Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Gadson v. Long Island Jewish Hospital

March 21, 2007

THERESA GADSON, PLAINTIFF,
v.
LONG ISLAND JEWISH HOSPITAL, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garaufis, United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Theresa Gadson ("Plaintiff" or "Gadson") filed this employment discrimination action against Long Island Jewish Medical Center s/h/a Long Island Jewish Hospital ("Defendant" or "LIJH") on October 7, 2005, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. (Compl. at 1.) LIJH now moves to dismiss Gadson's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) For the reasons set forth below, LIJH's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and Affidavits are accepted as true for the purpose of resolving this motion to dismiss. See Jaghory v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). Gadson is an African-American woman. During a three-year period beginning in March 2003, Gadson repeatedly sought employment with LIJH without any success. Her applications were not acknowledged by LIJH, while individuals of "Island Descent" (a term used, but not defined, by Gadson) and family members of employees of LIJH were "being considered."

On or about August 30, 2005, Gadson obtained a right to sue letter from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") based on her allegation that LIJH had failed to hire her because of her race. The EEOC was unable to conclude that Gadson's information established a violation of the federal anti-discrimination statutes, and it closed its investigation of the case. However, the EEOC was unable to conclude that LIJH was in compliance with those statutes.

Subsequently, on or about September 28, 2005, Gadson commenced the instant proceeding against LIJH, alleging that LIJH's failure to hire her was based on her race and national origin. (Compl. ¶ 7.) LIJH moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Motions to Dismiss

When deciding a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must read the complaint liberally, assume that the allegations in the complaint are true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 197-198 (2d Cir. 2001). A motion to dismiss will be granted if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Thus, a court must consider not whether a plaintiff will ultimately succeed, but whether he or she is "entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996). Court papers that may be considered when evaluating a motion to dismiss include any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit and any statements or documents incorporated in the complaint by reference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

B. Employment Discrimination Cases

The Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff asserting an employment discrimination claim need not plead facts establishing each element of a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss, but rather must merely allege facts sufficient to satisfy the notice pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). That is, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need provide only a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2); see also Braphman-Bines v. N.Y. City Police Dep't., No. 03 Civ 10207 (KMK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26416, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) ("Under Swierkiewicz, Rule 8 pleading is extremely permissive.").

Even under this the liberal pleading standard, however, it must be clear from a complaint "what adverse employment action or actions serve as the basis for [a plaintiff's] . . . discrimination claim [thereby] giving fair notice in [the] complaint of the grounds upon which [a] claim that those actions were discriminatory rests." Galvez v. N.Y. Mortg. Co. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.