The opinion of the court was delivered by: A. Kathleen Tomlinson, Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff alleges that on August 22, 2002, she, along with seven other candidates, interviewed with the Riverhead Central School District for three available music positions. See Compl. ¶ 13. On August 26, 2002, Plaintiff was notified that she was not hired for any of the positions. See id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff alleges that the school failed to hire her because of her age and has brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, and NYS Executive Law § 296(6). See id. at ¶¶ 23-43.
On January 17, 2006 Defendants' served an amended Rule 26(a) disclosure, including a two-page Common Policy Declaration and Supplemental Declaration for the insurance policy maintained by the Riverhead Central School District through its former insurance carrier, Specialty National Insurance Company. At the September 20, 2006 status conference before me, Plaintiff's counsel advised that Defendants' insurance information was incomplete since they did not provide the actual policy for inspection or copying as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D).
I directed Defendants' counsel to produce the insurance policy no later than October 3, 2006. On September 29, 2006, Defendants' counsel filed a letter, with five pages attached, consisting of:
(i) a New York Schools Insurance Reciprocal (hereinafter "NYSIR") Premium Summary;
(ii) a NYSIR Coverage Summary;
(iii) a NYSIR Crime Coverage Quote for 2002-2003; and
(iv) a NYSIR 2002-2003 Proposal.
By letter motion dated October 15, 2006 Plaintiff's counsel stated that the September 29, 2006 production was merely a "premium summary" and not the subject insurance policy which I ordered Defendants to produce. Plaintiff's counsel moved for an order compelling Defendants to produce a copy of the insurance policy. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' repeated production of their coverage summaries is insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D). Plaintiffs' counsel adds that Defendants' conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions. DE  For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED.
A motion to compel is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court. American Savings Bank, FSB v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc., (In re Fitch, Inc.),330 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit has noted that this is because a "trial court enjoys wide discretion in it handling of pre-trial discovery, and its rulings with regard to discovery are reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah, (In re DG Acquisition Corp.), 151 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Cruden v. Bank of N.Y., 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir. 1992). A district court is considered to have abused its discretion "if it bases its ruling on a mistaken application of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact." Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D) provides that a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties, "for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Id. (emphasis supplied). As this Court has held, production of a copy of the actual policy is sufficient to satisfy Rule 26(a)(1)(D). See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., No. 03-CV-531, 2005 WL 1522783, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005). An inspection of the insurance ...