The opinion of the court was delivered by: Matsumoto, United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before the court is a request dated January 26, 2007 from defendant City of New York for an order compelling plaintiff to produce the witness statements of Sandra Britt, Jessica Wright, Tremain Kirby,*fn1 Deval Robinson and Nigel George. (See Dkt. 45, City's Motion to Compel, dated January 26, 2007 ("City's 1/26/07 Motion"), at 1.) On February 8, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (dkt. 47, "Plaintiff's Opp."), and the City replied on February 15, 2007 (dkt. 51) and submitted an additional letter on February 26, 2007 (dkt. 53). On March 9, 2007, the Court ordered plaintiff, by March 13, 2007, to submit the witness statements for in camera review. Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the documents in camera, the Court hereby grants the City's motion for the reasons stated herein.
Plaintiff in this action, Carolyn Lopez, individually and as administrator of the estate of her son, Carlos Lopez, seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the common law claims of negligence and respondeat superior for the alleged wrongful death of her son. (See dkt. 1, Verified Complaint, dated August 1, 2005, at Counts I-VII.) Plaintiff alleges that on the afternoon of May 1, 2003, New York City police officers, after hearing gunshots, misidentified Carlos Lopez as the shooter, shot him without probable cause, and thereafter refused to provide him with emergency medical treatment before he died. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-2.)
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), plaintiff served the City its Initial Disclosures on January 9, 2006 and listed Anthony Kirby, Sandra Britt, Jessica Wright, Deval Robinson and Tremain Kirby as individuals "likely to have discoverable information related to this action," but did not provide the addresses or telephone numbers of the witnesses as provided by Rule(a)(1)(A). Nor did plaintiff indicate that she possessed statements by the witnesses. (Dkt. 47, Plaintiff's Opp. at 6.) On January 23, 2006, the City served plaintiff its First Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests. (See City's 1/26/07 Motion, Ex. B.) Interrogatory No. 2 requested that plaintiff identify "all statements, signed or unsigned, recorded on tape electronically or otherwise, made by the City of New York . . . or of any other person with knowledge regarding or concerning any matters alleged in the complaint, taken by, or on behalf of, or in the possession of, plaintiff or her counsel." (Id.) Over two months later, plaintiff responded on April 4, 2006, that she "was aware of several statements taken in connection with this case that are protected by the attorney work product privilege as they were taken in anticipation of litigation . . . . A privilege log is being prepared for those documents protected by the attorney work product privilege." (Id., Ex. C.)
After ongoing efforts by defendant to obtain plaintiff's responses to its document requests failed, on August 10, 2006, the City moved to compel plaintiff to respond to its Request for the Production of Documents. (Dkt. 36) The Court granted the motion and ordered plaintiff to produce documents by August 22, 2006, cautioning, "[S]hould [plaintiff] fail to comply with this order, she may be subject to sanctions, including but not limited to a recommendation that the case be dismissed." (Order dated 8/18/06.)
Plaintiff responded to the City's document requests by August 22, 2006, but again failed to include a privilege log. On October 18, 2006, the City wrote to plaintiff's counsel requesting, inter alia: (1) information regarding the subject matter of the potential testimony of the five witnesses identified in her Initial Disclosures; (2) the witnesses' contact information; and (3) a privilege log. (See City's 11/27/06 Motion, Ex. C.) The City repeated its requests on November 27, 2006. (See id., Ex. D.) Having received no answer, the City filed a second motion to compel on November 27, 2006 (dkt. 43.), to which the Court ordered plaintiff to respond (see Order dated 11/28/06).
On November 30, 2006, plaintiff provided the City with contact information for the five previously identified witnesses, the subject matter of their potential testimony, and a privilege log. (See City's 1/26/07 Motion, Ex. A.) The privilege log lists a total of five items, each stating, "Statement by [name of one of the five witnesses] to investigator, dated [interview date]." (Id.) The interview dates reveal that four of the five witnesses were interviewed in June, 2005 -- two months before plaintiff filed her compliant on August 2, 2005. (See id.) The City now seeks an order compelling the production of the witness statements, asserting that plaintiff failed to establish the basis for the attorney work product privilege and waived its protection, and that the City's need for the statements overcomes any applicable privilege. (See City's 1/26/07 Motion at 3-5.)
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the witness statements are protected by the attorney work product privilege. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides, "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . ." Rule 26(b)(3) further provides, [A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials . . . and . . . is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering the discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative . . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Because plaintiff's witness statements were "secured by an investigator working at the behest of plaintiff's counsel" and prepared "in anticipation of litigation" (dkt. 47, Plaintiff's Opp. at 1), the Court finds that the statements qualify as attorney work product. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) ("It is . . . necessary that the [work product] doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself."); United States v. Aldman, 134 F.3d 194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (according work product protection to documents that "would not have been prepared but for the prospect of that litigation"). The Court also notes, however, that because the documents are simply verbatim statements of each witnesses' recollection of the events of May 1, 2003, and do not contain any attorney mental impressions, conclusions, or thought processes, they are accorded a lower degree of protection. See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04 Civ.5316, 2007 WL 54588, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007) ("We do note that work-product immunity is a qualified protection, and that Rule 26(b)(3) authorizes disclosure -- at least of materials that do not include the 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney' . . . ."); Abdell v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8453, 2006 WL 2664313, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2006) (finding "'[c]ore' work product [consisting of attorney mental impressions] . . . subject to more stringent protection" than work product consisting merely of facts); cf. In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. C2 04 575, 2007 WL 495150, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007) (finding documents "squarely covered by the work product doctrine since they represent [the attorneys'] legal analysis, opinions, and mental impressions concerning the issues investigated.").
Despite the fact that the witness statements qualify for at least minimal work product protection, plaintiff has waived that protection by repeatedly failing to (1) sufficiently assert the basis for the privilege; and (2) timely produce a privilege log. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) provides,
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.
Likewise, Local Rule 26.2 directs that parties asserting privilege shall disclose the type of document, general subject matter of the document, date, and any other information "sufficient to identify the document for a subpoena duces tecum, including . . . the author of the document, the addressees of the document . . . and the ...