The opinion of the court was delivered by: Spatt, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This class action involves allegations by the Plaintiffs that the Defendants made misstatements and omissions and were engaged in market manipulation with respect to six public offerings. Presently before the Court are motions for final approval of the settlement and the award of attorneys' fees and expenses.
The detailed factual background of this dispute is set forth in the Court's decisions and orders, including the following: In re Sterling Foster & Co. Sec. Litig., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co. (In re Sterling Foster & Co.), 222 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); and the Second Circuit's August 13, 2003 decision, Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 340 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2003). Familiarity with the previous decisions is presumed.
On May 23, 2006, the Lead Plaintiffs and Defendants Michael Krasnoff, Nancy G. Shalek, Lasergate Systems, Inc., Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Stearns Securities Corp. and Richard Harriton (the "Bear Stearns Defendants") (collectively, the "Settling Defendants") executed a Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement ("Settlement Agreement"). On June 3, 2006, this Court entered an order certifying, for settlement purposes, the action as a class action for persons, entities, and their heirs, successors and assigns, who are members of the following subclasses:
(1) The Advanced Voice Subclass consisting of all purchasers of Advanced Voice Technologies, Inc. ("Advanced Voice") units (each unit consisting of one share of common stock and one Class A Redeemable Common Stock Purchase Warrant) during the period February 6, 1995 through October 8, 1996;
(2) The Com/Tech Subclass consisting of all purchasers of Com/Tech Communications Technologies, Inc. ("Com/Tech") common stock during the period August 23, 1995 through October 8, 1996;
(3) The Embryo Subclass consisting of all purchasers of Embryo Development Corporation common stock during the period November 17, 1995 through October 8, 1996;
(4) The Applewoods Subclass consisting of all purchasers of Applewoods, Inc. ("Applewoods") common stock during the period April 10, 1996 through October 8, 1996;
(5) The Lasergate Subclass consisting of all purchasers of Lasergate Systems Inc. ("Lasergate") units (each unit consisting of one share of common stock and two warrants to purchase common stock) during the period of October 17, 1994 through October 8, 1996;
(6) The ML Direct Subclass consisting of all purchasers of ML Direct, Inc. ("ML Direct") units (each unit consisting of two shares of common stock and one warrant) during the period September 3, 1996 through October 8, 1996; and
(7) The ML Direct Extended Subclass consisting of all purchasers of ML Direct Inc. units (each unit consisting of two shares of common stock and one warrant) during the period September 3, 1996 through December 31, 1996.
Following the Court's approval, counsel for the Lead Plaintiffs ("Lead Counsel") mailed 22,588 notices to the class members. One class member requested to be excluded from the class, and two class members previously excluded themselves from the class in response to the notice of pendency and partial settlement mailed to class members in 2002.
An objection to the Settlement Agreement has been filed by Leslie Trager, Esq. on behalf of Robert Levitt, Robert Rice, Stephen G. Siben, Stephen Strobehn, Stanley Veltkamp, Philip C. Vitanza, John T. White, Guy V. Wood, Carl Zander, Jr., and Ted M. and Kathryn Jones (the "Levitt Plaintiffs"). The Levitt Plaintiffs allege that the settlement does not meet the substantial fairness test. Specifically, they claim that: (1) the settlement amount is insufficient to compensate the Levitt Plaintiffs; (2) the Levitt Plaintiffs are likely to succeed at trial; and (3) LeslieTrager should be appointed new lead counsel.
The Settlement Agreement provides for a total cash settlement of $1,400,000 which will resolve all remaining claims that were not dismissed or settled pursuant to the 2002 partial settlement agreement. The 2002 partial settlement agreement provided for a cash settlement of $2,200,000 and Lead Counsel were awarded fees of 25% of that settlement amount. Lead Counsel presently request an attorneys' fee award of 25% of the settlement amount, which is the sum of$350,000. Lead Counsel also seek reimbursement of their litigation expenses in the amount of $85,935.37. Leslie Trager, the Levitt Plaintiffs' counsel, also seeks an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $200,000.
On October 27, 2006, this Court held a Fairness Hearing during which Lead Counsel, Leslie Trager, Esq. and Defendants' counsel had the opportunity to argue these issues and present evidence in support of their claims.
A. The Fairness of the Settlement Agreement
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that any settlement or dismissal of a class action be approved by the court. The district court must determine whether the settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of collusion." Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the court must "eschew any rubber stamp approval" yet "stop short of the detailed and thorough investigation that it would undertake if it were actually trying the case." City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974).
"A district court must review both the procedural and substantive fairness of a proposed settlement." Hicks v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ 10071, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24890, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005). The reasonableness of a settlement falls within the court's discretion. Joel A., 218 F.3d at 139.
The Second Circuit has identified nine factors (the "Grinnell factors") that courts should review to determine the substantive fairness of a settlement: (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages;
(6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 463.
In addition, courts should analyze the negotiating process in light of "the experience of counsel, the vigor with which the case was prosecuted, and the coercion or collusion that may have marred the negotiations themselves." Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). A strong presumption of fairness attaches to proposed settlements that have been ...