The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge
Plaintiff Leslie Johnson ("Johnson") brings this action against Smarte Carte, Inc. ("Smarte Carte"), Talx UCM Services, UC Express (SM), and two employees of Smarte Carte, Amdey Hammoudeh and Manny Aureus, (collectively, "defendants") alleging employment discrimination on the basis of his race and/or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., ("Title VII"), and a state law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (an "IIED" claim).
Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted as to plaintiff's IIED claim and denied as to the remaining claims.
The facts are drawn from the complaint, plaintiff's supporting materials, and documents from the administrative complaint filed by plaintiff that were attached as exhibits to defendants' motion. The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiff Johnson worked at Smarte Carte as a cart pusher from December 1996 until his termination on March 31, 2003. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 10.) On June 5, 2003, Johnson filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYDHR") alleging that defendants discriminated against and terminated him because he was a Black man of Jamaican national origin (hereinafter, the "NYDHR Complaint"). (Rich Aff. Ex. 1.) The first paragraph of the two-page NYDHR Complaint lists Johnson's residence as 466 Lincoln Street, Brooklyn, New York. (Id.) The second page of the NYDHR Complaint is signed by Johnson. (Id.)
In February 2004, the NYDHR dismissed the NYDHR Complaint. Subsequently, on April 12, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") adopted the findings of the NYDHR dismissing plaintiff's complaint and issued a right-to-sue letter; the letter stated that Johnson could continue pursuit of his Title VII claims by filing a private lawsuit but that such a lawsuit must be filed within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. (Rich Aff. Ex. 4.) The right-to-sue letter was signed by the EEOC Director, and indicated that the "Date Mailed" was April 12, 2004. (Id.) All notice regarding the NYDHR and EEOC actions discussed above, including the right-to-sue letter, were mailed to the address for Johnson listed on the NYDHR Complaint: 466 Lincoln Street in Brooklyn, New York. (See Rich Aff. Exs. 1-3.)
Over eight months after the right-to-sue letter was mailed, on December 21, 2004, Johnson filed a complaint in this Court, alleging that defendants harassed and, ultimately, terminated him because of his race and national origin. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) The most recent act of misconduct by defendants is alleged to have occurred on March 31, 2003, the date of Johnson's termination. According to the complaint filed in this action, Johnson has "always lived" at 466 Lynwood Street, Brooklyn, New York, and not, as listed in the NYDHR Complaint, at 466 Lincoln Street, in Brooklyn, New York. (Johnson Aff. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff contends that he gave the correct address to the NYDHR investigator but "did not read [the NYDHR Complaint] very carefully, and  just signed it." (Johnson Aff. ¶ 1.)
On January 1, 2007, defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Oral argument was held on defendants' motion on February 23, 2007. Following argument, the parties submitted additional letter briefs to the Court.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The standards for summary judgment are well-settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may not grant a motion for summary judgment unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 2006). The moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). The court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (summary judgment is unwarranted if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party").