Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Shine

March 13, 2007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
v.
VALENTINO SHINE, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge

DECISION AND ORDER

This case was referred to the undersigned by the Hon. William M. Skretny, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), for all pretrial matters and to hear and report upon dispositive motions.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The defendant, Valentino Shine ("the defendant"), is charged in a multi-count indictment with having violated Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 1 and 2) and §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (Count 3). (Docket #18). He has filed an omnibus discovery motion wherein he seeks: (1) an audibility hearing; (2) "disclosure of the identities of all government informants;" (3) "discovery and/or production of items" pursuant to Rule 16, Fed. R. Crim. P.; (4) "production of Brady material;" (5) "disclosure of evidence pursuant to Rules 404(b), 608 and 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence;" (6) "disclosure of witness statements;" (7) "preservation of rough notes and other evidence;" (8) "pre-trial production of government summaries;" (9) "disclosure of grand jury transcripts;" (10) permission to file "other motions." (Docket #30). The defendant also seeks orders allowing defense counsel to actively participate in voir dire and to "voir dire government experts outside the presence of the jury." (Docket #30).

The government has filed its response to these requests of the defendant. (Docket #31).

Each one of the defendant's requests will be separately addressed herein.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

1. Defendant's Request For An Audibility Hearing

The government advises that it "intends to offer at trial both audio and video recordings at trial" and asserts "that all the recordings are audible." (Docket #31, ¶ 4). Therefore, the defendant's motion in this regard is DENIED without prejudice with the right to reapply for such relief after the tapes in question have been reviewed and it is determined that there is an audibility issue that needs to be resolved by this Court. As part of this process, counsel for the government is hereby directed to identify those tapes that the government plans on using at the trial of the defendant and to have transcripts of those tape recordings prepared. Once such transcripts have been prepared, counsel for the government shall supply copies of the designated tapes and respective transcripts to counsel for the defendant. Counsel for the defendant is hereby directed to review the aforesaid tapes and transcripts after receipt of same, and upon completion of such review, make known to counsel for the government those portions of the aforesaid tapes and transcripts that counsel for the defendant claims are inaudible or, in the alternative, inaccurately transcribed. Thereafter, counsel for the government and the defendant are directed to confer for the purpose of resolving any disputes that may exist as to audibility of the tapes in question and the correctness of the transcripts of such tapes. Should the attorneys be unable to resolve any such disputes that may exist, counsel for the defendant may file a motion for an audibility hearing, which motion must be filed and served within ten days after the last conference between the attorneys seeking to resolve such issues.

2. Disclosure Of All Government Informants

The defendant seeks the "disclosure of the names, addresses and criminal records of all informants utilized by the government in the investigation of this case." In addition, the defendant seeks "all evidence affecting the issue of bias and credibility." (Docket #30, p. 5).

In response, the government states that "in keeping with the local rules of this district, the government will provide the defendant with the names of potential witness (sic) in their (sic) memorandum to the court." (Docket #31, ¶ 7).

The defendant has failed to sufficiently state a basis for requiring the disclosure of this information or "that the testimony of the informant would [be] of even marginal value to the defendant's case." As a result, the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1988) is dispositive of this request by the defendant wherein the Court stated:

The leading Supreme Court case on this question, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), holds that [w]here the disclosure of an informant's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to the fair determination of a cause, the [informant's] privilege must give way.

353 U.S. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. The Court explained that "no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable." Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628. What is required is "balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense." Id. Whether non-disclosure is erroneous "must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." Id. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534-35, 84 S.Ct. 825, 829, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964); United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350, 1359 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 1924, 36 L.Ed.2d 409 (1973).

The defendant is generally able to establish a right to disclosure "where the informant is a key witness or participant in the crime charged, someone whose testimony would be significant in determining guilt or innocence." United States v. Russotti, 746 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Roberts, 388 F.2d 646, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1968); see United States v. Price, 783 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Barnes, 486 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1973). In Roberts, the informant introduced an undercover agent to the defendant and was present when the defendant and the agent negotiated and transacted two sales of heroin. The Court, noting that the informant was "present during all the significant events," 388 F.2d at 649, found that he was "obviously a crucial witness to the alleged narcotics transactions," id., and therefore, his whereabouts should have been revealed to the defense if properly requested. But disclosure of the identify or address of a confidential informant is not required unless the informant's testimony is shown to be material to the defense. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 870-81, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3448, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (dictum); United States v. Lila, 699 F.2d at 105. As this Court's recent opinion in United States v. Jiminez, 789 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1986) makes clear, it is not sufficient to show that the informant was a participant in and witness to the crime charged. In Jimenez, the informant was both participant and witness, but the district court's refusal to order disclosure of his identity was upheld on the ground that the defendant had failed to show that the testimony of the informant "would have been of even marginal value to the defendant's case. 789 F.2d at 170."

Id. at 1073; see also United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 324 (2d Cir. 1997).

Since the defendant has not made a sufficient showing that any informant's potential testimony is material to his ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.