The opinion of the court was delivered by: Scullin, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
On May 10, 2004, Plaintiff Maxus Leasing Group, Inc. ("Maxus") filed its complaint alleging seven causes of action: (1) conversion against Defendant Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc. ("Wells Fargo"); (2) recovery of chattel against Defendants Wells Fargo and Brownell Steel, Inc. ("Brownell"); (3) breach of warranty of title against Defendants Kobelco America, Inc. and Kobelco Construction Machinery America LLC (collectively referred to as "Kobelco"); (4) fraud against Defendant Kobelco; (5) conspiracy against Defendant Kobelco; (6) unjust enrichment against Defendant Kobelco; and (7) conversion against Defendant Kobelco.
Currently before the Court are Defendants Wells Fargo and Brownell's motion for summary judgment, Defendant Kobelco's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff Maxus' cross-motion for summary judgment as to all claims.
The present dispute arises from a series of transactions involving two Kobelco cranes. In October 2000, Defendant Kobelco sold and delivered two Model CK 1000 crawler cranes to Defendant Syracuse Equipment Leasing Co., Inc. ("SELC") for $588,920.18 per crane.*fn1*fn2
On approximately May 10, 2001, Defendant Kobelco, claiming difficulty collecting payments from SELC, entered into another transaction regarding the same cranes. In this transaction, Plaintiff Maxus remitted $715,000 per crane to Defendant Kobelco. Defendant Kobelco applied Plaintiff Maxus' $1,430,000 payment to Defendant SELC's account, crediting entries for the two cranes and another piece of equipment.
By late 2001 and early 2002, Defendant SELC's financial situation was deteriorating, and it defaulted on all of its obligations concerning the two cranes. Defendant SELC filed for bankruptcy on April 22, 2002.*fn3
The nature of the transaction entered into between Defendant Kobelco and Plaintiff Maxus in May 2001 is the crux of this dispute. Plaintiff Maxus claims that it did not have knowledge of Defendant Kobelco's prior sale of the cranes to Defendant SELC and that it intended to purchase the cranes new from Defendant Kobelco in order that they could then lease them to Defendant SELC.
Defendant Kobelco sees the May 2001 transaction differently. Defendant Kobelco claims that it told Plaintiff Maxus that it had already sold the cranes to Defendant SELC and that Plaintiff Maxus, as a result of some business arrangement with Defendant SELC, had agreed to re-finance the cranes for Defendant SELC.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A district court will grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, the court must "'resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.'" Chan v. Gantner, 464 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
As an initial matter, with respect to Plaintiff Maxus' claims for conversion and recovery of chattel (Causes of Action 1 and 2), Defendants Kobelco, Wells Fargo, and Brownell contend that Plaintiff Maxus lacks standing to bring this action.
To complete the May 2001 transaction with Defendant Kobelco, Plaintiff Maxus needed to obtain financing from third parties. Therefore, Plaintiff Maxus obtained a "bridge loan" from First Merit Bank for $715,000 and assigned its security interest in the 61 crane as collateral. That crane was later reassigned to Plaintiff Maxus in March 2002.*fn4
Under New York law, assignment of a security interest passes all rights and interests to the assignee, including the right to seek delinquent payments or recover collateral. See Rockland Lease Funding Corp., Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. of N.Y., Inc., 245 A.D.2d 779, 779 (3d Dep't 1997) (citations omitted). A complete assignment, without qualification, cuts off the assignor's rights. See In re Stralem, 303 A.D.2d 120, 122-23 (2d Dep't 2003) (quotation and other citations omitted). Therefore, the assignor is no longer a real party in interest and lacks standing. See James McKinney & Son, Inc. v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 836, 838 (1984). However, a reassignment back to the assignor restores standing. Cf. Walsh v. Woarms, 109 A.D. 166, 168 (2d Dep't 1905).
Since the 61 crane was reassigned to Plaintiff Maxus in March 2002, the Court concludes that Maxus is a real party in interest with standing as to that crane.*fn5
C. Plaintiff Maxus' Conversion Claim Against Defendant Wells Fargo and Recovery of Chattel Claim Against Defendants Wells Fargo and Brownell
Plaintiff Maxus argues that, because it had a superior security interest in the 61 crane, Defendant Wells Fargo wrongfully repossessed the crane and sold it to Defendant Brownell.
In the time between the two transactions at issue in this case, Defendant SELC obtained a $2,540,000 loan from Defendant Wells Fargo on November 22, 2000. As collateral, Defendant SELC pledged the 61 crane and other equipment. Therefore, on November 22, 2000, Defendant Wells Fargo filed a UCC-1 financing statement attempting to designate the crane and other items as collateral. However, Defendant Wells Fargo omitted a zero in its filing, so that the serial number for the 61 crane incorrectly read GD02-0161 rather than the correct serial number GD0201061.
Following the May 2001 transaction between Plaintiff Maxus and Defendant Kobelco, and without conducting a UCC search, Plaintiff Maxus also attempted to create a security interest in the 61 crane. On May 29, 2001, Plaintiff Maxus filed a UCC-1 financing statement ...