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In re Comverse Technology

March 2, 2007

IN RE COMVERSE TECHNOLOGY, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garaufis, United States District Judge.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

By Memorandum and Order dated September 27, 2006 ("Judge Reyes's Order"), Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes selected Plaintiff Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund ("P&P"), represented by the law firm of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP ("Lerach Coughlin"), as lead plaintiff in this consolidated action under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). Plaintiffs The Menorah Insurance Co. Ltd. and Mivtachim Pension Funds Ltd. (collectively, the "Menorah Group"), represented by Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross LLP ("Pomerantz Haudek"), object to this decision pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), and ask this court to vacate Judge Reyes's Order and appoint the Menorah Group lead plaintiff. The court has considered thoroughly Judge Reyes's Order, the Menorah Group's objections, P&P's response, and the arguments advanced by the parties at oral argument on January 5, 2007.

For the reasons set forth below, the court VACATES Judge Reyes's Order, and APPOINTS the Menorah Group and Pomerantz Haudek to lead this consolidated action.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the allegedly unlawful granting of stock options by Comverse Technology, Inc. ("Comverse") to its senior executives. On March 14, 2006, Comverse announced the creation of a special committee of its Board of Directors to review matters relating to the company's stock option grants. (Caifa Complaint, No. 06 Civ. 1825 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2006), Docket Entry No. 1, ¶ 36.) On April 17, 2006, Comverse announced that it would be restating its financial results for fiscal years 2001 through 2005, due to the backdating of stock option grants during that period. (Id. ¶ 38.) On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff Anthony Caifa filed a class action private securities complaint against Comverse alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t, and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder. (Id. ¶¶ 45-53.)

In the ensuing months, three members of the plaintiff class moved the court to be appointed lead plaintiff in the consolidated private securities action, 06-CV-1825, under the PSLRA. P&P moved to be appointed lead plaintiff and to have its counsel, Lerach Coughlin, appointed lead counsel. The Menorah Group moved to be appointed lead plaintiff and to have its counsel, Pomerantz Haudek, appointed lead counsel. And Leumi-Pia Trust Fund Management Co. Ltd. ("Leumi-Pia") and Doris, Jacques, and Roger Gould ("the Goulds") moved to be appointed lead plaintiffs, and to have their respective counsel, Labaton Sucharow & Fudoff LLP and Paskowitz & Associates ("Labaton/Paskowitz"), appointed co-lead counsel.

Pursuant to Rule 72(a), this court referred the motions to Magistrate Judge Reyes for a decision. (Order dated August 16, 2006, at 2.) After briefing and oral argument, Judge Reyes issued a Memorandum and Order on September 27, 2006, appointing P&P to lead this consolidated action.*fn1 The Menorah Group has objected to Judge Reyes's Order and asks this court to vacate that decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district court can refer a nondispositive pretrial matter to a magistrate judge for a decision. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Under that same Rule, "a party may serve and file objections to the order" within "10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's order." Id. The Menorah Group timely objected to Judge Reyes's Order on October 12, 2006.

If a party objects to a magistrate judge's order in a nondispositive pretrial matter, "[t]he district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (the "judge of the court may reconsider any [nondispositive] pretrial matter . . . where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.").

A magistrate judge's findings may be considered "clearly erroneous" where "'on the entire evidence,' the [district court] is 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). An order is contrary to law "when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure." Ri Sau Kuen Chan v. NYU Downtown Hosp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16751, at **9-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing and quoting Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 2006 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Procedure under the PSLRA

In his order, Judge Reyes properly delineated the procedure for appointing a lead plaintiff under the PSLRA. The PSLRA requires that the court select "the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be the most capable of adequately representing the interest of class members." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(I). In making that determination, the statute designates three rebuttable presumptions that guide the court's effort to identify the most adequate plaintiff. Id. Courts routinely consider each of those presumptions in turn.

Under the first presumption, the most adequate plaintiff is the plaintiff "that filed the complaint or timely made a motion in response to a notice [under Section 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(I)]."

Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(I). Since all three competing plaintiffs timely filed complaints or motions in this case, the court proceeds to consider the second presumption.

The second presumption provides that the plaintiff who, "in the determination of the court, has the 'largest financial interest' in the relief sought by the class" is considered the most adequate class representative. A class member who meets this requirement is presumptively the lead plaintiff, subject to rebuttal from other class members that the presumptive lead plaintiff "will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" or "is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class." Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)(aa)-(bb). The decision in this case turns on the court's determination of which plaintiff has the "largest financial interest" in the relief sought by the class.

The PSLRA does not specify the method of calculating which plaintiff has the "largest financial interest." Courts have typically considered the following four factors, known as the "Olsten-Lax" factors, to determine who has the greatest financial interest:

(1) the number of shares purchased during the class period;

(2) the net number of shares purchased during the class period (i.e., shares purchased during and retained at ...


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