The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kimba M. Wood, U.S.D.J.
Joseph M. Darcy ("Plaintiff") has filed a pro se complaint against his employer, the New York State Unified Court System, ("UCS") and a number of supervisors (collectively, the "Defendants"), alleging that his October 2002 transfer from a position on Staten Island to one in Brooklyn violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621--634; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290--301; the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8--107; and New York common law. On November 10, 2003, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman issued a Report and Recommendation (the "Report") on November 1, 2004, familiarity with which is assumed, recommending that the Court grant the portion of Defendants' motion to dismiss pertaining to his federal claims and hold in abeyance portions pertaining to state law, pending a possible motion to amend the Complaint to assert an additional federal claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report in its entirety.
Plaintiff has worked for UCS since May 12, 1977, almost exclusively in the criminal court system. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. In March 1998, Plaintiff requested and received a transfer from Brooklyn to Staten Island, where he worked as Deputy Chief Clerk. Compl. ¶ 17; Ex. K. In August of 2000, Plaintiff took a leave of absence following his hospitalization and diagnosis of systolic heart failure in its most severe form. Compl. ¶¶ 22--24. He remained on UCS's payroll throughout his hospitalization and recovery.
When Plaintiff returned to work on November 1, 2002, William Etheridge ("Etheridge"), Chief Clerk of the Criminal Court, asked him if he would resume work on an online manual for court clerks -- a project that he had worked on prior to his leave of absence. Compl. ¶¶ 24--25. Plaintiff, who was concerned about the amount of time the project would require him to work in Manhattan, agreed, provided that: (1) he would remain assigned to the court on Staten Island; (2) he would divide his work time between Manhattan and Staten Island; (3) all of his official records would be processed by the court on Staten Island; and (4) he would return to his prior duties on Staten Island when the project was complete. Comp. ¶¶ 25--26. Plaintiff finished the majority of his work on the project in October 2002. Compl. ¶ 30.
During the first week of October 2002, Etheridge gave Plaintiff permission to return to Staten Island full time.
Compl. ¶ 30. At that time, however, Etheridge informed Plaintiff that -- notwithstanding the conditions Plaintiff and Etheridge agreed upon -- he might be transferred to Brooklyn because of possible broader personnel reassignments. Compl. ¶ 30. Plaintiff was officially transferred to Brooklyn on October 28, 2002. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff alleges that although he was assigned to be the Supervisor of the Clerk's Office in Brooklyn, his responsibilities did not compare to those on Staten Island. Compl. ¶ 39.
On October 10, 2002, Plaintiff requested that he be transferred back to Staten Island; he argued that the daily commute to Brooklyn aggravated his heart condition and that a transfer would be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Compl. ¶ 33. On or about October 16, 2002, Plaintiff notified Etheridge and Kluger that, in his view, failing to respond to his request for a reasonable accommodation was a violation of federal antidiscrimination law and would constitute discrimination on the basis of disability and age. Compl. ¶ 34. Regardless, no one responded to Plaintiff's request. Compl. ¶ 33. On October 18, 2002, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Judge Joan Carey ("Carey"), Chief Administrative Judge of the New York City Courts, offering to accept a demotion if it meant he could return to Staten Island. Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that he received no response to this letter. Compl. ¶ 35.
On October 28, 2002, and November 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed two separate grievances with Carey's office regarding his transfer to Brooklyn, both of which UCS summarily denied. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40; Exs. N-P. Plaintiff's appeal of those denials was similarly unsuccessful. Compl. ¶ 42; Exh. S. On October 29, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Claim of Discriminatory Treatment with the UCS Office of the Special Inspector General for Bias Matters; it seems that the office did not issue a formal response to the claim. Compl. ¶ 44, Exh. T.
On January 27, 2003, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC").
Compl. ¶ 46; Exh. BB. On June 16, 2003, the EEOC informed him that, in its view, no evidence supported his claims of discrimination based on disability or age. Compl. ¶ 46; Exh. BB. Plaintiff received a transfer back to Staten Island on March 3, 2003, although he alleges that it was contingent upon accepting a position subordinate to a less senior Associate Court Clerk. Compl. ¶ 95. He initiated this lawsuit on September 9, 2003.
On November 10, 2003, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York, the UCS, and the supervisors in their official capacities; (2) individuals cannot be held personally liable under the ADA or the ADEA; (3) the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's pendent state and city law claims; (4) Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are moot; (5) Plaintiff has failed to state a New York State Human Rights Law claim; (6) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (7) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his contract claim; and (8) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for emotional distress.
Magistrate Judge Freeman recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA and ADEA claims and hold the portion directed toward Plaintiff's state-law claims in abeyance. ...