective agreement with respect to the entire contract"). "Consent to arbitrate cannot be given by inadvertence." Marek v. Alexander Laufer and Son, Inc., 257 A.D.2d 363, 364, 683 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (1st Dep't 1999). An arbitration agreement "must be clear, explicit and unequivocal and must not depend upon implication or subtlety." Waldron v. Goddess, 61 N.Y.2d 181, 183-84, 461 N.E.2d 273, 274, 473 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Miner v. Walden, 101 Misc.2d 814, 819, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (noting that "[a]n agreement to arbitrate has been held to be enforceable if it had been openly and fairly entered into" and "[t]he language whereby a party agrees to or is under a duty to arbitrate should be clear and unequivocal and the burden lies on the party seeking arbitration" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). However, an individual who signs or otherwise assents to a contract without reading it (despite having an opportunity to do so) is bound by that contract, including its arbitration provision. See Tsadilas v. Providian Nat. Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480, 13 A.D.3d 190, 190 (1st Dep't 2004) (finding that "[p]laintiff is bound by the arbitration provision even if she did not read it"); for contracts more broadly, see Peabody v. Northgate Ford, Inc., 794 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454, 16 A.D.3d 879, 880 (3d Dep't 2005); Waters v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, No. 117342/03, 9 Misc.3d 1126(A), 1126(A), 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 51795(U), 2, 2005 WL 2934822, at *2, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2459, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2005).

ii. Whether Plaintiff Accepted the Customer Agreement, Including its Arbitration Provision, In Loading the CD-ROM

As noted earlier, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim of not having seen the Customer Agreement when loading the Road Runner software is "not credible." Def. Reply Mem. To Compel 2. Defendant describes the loading process, and the information shown to the user as he or she loads the CD-ROM, as follows. The screen immediately following the "welcome" screen notifies the person installing the software that he or she will see two agreements on the screen -- the Broad Jump Software License Agreement and the Road Runner Agreement - and further states:

At the end of each agreement, please click on the Accept button if you agree to be bound by all of its terms, and if you over the age of eighteen. You may thereafter install and complete the Road Runner Self Installation according to those terms. If you do not agree to all of the terms of each agreement, click on the Decline button and do not install or use this CD-Rom. Please understand that if you do not click Accept on both the Broad Jump Software License Agreement and the Road Runner Agreement, you will not be able to install the software and complete the Road Runner Self-Installation.

Second An Decl. ¶ 6 & Exh. 2. If the individual clicks the "Accept" button on this screen, the following two screens provide, respectively, the "Software License Agreement" and the "Road Runner Agreement," which includes a reference to the "Customer Agreement" and other agreements that are part of the Road Runner Agreement; the installing individual is required to click "Accept" on each screen in order to continue. Second An Decl. ¶¶ 7,8 & Exhs. 3, 4; Exhibit C attached to Defendant's Letter Dated April 29, 2004 (showing full screen shots of agreement, as would appear to an individual if he or she fully scrolls down) ("April 29, 2004, Exh. C") (Screens 3 & 4). The following screen shows the "Customer Agreement," which includes Section 13 concerning arbitration. Second An Decl. ¶ 9 & Exh. 5; April 29, 2004, Exh. C (Screen 5). The following screens show the other parts of the Road Runner Agreement, including the "Acceptable Use Policy," the "Customer Privacy Notice," and the "Note About Multiple Connections"; again, the "Accept" button must be clicked on each screen to continue. Second An Decl. ¶ 10 & Exh. 6; April 29, 2004, Exh. C (Screens 6-8). The screen that then appears states:

I have had the opportunity to read and understand each any every term set forth in the Road Runner Agreement, including the terms of the Customer Agreement . . . . I understand that by clicking the Accept button below, I am agreeing to be bound by all of the terms and conditions detailed therein, as if I had written my signature to each of the agreements, including Section 13 of the Customer Agreement, which provides that the parties desire to resolve disputes relating to the Customer Agreement through arbitration, and that by agreeing to arbitration, I am giving up various rights, including the right to a jury trial.

If you agree, click on the Accept button and continue with the Road Runner Self Installation. If you do not accept these conditions, click on the Decline button. Thereafter, do not install or otherwise manipulate the software.

Second An Decl. ¶ 11 & Exh. 7. If an individual clicks "Accept," the software installation steps begin. Second An Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13 & Exh. 9.

Plaintiff's Sur-Reply, i.e., the Schnall Declaration, does not dispute the description of the screens noted above, nor that an individual installing the CD-ROM is required to click "Accept" in order to continue from one screen to the next. But the Sur-Reply points to a few specific issues. First, Plaintiff states that the navigation bar that appears at the bottom of each screen after the welcome screen provides operative buttons only for "Help," "Print," "Accept," and "Decline,"; the "Back" button is inoperative, Schnall Decl. ¶ 10; furthermore, the navigation bar is "static, such that one could inadvertently click 'Accept' before scrolling down to read the entire text or inadvertently click 'Accept' multiple times at once and miss a screen of text entirely," id. ¶ 13. Furthermore, in order to view the full text of the Customer Agreement, an individual must scroll through about 700 lines, Schnall Decl. ¶ 19; indeed, the full print-outs provided by Defendant for the Customer Agreement amount to 38 screens, April 29, 2004, Exh. C. To reach the arbitration provision at Section 13 of the Customer Agreement, an individual must scroll through about 30 screens (600 lines); the text of the arbitration provision is completely capitalized, but it is not "highlighted or set-off in another color or font." Schnall Decl. ¶¶ 19, 20. Moreover, the "Help" button is not always clear or, it seems, accurate: specifically, when "help" is clicked on the screen showing the Customer Agreement (Screen 5) and on the screen that asks for a final acceptance of the Road Runner Agreement (Screen 9), the message that pops up is entitled "Software license agreement" and states that "you must choose whether you do or do not accept the license agreement before you can proceed"). Schnall Decl. ¶¶ 8, 18, 29. Finally, Mr. Schnall argues that in certain instances the screens state policies or information that do not require acceptance, per se, yet an individual must click "Accept" to proceed, id. ¶ 22, 24, 26 (referring to the screens showing the Road Runner Acceptable Use Policy, the Customer Privacy Notice, and the Note About Multiple Connections); Mr. Schnall appears to claim, therefore, that this constituted another "ambiguit[y]" that "compounded the notice problem," id. ¶ 30.

Based on the above, and guided by New York state law, the Court concludes that Plaintiff, in installing the Road Runner software through a similar CD-ROM, accepted the terms of the Customer Agreement, including its arbitration provision (and including the latter's referral of arbitrability issues to the arbitrator). First, an individual who, like Plaintiff, used a Road Runner self-installation CD-ROM as described above would have been initially informed that, on the following screens, he or she would see certain agreements and that, "at the end of each agreement," he or she should click "accept" if he or she agreed to be bound by all of the terms of the agreements (and should click "decline," if not, in which case the individual would not be able to download the software), Second An Decl. Exh. 2; April 28, 2004, Exh. C (Screen 2 - no need to scroll down to see full text). The individual would then have been required to click "accept" eight times in order to install the software, including a final "accept" indicating that the individual "had the opportunity to read and understand each any every term set forth in the Road Runner Agreement, including the terms of the Customer Agreement" and "underst[oo]d that by clicking the Accept button below, [he or she was] agreeing to be bound by all of the terms and conditions detailed therein . . . including Section 13 of the Customer Agreement, which provides that the parties desire to resolve disputes relating to the Customer Agreement through arbitration," Second An Decl. Exh. 7; April 28, 2004, Exh. C (Screen 9 - no need to scroll down to see full text).

Furthermore, the Customer Agreement, including the arbitration provision - which was written in clear and unequivocal language - was available in full to the individual. It was not hidden or hard to find, but rather presented on the computer screen.*fn23 Although it is true that the individual would have had to scroll down through about 38 screens to read the Customer Agreement in its entirety (including 30 screens before reaching the arbitration provision), it is not significantly more arduous to scroll down to read an agreement on a computer screen than to turn the pages of a printed agreement; that an individual must go through multiple computer screens to read an agreement does not in and of itself mean that he should not be bound by his consent to the agreement as manifested by his clicking of the "accept" button. Furthermore, the agreement could be printed out if an individual found it necessary or helpful to do so; printed out, the agreement is about nine pages - not an extraordinary length. And the fact that an individual could click the "Accept" button without having to scroll down to the end of the agreement does not mean that an individual's clicking of the "accept" button is therefore inherently meaningless; indeed, an individual who signs or otherwise assents to a contract without reading it is bound by that contract, including its arbitration provision. See Tsadilas v. Providian Nat. Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480, 13 A.D.3d 190, 190 (1st Dep't 2004); Peabody v. Northgate Ford, Inc., 794 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454, 16 A.D.3d 879, 880 (3d Dep't 2005).

Moreover, the arbitration provision itself (including its statement concerning the resolution of arbitrability issues by the arbitrator) was not obscured but rather was the same size print as the rest of the agreement and written in all capitalized letters, thus standing out from the rest; Plaintiff's claim that the provision was not sufficiently visible is therefore unpersuasive. See Kimi Jewelers, Inc. v. Advance Burglar Alarm Systems, Inc., 555 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (1st Dep't 1990) ("We reject plaintiff's claim that the waiver provision was deeply and inconspicuously hidden in the agreement. It was set forth in the rather short agreement in the same size print as every other provision of the document and under the heading "LEGAL ACTION", so as to draw one's attention to it."); Edwards v. North American Van Lines, 513 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897, 129 A.D.2d 869, 870, (3d Dep't 1987) (finding it "evident that the arbitration clause was not hidden in the fine print of the contract" where "the front of the contract provides in bold print and larger type that the contract 'INCLUDES THE CONDITIONS PRINTED ON THE BACK HEREOF'" and the arbitration provision appears on the back of the contract, under the heading "in bold print and larger type . . . 'TIME OF FILING CLAIM FOR DAMAGES-ARBITRATION'"). And the question of whether the "help" feature was sufficiently informative - on which Plaintiff focuses - is not decisive, because the text in the main screens was sufficiently clear for an individual to understand that he or she was being asked if he or she accepted certain agreements provided in those main screens.*fn24

Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), on which Plaintiff primarily relies, is not to the contrary. In Specht, the plaintiffs downloaded a browser program called Netscape Communicator, as well as a "plug-in" program called SmartDownload; they brought claims against the defendants related to these programs, and defendants sought to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings. Id. at 21-23. All of the plaintiffs except for one downloaded and installed Communicator in connection with downloading SmartDownload. Id. at 22. These plaintiffs allegedly came upon a Netscape webpage with the caption "SmartDownload Communicator"; the page stated "Download With Confidence Using SmartDownload!," and featured, near the bottom of the screen, a "Start Download" prompt with a "tinted button labeled 'Download.'" Id. at 22. The plaintiffs clicked on the button and downloaded and installed SmartDownload, which then permitted them to download and install Communicator. When they downloaded Communicator from the Netscape website, the plaintiffs, upon initiating the installation of Communicator, "were automatically shown a scrollable text of that program's license agreement and were not permitted to complete the installation until they had clicked on a 'Yes' button to indicate that they accepted all the license terms." Id. at 21-22. The Court of Appeals noted:

This kind of online software license agreement has come to be known as "clickwrap" (by analogy to "shrinkwrap," used in the licensing of tangible forms of software sold in packages) because it "presents the user with a message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by clicking on an icon. The product cannot be obtained or used unless and until the icon is clicked."

Id. at 22 n.4 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). The Court stated that the plaintiffs "expressly agreed to Communicator's license terms by clicking 'Yes.'" Id. at 22. The Communicator license agreement contained an arbitration provision. Id.

The Court emphasized that "[t]he signal difference between downloading Communicator and downloading SmartDownload was that no clickwrap presentation accompanied the latter operation." Id. at 23. "The sole reference to SmartDownload's license terms on the 'SmartDownload Communicator' webpage was located in text that would have become visible to plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to the next screen": if, rather than simply clicking on the "Download" button to obtain SmartDownload, the plaintiffs had scrolled down, they would have seen text asking them to "review and agree to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload software license agreement before downloading and using the software."

Id. Plaintiffs averred, however, that they had not seen this. Id. After clicking on the "Download" button, moreover, "plaintiffs encountered no further information about the plug-in program or the existence of license terms governing its use."

Id. Furthermore, even if plaintiffs had scrolled down and seen the text noted above before downloading SmartDownload, "SmartDownload's license terms would not have been immediately displayed in the manner of Communicator's clickwrapped terms"; rather, a user would have had to click on the underlined text to be taken by hyperlink to a separate webpage, with yet another set of links, one of which would have taken the user to another webpage that contained the full text of a license agreement, which included an arbitration provision. Id. at 23-24.

Guided in part by relevant state law (in that case, California law), the Court of Appeals "h[e]ld that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs' position would not have known or learned, prior to acting on the invitation to download, of the reference to SmartDownload's license terms hidden below the 'Download' button on the next screen"; therefore, the Court "conclude[d] that under the circumstances here, plaintiff's downloading of SmartDownload did not constitute acceptance of defendants' license terms," including its arbitration provision. Id. at 35. See also id. at 32 (concluding that "in circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms" and finding therefore that "plaintiffs did not manifest assent to SmartDownload's license terms"). There was, however, no dispute between the parties that plaintiffs had accepted the Communicator licensing agreement (including its arbitration provision). Id. at 35.

In this case, the circumstances are more akin to those in Specht surrounding the Communicator license agreement than the SmartDownload agreement: individuals seeking to install the Road Runner Internet access service with a self-installation CD-ROM were "automatically shown a scrollable text of that program's . . . agreement[s] and were not permitted to complete the installation until they had clicked on a 'Yes' button to indicate that they accepted all the . . . terms." Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff did not simply happen upon a free download which made no easily visible reference to a binding agreement. Thus, Specht (even assuming it would apply here although it is based largely on California state law) does not suggest that Plaintiff failed to manifest his or her assent to the terms of the Customer Agreement; on the contrary, the analogies and rationale to be drawn from Specht indicate that Plaintiff, by installing the Road Runner software after presumably clicking "Accept" eight times (as he must have in order for the installation to proceed), agreed to the Customer Agreement, including its arbitration provision (and that provision's indication that arbitrability questions should be decided by the arbitrator). See also Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92, 293 A.D.2d 587, 587 (2d Dep't 2002) (finding that, where terms of agreement contained in defendant's software program were "prominently displayed on the program user's computer screen before the software could be installed" and "the program's user was required to indicate assent to the [agreement] by clicking on the "'I agree' icon before proceeding with the download of the software," "the defendant offered a contract that the plaintiff accepted by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure").

c. Scope of Arbitration Provision

For the reasons discussed above, the question of whether this action falls within the scope of the arbitration provision is also an issue for the arbitrator to decide.*fn25

d. Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that, even if the arbitration provision at issue is binding on him (and other class members), it should not be enforced because it is unconscionable under New York state law. This argument pertains to the validity of the arbitration provision (rather than to its existence, which has been discussed above). As noted at the outset, Plaintiff makes claims of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. As to the procedural element, Plaintiff contends that: Defendant was able to "dictate contract terms" because "upon information and belief, Time Warner has been able to function as a monopoly in the area of cable modem services"; Plaintiff lacked meaningful choice in his ability to purchase both cable and Internet services; there was a "significant disparity in bargaining power" between Plaintiff and Defendant; and Plaintiff was not put on notice of the Customer Agreement, including its arbitration provision.*fn26 Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 12. Plaintiff also contends that the arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because: 1) it replaces the applicable statute of limitations, of three to six years, with a one-year limit for bringing claims; 2) it eliminates the right to a jury trial; 3) it eliminates pre-hearing discovery; 4) it eliminates the possibility of bringing class actions; and 5) it precludes actions in small-claims court, "mandating a costly arbitration process instead." Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 12.

The Court must, again, first determine who must decide these claims of unconscionability. Plaintiff's procedural unconscionability argument, see Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 12, could be understood to pertain to the entire Customer Agreement. Cf. JLM Indust., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2004) (understanding the argument of the plaintiffs -- who argued that the arbitration provision in the standard form contract at issue should not be enforced -- to be that the entire contract, rather than only the arbitration clause, was a contract of adhesion, based on an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs stating that, because vessel owners "all use a standard form charter . . . 'every charterer has to accept arbitration or they will not be offered a ship'" and that therefore plaintiffs "'have no choice but to accept the arbitration clauses that are printed in the form contract'"). Although Plaintiff focuses only on the arbitration provision as being unconscionable, Plaintiff's allegations regarding Defendant's monopoly position, Plaintiff's lack of meaningful choice, the resulting disparity of power between the parties, and Defendant's ability to "dictate contract terms" -- as well as Plaintiff's argument of lack of notice concerning the Customer Agreement -- pertain to the Customer Agreement generally, rather than specifically to the arbitration clause. To the extent that Plaintiff's argument may be viewed as a challenge to the validity of the entire Customer Agreement, it must be decided by an arbitrator. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 1209 (2006); JLM Indust., Inc., 387 F.3d at 170.

Plaintiff's claims of procedural unconscionability could be understood, however, as pertaining specifically to the arbitration provision; furthermore, Plaintiff's claims of substantive unconscionability clearly pertain specifically to the arbitration clause. As such, these claims of unconscionability would generally be decided by a court. But, here, issues of arbitrability, including the validity of the arbitration agreement, have been referred to the arbitrator -- suggesting that the unconscionability claims should be decided by the arbitrator. A further question arises, however: can the provision referring arbitrability issues to an arbitrator be enforced if the arbitration clause is unconscionable? A defense of unconscionability may invalidate an arbitration agreement, Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); generally, "questions of contractual validity relating to the unconscionability of the underlying arbitration agreement must be resolved first, as a matter of state law, before compelling arbitration pursuant to the FAA," Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 2003). Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will address Plaintiff's unconscionability claims here.

Under New York law, "[a] determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made -- i.e., 'some showing of an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.'" Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d 824 (1988) (quoting Matter of State of New York v. Avco Fin. Serv., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 389, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 406 N.E.2d 1075 (1980); further internal quotation marks and citation omitted).*fn27 Accord Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 253, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (1st Dep't 1998). "The procedural element of unconscionability requires an examination of the contract formation process and the alleged lack of meaningful choice," focusing on factors such as "the size and commercial setting of the transaction, whether deceptive or high-pressured tactics were employed, the use of fine print in the contract, the experience and education of the party claiming unconscionability, and whether there was disparity in bargaining power." Gillman, 73 N.Y.2d at 10-11 (citations omitted). Ultimately, the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine "is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise, not to readjust the agreed allocation of the risks in the light of some perceived imbalance in the parties' bargaining power." Id. at 13-14 (citing Avco Fin. Serv., 50 N.Y.2d at 389). See also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent unfair surprise and oppression.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Court does not find the arbitration provision at issue here to be unconscionable. First, Plaintiff's argument regarding lack of adequate notice has already been discussed at length supra and been found to be without merit. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he could not obtain high-speed Internet service from another provider. "It does not avail plaintiff to argue that the arbitration provision is unconscionable without offering evidence that he could not have chosen another service provider," Ranieri v. Bell Atlantic Mobile, 304 A.D.2d 353, 354, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (1st Dep't 2003).*fn28 Finally, "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable," Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991), as Plaintiff himself recognizes, see Pl. Mem. Opp. Compel 12.

Plaintiff's claims of substantive unconscionability -- for which Plaintiff provides no legal support -- are unfounded. See 1) as to replacing the statute of limitations with a one-year limit: Blends, Inc. v. Schottland Mills, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 377, 379, 316 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (1st Dep't 1970) (upholding one-year period of limitation incorporated in arbitration clause), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 575, 272 N.E.2d 892, 324 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971); 2) as to eliminating the right to a jury trial: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (the fact that arbitration proceeding provides more limited discovery is not a ground for invalidating the arbitration agreement)*fn29 ; 3) as to eliminating pre-hearing discovery: Ciago v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 295 F. Supp. 2d 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (implicit waiver of jury trial does not invalidate an arbitration agreement); In re Ball (SFX Broadcasting Inc.), 236 A.D.2d 158, 162, 665 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (3d Dep't 1997) (finding that right to jury trial may be waived by consenting to arbitration)*fn30 ; 4) as to eliminating the possibility of bringing class actions: Tsadilas v. Providian Nat. Bank, 13 A.D.3d 190, 191, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1st Dep't 2004) (holding that "[t]he arbitration provision is enforceable even though it waives plaintiff's right to bring a class action" because "[u]nder New York law, 'a contractual proscription against class actions . . . is neither unconscionable nor violative of public policy'" (quoting Ranieri, 304 A.D.2d at 354)); 5) as to precluding actions in small-claims court and allegedly "mandating a costly arbitration process instead": Tsadilas, 13 A.D.3d at 191 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the arbitration agreement should be invalidated on the basis that it "exposes her to potentially unaffordable fees," because "'[t]he 'risk' that [plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement. To invalidate the agreement on that basis would undermine the 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"") (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000)).*fn31 Furthermore, none of (citing Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921)). these terms is "grossly one-sided," as Plaintiff claims, Pl. Mem. 11; they affect both parties.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant's motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. Any pending motions are moot.

SO ORDERED.


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