The opinion of the court was delivered by: Matsumoto, United States Magistrate Judge
On November 13, 2006, plaintiffs, members of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants ("APFA" or "Union Defendants") moved to renew their motion to compel production of the Bankruptcy Petition and First Day Motions that defendants American Airlines, Inc. and A.M.R. Corporation ("AA" or the "Company Defendants") prepared but did not file in April 2003. (See docket no. 148, Pltfs' 11/13/06 Ltr.) These discovery requests were part of a prior motion to compel by plaintiffs (docket no. 138), and were denied by the Court in an order dated October 20, 2006 (docket no. 146, "10/20/06 Order").*fn1 For the reasons stated herein and at the status conference on December 5, 2006, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion to renew its motion to compel.
Plaintiffs bring the instant lawsuit alleging that the defendants imposed a Restructuring Participation Agreement ("RPA") on American Airline's flight attendants without proper ratification by the union members in violation of, inter alia, the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188, and the duty of fair representation. The discovery requests at issue in plaintiffs' motion to renew are document request no. 29, which calls for "All petition(s) for relief under Title 11 of the United States Code AMR prepared between January 2000 and May 1, 2003" and document request no. 32, which calls for "All motion(s) or draft motion(s) AMR prepared to be filed with or shortly after the bankruptcy petition referred to in Request # 29." (See docket no. 148, Ex. A.) In its October 20, 2006 order, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion to compel production of these draft documents, finding, "based on the weight of legal authority cited in AA's opposition, that the draft bankruptcy petitions and motions sought by plaintiffs are protected by the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges and were prepared in anticipation of litigation." (10/20/06 Order at 11.)
In support of their motion to renew, plaintiffs assert that the "record . . . changed" after they received the report of AA's expert, Jerrold A. Glass, on October 31, 2006. (See Pltfs' 11/13/06 Ltr. at 1 and Ex. B to Pltfs' 11/13/06 Ltr., Expert Opinion of Jerrold A. Glass (the "Glass Report").) Plaintiffs argue that Glass, in his report, "speculates on what would have happened if the Company Defendants had filed for bankruptcy in March or April 2003," thus effecting a waiver of the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges applicable to the Bankruptcy Petition and First Day Motions. (Pltfs' 11/13/06 Ltr. at 1.) In their response to plaintiffs' motion (see docket no. 151, Defts. 11/16/06 Ltr.), the Company Defendants argue that plaintiffs' motion is time-barred, deny that Glass relied on any proposed drafts of AA's Bankruptcy Petition or First Day Motions, deny that Glass's expert report constitutes a waiver of privilege, and request an award of attorneys' fees and costs for opposing plaintiffs' motion.
I. Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Motion
Plaintiffs frame their submission as a "motion to renew" their prior motion to compel with respect to the Bankruptcy Petition and First Day Motions. Plaintiffs do not identify the rule of procedure under which they seek to bring their motion to renew. Presumably, because they have raised the matter before the magistrate judge, plaintiffs are seeking to invoke Local Civil Rule 6.3, which provides: "A notice of motion for reconsideration . . . of a court order determining a motion shall be served within ten (10) days after the entry of the court's determination of the original motion . . . . There shall be served with the notice of motion a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." Plaintiffs have not complied with Local Civil Rule 6.3's prescribed time limits, notice of motion and memorandum of law.
Had the plaintiffs timely brought their application before the district court judge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) would have applied. That Rule provides that:
Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's order [regarding a nondispositive matter], a party may serve and file objections to the order; a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made. The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiffs have expressly stated in their objections to specific aspects of the Court's October 20, 2006 order that they were not objecting to other aspects of the order. (See docket no. 147 at 16.)
In either case, the Court finds that plaintiffs' November 13, 2006 submission, whether considered as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 or an objection to the Court's order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), is not timely, because the motion was filed more than ten days after the Court's November 20, 2006 Order. Moreover, plaintiffs do not explain why they waited more than ten days after receiving the Company Defendants' expert report on October 31, 2006 to file their so-called motion to renew.
Even assuming that plaintiffs' motion was timely filed, however, the Court finds that defendants have not waived any of their previously asserted privileges with respect to the Bankruptcy Petition ...